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ABSTRACT 
Introduction: By the late 1980s, Uganda’s health system had been devastated by two decades of 
conflict and mismanagement. At the same time, public-funded and run health systems had 
begun to be viewed as inefficient and undesirable. Uganda’s attempt to rehabilitate its destroyed 
health infrastructure was blocked by donors in favour of reform. Introduced as pre-conditions of 
aid, market-based health sector reforms (HSRs) were eventually embraced by the government of 
Uganda as part of the wider globalized free-market policy to provide market solutions to health 
sector problems. The reforms were driven by ideology; they were untested and not based on 
evidence. 
Theoretical framework: The research develops a conceptual framework for critical analysis of 
HSRs as a policy of the free-market system, and uses policy analysis framework of Hogwood 
and Gunn, which starts from policy agenda setting and ends with policy maintenance, 
succession or termination. Where a policy fails or becomes irrelevant, it is succeeded by another 
policy and terminated.  It also employs Raskin et al’s transition-and-trend prediction of the 
future; that uncontrolled free-market capitalism is hungry for markets, resources and 
investment opportunities with dire consequences of social polarization, terrorism, 
environmental degradation, climate change and breakdown of welfare, such as health care. Two 
possible scenario options are predicted: either to reform the free-market policy or develop a new 
civilization.
Aim and objectives: The aim of the study was to explore the implications of market-based 
health sector reforms in Uganda for the development of sustainable health systems. The 
objectives were to 1) analyse the genesis, formulation and implementation of HSRs in Uganda; 
2) to evaluate the performance of the health sector under HSRs; 3) to evaluate HSRs collectively 
and individually; and 4) recommend a framework for sustainable health systems. 
Methods: Four main methods were used in the study: a) Several evaluation studies of HSRs in 
Uganda were done. Ugandan studies were done in thirteen pilot health reform project districts. 
Evaluation studies included several separate thematic sub-studies. Most studies employed 
interviews, focus-group discussions, and structured observation; b) A study was done to 
compare Uganda’s reform with those in other countries under a bi-country study and through a 
review of multi-country studies; c) Systematic reviews and analyses of various household and 
health-facility surveys were carried out; and d) A sub-district health systems survey was carried 
out to assess health system inputs, functions, outcomes and efficiency.    
Results: Health indicators stagnated or deteriorated during the period under study. Only slight 
improvements have occurred recently but are associated factors outside the health sector. Of the 
twenty reforms, only two achieved success: setting up private facilities and community-based 
distribution of health commodities. Eight failed to achieve individual objectives (user-fees, 
pricing of health care, defining and implementing an essential health package, hospital 
autonomy, decentralization, contracting out, sector wide approaches, and restructuring of 
ministry of health). Seven reforms were not sustainable or feasible (revolving drug funds, 
prepayment schemes, social-health insurance, income generation for health care, payment 
incentives, hospital trusts and autonomy or privatization of National Medical Stores).  Three 
reforms were found to undermine health sector objectives, especially that of equity (user-fees, 
privatization, and decentralization). Factors complicating HSRs include aid, macroeconomic 
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policy, policy on economic growth, corruption, inadequate internal management capacity, and 
ad hoc nature of reforms in general. 
Discussion: The failure of market-based HSRs to achieve collective and individual objectives in 
Uganda is a trend also documented in other countries. The characteristics of a good health 
system (such as equity, solidarity, evidence-based decisions, government leadership and control, 
and regulation) cannot be achieved through privatization and market forces. Moreover, HSRs 
are linked to a much wider and entrenched socio-economic global system established and 
driven by free-market capitalism. Health systems crises cannot therefore be addressed 
independently of the wider global economic order. Either there has to be policy reform within 
the prevailing framework of the free-market, focussed on addressing perpetual crises as they 
emerge, or a new world order based on different values has to be defined and the human society 
has embark on the path of a new civilization. It is envisioned that only when the values upon 
which the free-market is based (such as materialism, winner-takes-it-all, individualism, and 
domination of others) are replaced with other values (such as equity, solidarity, mutual 
existence, and shared responsibility), will there be a suitable environment for sustainable and 
equitable health systems development.  
Conclusions, lessons and recommendations: The health system crisis in Uganda is due to free-
market policy, introduced through and driven by donor aid and its poor management. It was 
also due to poor leadership and governance in Uganda. Market-based approaches need close 
control and regulation to protect social welfare and the environment.  To address the crisis 
caused by HSRs, Uganda requires counter-reforms in the economy, health policy, social services, 
leadership and governance. But globally, the market has to be controlled in favour of human 
development, peaceful coexistence and sustainable use of resources. Ultimately, a new 
civilization in which the market is fully controlled and is not the mechanism for health service 
delivery needs to be established.  
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SUMMARIES AND UPDATES OF PUBLICATIONS
Paper I 
This paper highlights the important role played by donors and donor agents, using the leverage 
of aid, to influence and determine health policy for Uganda. The paper uses two examples of 
user-fees and drug policy. User-fees were introduced as one of the conditions for securing a 
World Bank loan for a health project. Danida used its funding of essential drugs in Uganda as 
leverage to introduce a drug policy, the National Drug Authority, and to make the National 
Medical Stores (NMS) autonomous. The paper points out problems of inadequate national 
capacity and the erosion of national sovereignty in policy process. The reduced sovereignty led 
to NGOs operating micro-policies of their own, largely unchecked, and thus impairing the 
development of one national strategic policy direction, which was to be led by the Government. 
An earlier conclusion of this paper was that policy has to be owned by the country, not just by 
the government. An emerging qualification of this ownership is that it must be democratic. 
Paper II  
Based on a comparative study of the successful enrolment in primary school under the 
Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme and PHC, paper II assesses key health sector 
performance under HSRs. The indicators show stagnation or deterioration, in spite of 10 or so 
years of HSRs. Lessons from education were that political support and stewardship, free access, 
better funding, and few, direct objectives made UPE successful. The paper discusses and 
evaluates HSRs, and concludes that they failed both in their individual and collective objectives.  
A question has been posed by a reviewer of this paper: Why is there a difference in ownership 
between UPE and HSRs? This hits at the core of this paper.  UPE was internally conceived and 
developed; and HSR was imposed from outside.  UPE was developed by the GoU at a time 
when privatization of social services had begun to lose appeal at the World Bank and so its 
funding from the Bank was readily granted.  But the 10-year health sector rehabilitation plan 
that the MOH developed earlier had been rejected by the Bank in favour of the Bank’s own pre-
packaged market-based HSR.  This has never been owned by the population and has remained 
controversial today.    Uganda’s own health policy, which is largely unimplemented, shows that 
the country’s intentions were clearly different from the reforms.  
Paper III  
The paper compares vertical and holistic forms of decentralization between Zambia and 
Uganda, respectively. In Zambia, purchaser-provider split was made in the MOH, with part of it 
becoming “provider” another part remaining “purchaser”. Organizational and management 
changes were made up to the village level. Improvements were made in planning, financial 
management, prioritization, procurement, monitoring, supervision and donor coordination. In 
Uganda, all ministries including the MOH were restructured and service delivery was 
decentralized. Organizational changes were made at central, district, facility and community 
levels. Changes were made in the functions of local agencies, as in Zambia. But in both 
countries, these changes did not improve health service delivery. On the contrary, the quality, 
immunization coverage, equity and access to health care worsened. In addition, there was lack 
of support for national priority programmes at local levels. The support from the centre to 
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districts, especially supervision, dropped significantly as a result of reduced funding to the 
centre. The local level capacity for many activities was grossly inadequate.  
The paper concludes that decentralization on its own fails to improve health services. Holistic 
decentralization is good for integration of the health sector into the overall development and is 
more likely to be sustainable. But vertical decentralization is good for focusing on health and for 
giving priority to the health sector. However, it is difficult to be used for integration and 
sustainability of the health sector. The statement “HSR is more sustainable in Uganda because it 
is rooted in the wider political structure” requires a qualification.  First, with the benefit of 
hindsight, it is clear that HSRs tied to decentralization were pre-packaged from outside and 
imposed through aid.  But it is true decentralization in Uganda started as a successful 
homegrown programme.  However, the policy has now become so politicized and dysfunctional 
that a new conclusion can be drawn:  even a successful homegrown reform that is mismanaged 
cannot deliver. 
Paper IV  
Focusing on the impact of extreme economic policy measures on the health sector, this paper 
argues that Uganda is pursuing a market economy which is to be export-oriented and driven by 
private-sector investment. This, it is argued, requires macro-economic stability. Uganda has thus 
adopted drastic measures supposedly to maintain macro-economic stability. Public expenditure 
on social services, especially on health-care has been kept minimal. Hospital funding, for 
example, has capped since 1990’s under is the so-called Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF). Ceilings have been set arbitrarily on all social services without due regard to the 
continuing deterioration of these services. External aid targeting social services have been 
rejected supposedly because this will upset macro-economic stability. It is argued that Uganda’s 
economic policy is too drastic and yet not based on evidence. World experience shows that a 
country can maintain a healthy economic growth, whilst improving social services.  
The reason for denying aid for essential services to the poor is not based on evidence and is 
flawed. The paper includes the warning that unfettered market economy in Uganda is the cause 
of deterioration of social services. It is recommended that the Government study the example of 
UK’s public intervention in improving welfare, and the focus on health and education pursued 
by Asian Tiger countries as part of their fast-tracked economic growth. Uganda is advised to 
consider all interconnected factors, which include speed of economic growth, social welfare, 
work ethic, tradable and exportable commodities, and social values. Finally a warning is given 
that an economic model largely supporting investors and multinationals while marginalizing 
the majority of the local population is a recipe for social and political instability that could lead 
to violence. Alternative economic strategies to address tensions between economic growth and 
social welfare involve the empowerment of the local population in economic production leading 
to sustainable and peaceful economic growth. 
Paper V  
This paper argues that HSRs have been implemented in Uganda for almost 20 years but they 
have failed to achieve their objectives. They were imposed as conditions for aid, not through 
careful analysis and consultation with stakeholders. The reform packages were similar across 
countries with widely varied socio-economic and political circumstances. The effects of the 
reforms have been the reduction of access to health care, increase of inequity, reduction in health 
status, and no improvements in the quality and efficiency of health services. Those who support 
these reforms provide partisan and misleading interpretation of the performance of the health 
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sector under HSRs. They usually use life-expectancy and output indicators, without linking 
these to the specific health-sector goals and objectives.  
The paper concludes that market principles are good for business and economic growth, but not 
for sustainable human development, including health care. Sustainable HSR must be largely 
non-market oriented, based on solidarity, and linked to health sector goals and objectives. 
Health services will only improve with increased funding from internal sources or from external 
aid that is not conditional on free market policies or other restrictions. Even in a poor country, 
effort must be made at the outset towards universal coverage with targets and a framework for 
implementation.  Economic policy should be oriented to support welfare and human 
development.  A number of poor countries have been able to achieve universal social welfare – 
Cuba, Costa Rica, Kerala of India, Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka, among others. They have 
also experienced remarkable economic growth. 
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SUB-THEMES OF PUBLICATIONS 
The five thesis papers assess HSRs and cover a wide range of sub-themes. Most of these had 
originally been dealt with as single topics, with no or incomplete links to each other, without 
providing the bigger picture of the free-market economy, and how this affects health systems 
development. The sub-themes covered by the papers include: 
Paper I: External influence on health policy 
1. Health financing and especially the role of user-fees in setting the reform agenda 
2. The role of aid in leveraging reforms 
3. The freedom enjoyed by NGOs to set up parallel policy environment in the absence of 
effective oversight by the host government 
4. The lack of national capacity to understand the nature of market reforms and to respond 
appropriately  
5. The erosion of national sovereignty and the lack of ownership of the reforms 
Paper II: Inappropriateness of market-based priority setting 
6. The overemphasis on priority-setting and its elaborate tools, but without any significant 
practical application or usefulness 
7. Development is much more than just economic growth; the overemphasis on economic 
growth at the expense of social development 
8. Achievements of the health sector despite the reform problems 
Paper III: The failure of ideology-based decentralization 
9. Evaluation of the health sector: the failure of the HSR and the health sector 
10.  Excessive, politically driven decentralization, largely unrelated to and often working 
against health sector objectives and HSD 
Paper IV: The destruction of health services as a result of free-market policies  
11. How free-market principles are driving global capitalism or globalization, whose 
objectives run counter to health sector objectives 
12. The near destruction of hospital services in Uganda under the guise of controlling cost 
explosion or trying to attain efficiency 
Paper V: One-size-fits-all reform policy and dishonesty about reform results 
13. The uniformity of market reform around the world, regardless of the local circumstances 
14. The highly partisan, selective and often dishonest interpretation of the results of HSRs 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Definition and origin  
Health Sector Reforms (HSRs) have been applied worldwide over the past three decades. The 
term “reform” has become increasingly popular, being used to cover incremental and structural 
changes in policy and institutions. Reforms are concerned with defining priorities, refining 
policies and changing the institutions through which the policies are implemented (Cassels, 
1995). HSRs were inspired by the neo-liberal ideology as a result of political, economic, historical 
and cultural pressures and changes. The reforms were meant to address genuine health sector 
problems that had emerged (Eriksson et al, 2001). 
Initial efforts for health reform were undertaken in Europe. In Western Europe, where welfare-
state countries provided universal health care, funded from tax or social insurance, new issues 
began to be noticed. The primary pressure was the demographic change, mainly with aging 
populations. This brought about changes in health care needs and demands. There was the 
increased burden of chronic illnesses and mental problems. Technologies for diagnosis and 
treatment also improved greatly, raising expectations for high quality services. There were also 
increased waiting times for diagnosis and treatment (Abel-Smith, 1994). Specifically the demand 
for shorter waiting-times was a key driver in United Kingdom to reform their National Health 
Services (NHS).  
In Eastern Europe, especially in the republics of the former Soviet Union, the economies were 
being restructured from centrally planned to market economies. As a consequence, there was a 
sharp decline in health sector budgets. In addition, state funding of the health sector was 
severely skewed towards hospitals and curative care, taking 70% of the entire health care budget 
(McKee and McPake, 2004). There were also changing patterns of disease, and greater 
opportunities for better medical interventions from improved technologies. Medical training 
was highly hospital-centred and the health system provided limited alternative forms of health 
care outside the hospital. Health planning was bureaucratic and centralized, and most 
stakeholders especially patients had little opportunity to participate. 
In Africa and Asia, following the oil crisis of 1970s and the ensuing macroeconomic instability, 
there were drastic declines in external aid and thus in health budgets. Health infrastructure 
started to deteriorate, and supplies were reduced and became unpredictable. Then the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic started, devastating populations and putting enormous pressure on health 
systems that were already falling apart. The increase of infectious diseases and public health 
problems soared with the emergence and re-emergence of TB and other diseases associated with 
HIV/AIDS. As public health facilities deteriorated, private sector provision of health care 
increased in proportion (Bloom and Standing, 2001) especially in Asia.  
All these pressures on health systems around the world were to be “cured” by free-market 
reforms. A central theme of HSRs is to reduce public spending to improve the efficiency of 
health services. “Efficiency” is the subject of the neo-liberal economic theory. The theory is that 
competition and financial rewards (incentives) tied to performance are superior in improving 
productivity, efficiency and quality, relative to a comprehensive state-owned and funded health 
care provision. Thus, concepts of purchaser-provider split, internal or quasi markets, managed 
competition, and performance-linked remuneration were at the core of these reforms. 
HSRs led the African Inter-Country Meeting in 1995 to re-define HSR as 
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a sustained process of fundamental change in policy and institutional arrangements, based on 
scientific evidence, guided by the government, and designed to improve the functioning and 
performance of the health sector and ultimately the health status of the population (WHO, 1997).  
The group emphasized “evidence-based”. But this ideal definition defers significantly from the 
HSRs in use and in practice, which is the orientation of health care systems to be market-based, 
because of the blind belief that markets are efficient and are the best mechanism for managing 
society, including health systems (Helms, 1993).  
1.2 The problem  
Twenty years ago, Uganda came out of a war that left a great deal of the health care 
infrastructure destroyed and the health system dysfunctional. The government of Uganda 
(GoU) made an elaborate ten-year plan to rehabilitate the destroyed health infrastructure. But 
donors advised GoU that no major rehabilitation of the health infrastructure be carried out. The 
donors, who were supposedly assisting Uganda, had determined that what Uganda needed was 
a “major reform of the tertiary sector”– the hospital sector (World Bank, 1994 ). 
A key reform measure was to orient health services to Primary Health Care (PHC), which was 
interpreted to mean preventive and promotional services, leaving out curative care for 
individuals to buy from the private-sector (World Bank, 1993;1994 ). The vast majority of poor 
people requiring hospital care would be left to fend for themselves because hospitals “required 
costly investments” which the government could presumably not afford (GoU 2004). This meant 
that the public financing of hospitals would be capped or even reduced, and that public 
hospitals would possibly be privatized.  
As time went by, more contents of what came to be known as Health Sector Reforms (HSRs) 
were revealed. A number of reform rationales were particularly at odds with the reality on the 
ground. For example, the reason to introduce user-fees in public facilities was given as “the 
willingness of the poor to pay for health services” (Akin et al 1985), and because about 70% of all 
health financing in the country was out of pocket (Hutchison, 1998). Some reform measures 
seemed plausible and potentially useful; for example, the essential health package concept.  
The GoU unquestioningly embraced all these reforms. When the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) took over power Uganda in 1986, it inherited a severely fractured but still somewhat 
working health system. But there was a high possibility at that point for a quick turnaround in 
the decline in health services through the NRM’s ten-point programme, which embraced 
economic as well as social development (Paper I). But in a dramatic change of policy within a 
few years of assuming office, the NRM, embraced the free-market policy. This was perhaps a 
necessary change in line with the prevailing global economic order. Over time however, the 
NRM government pursued an aggressive economic growth policy paying less attention to social 
services (Paper IV). Health services and especially hospitals were the most affected. The 
government developed an extreme doctrine out the free-market policy, where top politicians 
often openly said “Seek ye the kingdom of economic growth and everything shall be given unto 
you” (Matsiko, 2007). 
And yet, in 1960s, Uganda had one of the best net-work of public rural hospitals and health 
centres in sub-Saharan Africa, supported by health inspectors and health visitors (Paper I). 
Health care was available, predictable and free (i.e. funded entirely from taxes), and easily 
accessible through a good network of roads and railways. Health inspectors promoted home 
and personal hygiene, mosquito spraying to control malaria, and a programme of immunization 
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for children. They ensured each homestead had a latrine. Health visitors (nurses or midwives) 
advised expectant mothers about birth risks and families about the health of young children. 
Safe water sources were provided in most areas. Food storage and reserves were encouraged to 
mitigate famines and food shortages. Nutrition centres were established around the country to 
cater for acute childhood malnutrition, which was rampant. These measures ensured that within 
30 years (1940 – 1970), infant mortality was reduced by two-thirds, from ~300 per 1000 to 120 per 
1000. 
But prior to the market reforms, Uganda’s health system had been devastated by civil conflict, 
mismanagement and economic crises. At the same time, the health-system models that had been 
used in Uganda became inappropriate. These included high-tech, hospital-based, PHC and 
market-based models. Most poor countries had similar experiences. The word “reform” gives 
the impression of changing something fundamentally for the better. But health sector reforms 
became synonymous with market orientation of health systems. Often it was doubtful whether 
indeed some health sector problems such as inequity could ever be addressed by market 
interventions. 
Market principles and approaches are ordinarily used for generating private wealth. But they 
were stretched to apply to health care and other social services. Donors used aid to introduce 
HSRs, but largely denied the use of aid for straightforward interventions such as rehabilitation 
of health care infrastructure, buying drugs and equipment, and paying health workers. Instead 
much funding and effort was devoted to suspicious sounding reforms such as autonomy, 
privatization, and contracting (Papers II and IV).  HSRs were unquestioningly embraced by 
political and finance ministry leaders who believed that market-based reforms were the best 
way of improving the economy, including the national health system. The reforms were 
ideologically defined and driven as a policy. They were introduced as untested interventions, 
not based on evidence. And there was great doubt and resistance among the medical 
professional community, and the general public about the viability and usefulness of HSRs, 
particularly about free-market interventions solving health sector problems and hence 
improving health services (Paper I). Therefore, the reforms required evaluation and analysis. 
1.3 Research question
What are the implications of market-based health sector reforms for sustainable and equitable 
health systems development in Uganda? 
1.4 Role of the researcher / author 
I was head of the health policy analysis unit and policy advisor to the MoH from 1998 - 2003.  
My analytical curiosity was heightened when I started teaching health policy and health 
economics to master degree students at Makerere University (and later Uganda Christian and 
Uganda Martyrs Universities) from 1997. Research carried out or commissioned by my unit was 
meant to help me advise the government. But over time, the inconsistencies and contradictions 
between health policies preferred by donors on one hand and by MoH based on the realities on 
the ground on other hand became overwhelming. I became the punching bag between donors 
and the government. I was also head of health sector reform project under which all HSRs were 
introduced, formulated and implemented from 1995 - 2000. I commissioned, supervised or 
carried out over 50 feasibility and evaluative studies on HSRs. The five thesis publications 
derive from these studies. I wrote most research reports and the accompanying policy briefs. I 
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also remained responsible for presenting research findings and defending policy 
recommendations arising from the research in the MoH and the GoU at large. 
1.5 Study aims and objectives 
The aim of the study was to explore the implications of market-based health sector reforms in 
Uganda for the development of sustainable and equitable health systems. 
The study objectives were: 
1. To analyse the genesis, formulation and implementation of market based HSRs in 
Uganda. 
2. To evaluate the performance of the health sector over the period in which HSRs were 
introduced and implemented in Uganda 
3. To evaluate the  health sector reforms collectively and individually, and 
4. To recommend a framework for a sustainable health system. 
1.6 Thesis cover 
The thesis cover links the five papers with the same theme of health reforms. It also serves to 
update the papers and to draw collective conclusions and lessons which no single on its own 
would be able to achieve. Based on the conclusions and lessons the cover also provides a chapter 
on recommendations. The thesis cover is not a stand-alone paper but part of the whole thesis 
and should be read together with the five papers.  
The cover sets out to achieve the following specific objectives:  
1. to create one coherent picture of health sector reforms in Uganda as part of global health 
reforms and as part of the global market economy 
2. to provide the results of the discussion and analysis done in especially papers IV and V  
It does not repeat the findings which are already in the five papers. But it summarises 
them to gain an overall picture 
3. to present an updated literature review, which provides literature background to the 
subject of health sector reforms as well as findings from literature search to answer 
specific questions as a methodology  
4. to describe in detail the methodologies used in all the studies on which the five papers 
are based 
5. to draw collective and overall conclusions and lessons from the different papers, and to 
6. to make recommendations based on the conclusions and lessons for  achieving  
sustainable and equitable health system in Uganda 
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2.0 THEORY AND ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Policy analysis 
The thesis is based on two theoretical approaches: theory of policy analysis and projection of 
future global trends and scenarios.  
In policy analysis, HSRs are seen collectively as a policy. Policy has been defined as a set of 
interrelated decisions taken by political actors or groups of actors concerning social goals and 
the means of achieving them (Walt, 1994). Hogwood and Gunn (1984) argue that “policy” is a 
course of action pursued by political actors. Anderson (1975) defines policy as a purposive 
course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of 
social concern. By policy analysis one seeks to find out how policies are made, who the actors 
are, and whether a policy has achieved its objectives, and should be maintained or replaced. A 
useful policy analysis framework is both descriptive (how policies are made) and prescriptive 
(how polices should be made) (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).   
Policy analysis approach employed in the HSR study has several purposes as below. This is 
illustrated in figure 1. 
Policy Content: The approach aims to assess the origins, intentions and operation of specific 
policies and areas.  Such studies of policies help to inform policy-makers.  
Policy Process:  The concern here is with how policies are actually made in terms of the actions 
taken by various actors at each stage.  This can consist of individual case studies or attempts to 
devise generalizable but largely descriptive propositions about the nature of public policy-
making. This thesis has done both: several studies were carried out and generalized conclusions 
were drawn from the findings.  
Policy outputs: Studies of outputs from policy typically seek to establish the determinants of the 
pattern of distribution of expenditure or other indicators of policy outputs.  Such studies often 
involve statistical analysis with a number of variables relating to economic, social, and political 
characteristics. This has been achieved through these studies. 
Policy evaluation: Evaluation studies seek to assess specific policies in terms of the extent to 
which their outcomes have achieved the objectives of the policy.  Evaluation studies can be 
descriptive to improve our understanding of the factors which shape policy, as well as 
providing information which can be used in future policy-making. Much of the HSR is actually 
a policy evaluation study. 
Information for policy-making: This refers to the collection and analysis of data with the specific 
purpose of aiding a policy decision or advising on the implications of alternative policies.  Such 
analysis differs from ‘content’ studies in that it is explicitly designed to contribute to policy-
making. Many of these HSR studies were originally done to aid policy making.  
Process advocacy: The analyst is here concerned not simply to understand the policy-making 
process but to change it – usually in terms of somehow making it more ‘rational’.  This often 
involves putting a high value upon particular approaches, procedures, and techniques. The 
emphasis is less upon what any particular policy should be than with how policies ought to be 
made. 
Policy Advocacy: This involves the use of analysis in making an argument for a particular 
policy.  It may be worth distinguishing between (a) the analyst as political actor and (b) the 
political actor as analyst. Both roles are controversial.  Academic analysts who involve 
themselves in the policy process to the extent of becoming ‘policy advocates’ may do so at the 
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expense of scholarly standards of objectivity and detachment.  When, on the other hand, 
political actors such as ministers and senior civil servants set themselves up as analysts, both the 
quality of the resulting analysis and its motivation are often questioned.  To a great extent, I 
worked as a policy advocate. Later, while teaching policy at the university, I looked at the whole 
study more objectively and thus became an academic analyst. 
Figure1: Framework for public policy analysis 
Source: Hogwood and Gunn, 1984.
The Analysis of Analysis: Appraisal of assumptions, methodology, and validity of policy 
analysis is important. The extent to which ‘facts’ and ‘values’ can be separated in analysis is of 
vital importance.  Policy analysis can be descriptive and prescriptive. In this thesis, it is both. 
The characteristics of policy analysis: Policy analysis is usually applied rather than pure.  Policy 
studies are problem-oriented. The analysis is usually inter-disciplinary as well as multi-
disciplinary.  To deal with real many-sided problems (such as health), it must develop an 
integrated or interdisciplinary approach. Policy analysis is politically sensitive.  Typically, there 
is concern with developing indicators of social conditions and problems, better forecasts, 
hierarchies of objectives, improved definitions and appraisal of options.  There is therefore an 
overlap between policy analysis and policy planning.  This thesis has attempted to give 
complete characterization to HSR policy analysis. 
2.2 Transition and trend analysis 
In transition-and-trend scenario analysis (Raskin et al, 2002) it is suggested that the world 
changes from one era to another over time. So far it has gone through three major eras: stone-
age, early civilization and now, modern era. Each successive era takes a shorter time. The stone-
age lasted 100,000 years, early civilization about 10,000 years, and modern era 1,000 years. It is 
predicted that a new planetary phase has begun and will last only 100 years. Thus, there is a 
logarithmic acceleration of change and complexity. The movement from one era to another is 
called a transition, which happens in distinct three phases. First there is a take-off, then 
acceleration of transition and thirdly stabilization, when transition gradually ceases and gives 
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way to a non-changing period. It is suggested that the planetary era has begun, with 
globalization and increasing technology reaching a planetary scale (see figure 2) 
The transition is being driven by capitalism, a perpetual revolution in technology, culture and 
desire spawned by an explosion of population, and production and economic complexity. 
Globalized capitalism is hungry for new markets, resources and investment opportunities. The 
self-expanding and colonizing industrial system entered a planetary phase (involving the whole 
planet earth) over the past 50 years. It started to take off into a new rapidly changing phase from 
1980-2005 with significant features hitherto not seen. These include climate changes, the ozone 
hole, the earth summit, the information revolution, the collapse of the USSR, the hegemony of 
capitalism, globalization, the creation of the World Trade Organization, and the increasing 
influence of Transnational Corporations and NGOs. 
Figure 2: Planetary transition 
Source: Raskin et al. 2002 
The changes have created three archetypal social philosophies on the future of the world: 
evolutionary, catastrophic and transformational futures. Evolutionists are optimistic about 
prosperity, stability and environmental health. Catastrophists fear deepening social, economic 
and environmental tensions, with dire consequences for the world’s future. Transformationists 
share these fears but believe an opportunity can be seized to forge a better civilization for 
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humanity. These represent incremental adjustment, cataclysms, and structural shift and 
renewal. These scenarios are in relation to five areas of development: population, economy, 
environment, equity, technology and conflict. Figure 3 illustrates the trend and change 
implications of each type of scenario that could happen. 
Based on these outlooks, three possible global scenarios are projected – the conventional world, 
barbarization and great transition: 
1) A possible scenario is incremental adjustment of the current conventional world. This means 
that the status quo is more-or-less maintained. “Conventional world” assumes that the  
Scenarios                                        Population    Economy   Environment   Equity     Technology    Conflict
Conventional Worlds 
          Market Forces 
          Policy Reform 
Barbarization 
          Breakdown 
          Fortress World 
Great Transitions 
          Eco-Communalism 
          New Sustainability 
          Paradigm 
Figure 3: Scenario structure with illustrative patterns 
Source: Raskin et al. 2002 
global systems in the twenty-first century evolve without major surprises, sharp discontinuity or 
fundamental transformation in basic human civilization. The current dominant forces and 
values driving globalization will shape the future. Incremental market policy and adjustments 
are thought to cope with social, economic and environmental problems as they arise. But the 
market-driven development is now judged to be unsustainable. It is being built to overcome 
market barriers, create and enable institutional frameworks to integrate the world into a global 
economic system. But there is now increasing frequency of crises as a result of this system: rising 
food and energy prices, market crushes, terrorism, etc. Thus, the path to this scenario is possible, 
but undesirable. 
2) Through cataclysms a possible situation of “Barbarization” is foreseen. The problems not 
solved by the “conventional world” cascade into self-amplifying crises that overwhelm 
institutions, with civilization descending into anarchy. “Barbarization” scenario inevitably leads 
to a global conflict. The warning bells are being sounded – breakdown of health systems, social 
polarization, terrorism, environmental degradation, climate change – but go unheeded. As a 
multi-dimensional crisis unfolds, anarchy may result. Conflict may result into a “Fortress 
World” where powerful regional and international actors engineer an organized response to 
Health sector reforms in Uganda 1987 – 2007 
25
protect their own interests and create lasting alliances. The poor are kept away by a police force 
and the rich live in favoured enclaves in rich and poor nations. This is a situation that many 
have begun to see and are trying to avoid. It is possible that sufficient global effort can be 
mobilized just to avoid this scenario. 
If mankind makes a serious effort through a structural shift, addressing economic, social and 
governance issues, the current problems created in the world as a result of global capitalism, 
including health system crises, could be overcome. This is global policy reform. However, this 
may still not provide sustainable solution to development, including health systems, without 
major changes in values and lifestyles. 
3) But through global renewal, it is also possible to create a new civilization. Called the “Great 
transition”, this envisions profound historical transformations in the fundamental values and 
principles of organizing society. New values will emphasize quality of life, material sufficiency, 
human solidarity and global equity, and affinity with nature and environmental sustainability. 
Thus, health system crises around the world are but just one of the drivers or potential drivers of 
global change. Other drivers of change include population explosion with dire consequences on 
food availability; trans-national enterprises taking over national governments and economies; 
increasing social inequality and economic inequity; globalised information technology fostering 
a consumer culture; technology revolution giving a high potential to improve human livelihood, 
but may raise ethical and environmental issues; the environment is degraded by toxic 
substances, loss of species, and degradation of ecosystems; a trend in governance towards 
individual rights, private sector, civil society and diversity in culture. 
2.3 Analytic framework 
The theoretical framework to explain the HSR policy pathway is based on four approaches. First 
is the analysis of the market and market-based systems. Here the origin, the evolution and the 
factors that are driving the market-based model of development are discussed. Second is the 
analysis of the health systems, especially the evolution of hospitals and health financing. The 
“marriage” of health system development to the free-market is analysed.  Third is policy 
analysis where HSRs are seen collectively as a policy.  Because of the external influence (of 
inhibition) of donor aid on national policy processes, the national stages did not take place 
(Paper I). This also explains the lack of ownership of aid-driven policies by recipient countries.  
Thus, a meaningful analysis of HSRs as a policy can only focus on five elements of the elements: 
issue definition; setting objectives and priorities; implementation, monitoring and control; 
evaluation and review; and maintenance, succession or termination. It is suggested that when a 
policy fails to deliver, it is terminated and replaced. 
Fourth is the transition-and-trend scenario analysis. Here it is suggested that the world changes 
from one era to another over time. The planetary era has begun, with globalization and 
increasing technology reaching a planetary scale. But in this analytic framework, only the most 
desirable changes, policy reform and great transition are analyzed. They represent a definite 
departure from the current systems which sustain continuing social and health system failures 
and crises. Figure 4 below combines the analyses of health systems, the market, policy and 
trend-and-scenario into one theoretical framework. The discussion, conclusions, lessons and 
way forward of the thesis are based on this framework. 
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Figure 4: Analytic framework 
Source: author’s compilation 
In the top boxes are health systems and market-based systems respectively. These systems have 
evolved along different paths, with different characteristics and values. Health systems evolved 
to help the sick and achieve equity. The market evolved as a mechanism for exchanging 
commodities and for generating wealth. But increasingly, as a deliberate and distinct policy, 
market mechanisms are used to organize social services and life in general, including health 
services. Thus, in the box in the second level the health system and market are mixed. The 
resultant cocktail is the subject of evaluation in this study. But several analysts (eg Raskin et al, 
2002) have concluded  that market-based systems are responsible for inequity, social crises and 
failure of social systems. They predict that for sustainable global development and living, 
including sustainable health systems, market-based systems are untenable. Thus, in the box at 
the third level, they predict the need to succeed the market-based policy as a normal and 
necessary step of replacing policy (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). There are two key pathways to 
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the succession of the market-based policy: reform of the system or transition to a new 
civilization. Reform of the market-based system is to leave the system intact but address the 
threats such as inequity, social unrest and conflict, population explosion and food shortages. It is 
predicted that this may lead to an uneasy form of sustainable life, including an uneasy 
sustainable health system (see box at the bottom). It may also not be as much resisted as 
introducing a new system. A second key pathway to succeed the market system to a sustainable, 
equitable and peaceful world however is the transition to a new civilization altogether with new 
values and principles on which to organize society. This civilization will emphasize quality of 
life, material sufficiency, solidarity, global equity and environmental sustainability. It is 
envisaged that only under such conditions will it be possible to have sustainable and equitable 
health systems, represented in the box at the bottom of the diagram. 
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3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Uganda: the context of reform
Uganda is a landlocked country located in East Africa astride the equator. It is bordered by the 
Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and DR Congo (figure 1). It shares Lake Victoria, the largest 
inland fresh water lake in Africa, with Kenya and Tanzania. It is elevated to an altitude of 1000-
1500 metres above sea-level and covers an area of 240,000 sq km. It lies in the equatorial belt 
with temperatures between 20 to 30 degrees Celsius. Rainfall is regular throughout the year, 
with peaks in April-May and October-November. However, this pattern appears to be changing. 
The country is generally fertile and suitable for agriculture except in North-East, where it is 
semi-arid. Vegetation varies between rainforest and savannah land to semi-desert vegetation of 
shrubs. 
High population growth and poverty 
Uganda’s population is projected to be about 31 million in 2007 (table 1). The country has a high 
population growth rate of 3.2% per year. Infant and maternal mortality rates are relatively high 
and have persisted at about the same level over the past 30 years. However, in the most recent 
population surveys some slight reduction in mortality has been achieved (GoU, 2006(a); 2006(b). 
Other health indicators have not changed much. Total fertility is still high at 6.7 children per 
woman. Contraceptive rate is only 23.7%, supervised births are at 41%, and full immunization is 
at 46%. Stunting in children under-five years of age is quite high, at 32%. Nevertheless, Uganda 
has done well in reducing and managing HIV/AIDS, where HIV prevalence has reduced from 
about 30% in 1991 to only 6.4% in 2007. It has also dramatically improved access to ARVs for 
AIDS patients with financial support from donors. 
Other human development indices show that human poverty index has remained at 36%, but 
life expectancy has increased from about 47 years in 1990’s to 54 years. The proportion of 
expenditure on health as a percentage of the GDP is 2.2%. But expenditure on education as a 
proportion of the public sector budget rose from 1.5% in 1991 to 5.2% in 2007. The majority of 
the people are peasant farmers. About 90% of the population lives in rural areas. Modern 
agriculture for export has begun to emerge in many places. The major foreign exchange earners 
are coffee, tea and tobacco; and increasingly newly commercialized products, such as vanilla, 
fish and flowers. 
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Figure 5: Map of Uganda 
Colonial history: roots of instability 
The British colonialists found what has now become Uganda a conglomeration of different 
ethnic groups living separately and often at war with each other. Some ethnic groups had 
become organized as kingdoms with a strong central authority. These included Buganda, 
Bunyoro, Ankole and Tooro. Others were organized along clan relations without a strong 
central control. The British established indirect rule over the kingdoms through the kings, and 
appointed chiefs to administer the non-kingdom areas. Eventually, the British carved out 
Uganda as its territory and declared it a protectorate. However, dissent against the British 
sparked off by the Omukama (king) Kabalega of Bunyoro spread to Buganda, the dominant 
kingdom that time, and to other parts. Thus, by 1950s, there was a well-organized resistance 
against the British colonial rule. 
Post-colonial political instability 
On October 9, 1962, Uganda got its independence from Britain. The Kabaka (king) of Buganda 
became president and Milton Obote from another ethnic group became prime-minister. Political 
and tribal rivalry within the newly established post-independence government led Obote in 
1966 to change the constitution and abolish kingdoms. He became president and declared 
Uganda a republic (Jorgensen 1991). Buganda wanted its kingdom restored and began to agitate 
for reform. Subsequently an attempt was made to assassinate Obote in 1969. In 1970, there were 
sufficient rivalries, plots and counterplots within the establishment to cause change of 
government - which happened in 1971. In a swift, coordinated chain of events, Idi Amin, the 
head of Ugandan Army, overthrew the government. He was initially a welcome change to curb 
the growing restlessness, especially in the Buganda region. But as he began to consolidate power 
and became aware of the rising insurgency from members of the previous government who had 
grouped in neighbouring countries, he became increasingly ruthless. He abolished the 
constitution and ruled by decree, and eventually declared himself life-president. From 1971 to 
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1979, Uganda experienced the worst dictatorship, and political and economic mismanagement. 
The economy declined and social services sharply deteriorated. 
Table 1. Uganda: selected development indicators  
Indicator       Value 
Population       31 millions
Population Growth Rate          3.2 % 
Urban Population        12.8 % 
Infant Mortality Rate         76 /1 000 
Child Mortality Rate       137 /1 000 
Maternal Mortality Rate      435 /100 000 
Total Fertility Rate           6.7 children/ woman 
Full immunization        46 % 
Stunted Children        32 % 
HIV Prevalence Rate          6.4 % 
Literacy Rate         69 % 
Human Development Index      0.502
Income inequality          0.43 
Gender Related Development Index        0.498 
Human Poverty Index        36 % 
Government expenditure on education       5.2 % of GDP 
Government expenditure on health        2.2 % of GDP 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics: Fact sheet 2007 
In 1979, through a concerted effort of the government of Tanzania and Ugandans in exile, 
Amin’s military junta was overthrown. A government of national unity was established, but 
there were serious internal wrangles among groups that had deposed Idi Amin. Within two 
years, Uganda changed presidents three times. Eventually, elections were held with the support 
of Tanzania, which paved the way for Obote to return as president for a second time. But the 
elections were widely contested and largely viewed as having been rigged (Jorgensen 1991). One 
group that had been part of the effort to remove Idi Amin had organized under the banner of a 
party and had lost in the elections. This group, led by Yoweri Museveni, the current president, 
returned to the bush to wage a guerilla war against Obote’s government.  
As Obote tried to re-organize the economy, insurgency by the guerillas severely destabilized his 
government. Within five years, Obote’s government was overthrown for a second time by his 
own generals through a tribal rivalry. The generals tried to persuade Yoweri Museveni to join 
them in forming a government of national unity, but the latter regarded the generals as part of 
the old establishment. Thus, the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Museveni over-ran this 
new, partially formed, and unconsolidated government within a matter of months. 
The NRM government was a multi-ideological alliance of freedom fighters. They thought that 
parties and religious beliefs divided people, and so peaceful change of government should be 
organized through a “no-party system” (Odonga-Ori, 1998). Individuals should compete for 
political posts on personal merit rather than through political parties. The no-party experiment 
took about ten years before it was found to be unsuitable The NRM behaved like a party and 
anybody with dissenting views was regarded as opposition, even an enemy. It thus lost its 
multi-ideological stance. With pressure from donors and internal opposition, a multi-party 
system of governance was re-introduced in Uganda in 2001 and NRM has become a fully-
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fledged party. It is now the ruling party, having won elections in 2001 and 2006. The NRM 
government has been innovative, achieving considerable successes in economic recovery and 
the fight against AIDS. 
Western medicine  
Modern-type health care was first introduced in Uganda in 1889 by the Imperial British East 
Africa Company (IBEAC), a trading concern. IBEAC brought doctors to look after its staff and 
Indians who were needed for the construction of the rail-road from Mombasa to Kampala. 
Africans received medical care only in emergencies. But successive epidemics forced IBEAC to 
treat Africans generally. These medical services were subsequently taken over by the colonial 
office (Owor, 1987). It was missionaries who started medical services devoted mainly to 
Africans. Dr Albert Cook arrived in Uganda in 1897 and opened the first hospital in Mengo, in 
Kampala. In 1917 he became the first person to teach Africans modern medicine. The three-year 
diploma course led to the qualification of “Native Medicine Assistant”. His wife, Sister Timpson, 
also started teaching African midwives. Later, other missionaries brought more medical 
workers, building more hospitals and starting schools for nurses and midwives. 
During the period, the country experienced successive epidemics of plague, sleeping sickness 
and small pox. Also, Dr Cook’s analysis of patients at Mengo Hospital showed that 80% of 
patients had syphilis (Owor, 1987). These problems forced the colonial administration to 
establish a medical department in 1902. By 1909, three health centres had been established at 
Mulago, Mityana and Masaka for the treatment of venereal diseases. Mulago hospital was 
completed in 1913 and dedicated to the treatment of venereal diseases. It became a general 
hospital in 1923. Other hospitals and dispensaries were gradually established in provincial and 
district headquarters throughout the country.  
The rapid succession of epidemics of small pox, plague and syphilis shortly after the arrival of 
Europeans and Indians in large enough numbers is not surprising. Recent studies of human 
evolution and development show that Africans remained free from these diseases which 
originated from animals which were subsequently transmitted to humans who got in close 
contact through domesticating the animals (Diamond, 1997). Agriculture, including the 
domestication of wild animals started in Middle East and Asia. Genetic and archaeological 
evidence show that some early Asians migrated to Europe and gave rise to the European race. 
These Euroasians picked up germs from animals, which caused them illness and mutated. But 
over hundreds of years, humans developed immunity and were able to resist infections from 
these germs. Africans remained non immune to several diseases until Europeans brought the 
diseases with them when they colonised Africa. Initially, the diseases had devastating impact on 
African populations, until they gained immunity against the diseases. 
Smallpox originated from cattle and is related to cowpox. Plague also originated from animals – 
rats, transmitted to humans by fleas. Syphilis has its origins from animals. The indigenous 
epidemic to Uganda was sleeping sickness which is transmitted from wild and domestic 
animals to humans by the tse-tse fly.  Epidemics are diseases of crowds. In Africa, there were no 
crowds until relatively recently. But “crowds” first developed in areas where agriculture started. 
In a crowd, there is a high possibility of exposure to infectious diseases and ease of transmission 
of disease from one person to another. Plague, which is carried by ticks found on rats, would be 
possible only at a certain population density. Syphilis also has its origins in animals. The 
indigenous epidemic to Uganda was sleeping sickness.  
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The colonial government encouraged local administrations to participate in the running of 
health services. This role of local authorities was later strengthened by Local Administration 
Acts of 1964 and 1967 (Owor, 1987). Traditional medicine predates the colonial era and it 
continued to thrive throughout the country. However, the colonial government viewed 
traditional medicine with suspicion. As a result, the government legislated that traditional 
healers would only practice in their own communities. Today, traditional medicine has become 
officially established alongside western medicine in most countries. WHO has now recognized 
traditional medicine as an integral part of the national health system. After the Second World 
War, international cooperation in health became a global concern under the newly established 
United Nations (UN). UN agencies, WHO and UNICEF, began to sponsor health programmes in 
public health, which became the building blocks of the health system in Uganda. 
Post-independence health sector development/mismanagement 
The MOH was created in 1961 out of the colonial department of the Ministry of Social Services. 
By 1961 there were 27 hospitals and 1,288 staff for a population of 7 million. After independence 
another 22 new rural hospitals were built throughout Uganda, bringing the total number of 
hospitals to 49. During the period from early 1960’s to early 1970’s, Uganda had one of the most 
outstanding networks of health services on the continent. But the 1970’s ushered in political 
upheavals culminating into 2 decades of devastating wars. The exodus of trained personnel, the 
decline of the economy, rising inflation, mismanagement, neglect, and the physical destruction 
of health facilities reduced the previously good services to an appalling state (Owor, 1987). 
The public outcry about the deterioration of health services led the government to institute a 
commission of inquiry in 1977, but by 1985 the recommendations had not been implemented. 
Understandably, the country was in period of turmoil – both political and economic(Owor, 
1987). Meanwhile, NGOs and churches continued to provide health services, contributing at 
least 40% of services in the national health system. The private sector was small in 1960’s 
especially when the national health system was working well. As the health system deteriorated, 
private health providers increased in number and scope of services. The general breakdown in 
law and order in the country made it impossible to enforce statutory controls over private 
practice. This led to an explosion of illegal private clinics with indiscriminate peddling of drugs 
by unqualified persons. 
Primary Health Care 
During early 1980’s, the concept of PHC was introduced in Uganda as a major strategy for 
health improvement. It was defined as an essential, affordable and acceptable health care based 
on intermediate technology and implemented through an inter-sectoral approach, with 
community participation (WHO, 1978). The National PHC Action Plan was completed in 1982, 
but remained unimplemented because there were no clear modalities for its implementation, 
and its budget was unaffordable. Within three years, PHC was dismissed by most health 
officials as impracticable and they sought more consultation. This dilemma was faced by most 
low-income countries. The impasse was partially resolved by Walsh and Warren (1979) and later 
taken up by UNICEF under the selective PHC. UNICEF subsequently developed the famous 
GOBIFFF (Growth monitoring, Oral re-hydration, Breastfeeding, Immunization, Family 
Planning, Female education and Food Supplementation) formula. This selective approach was 
rejected by WHO, who insisted on PHC in its comprehensive state. But for programme 
managers, this was a distant academic debate. Uganda embarked on selective PHC. 
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NGOs, initially providing emergency and relief assistance, eventually joined the health sector in 
large numbers to champion selective PHC. But NGOs operated their own micro-policies, 
especially in the absence of a national policy and overall guidance. Thus, in 1987, the 
government appointed a “Health Policy Review Commission” to review the situation and 
propose a health policy for the country. By 1991, no health policy had been made, but a plan – 
the “National Health Plan 1990-2000” - was completed. It had ten key policy measures some of 
which were later to become key components of the NHP. The plan had the following policy 
measures: commitment to comprehensive PHC, community participation, decentralization of 
health care, inter-sectoral collaboration, coordination of NGOs and donors, collaboration with 
NGOs, promotion and regulation of private practice, integration of traditional medicine, re-
organization of health care system into four levels, and promotion of alternative methods of 
health financing (Okuonzi, Owor et al, 2002). 
The advent of AIDS 
Before the plan and policy could be completed, there were increasing concerns about the 
emergence of HIV/AIDS and the sorry-state of health care infrastructure (Paper I). Two projects 
funded by a World Bank loan were set up to address these concerns. While remarkable 
achievements were made with regard to controlling AIDS, the infrastructure rehabilitation 
targeted only a few facilities, which were partially done. In 1992, the MOH completed its ten-
year plan. But its publication prompted a major outcry from donors. The point of contention 
was that the budget of the plan exceeded by fourfold the available resources.  
With the benefit of hindsight, it has become evident that resources were not the main issue 
because donors eventually spent much more on health sector programmes than had been 
envisaged in the budget (Okuonzi, 2004 ). The real bone of contention was that no further 
expansion or rehabilitation of existing health care infrastructure would be funded by donor 
funds. This was in line with the new donor vision shaped by market reforms that were seen as 
the panacea for health systems in crisis. Therefore, the concern about the direction the plan had 
taken – greater government involvement in the provision of health care - prompted donors to 
get involved in health policy and planning, and to use aid as a leverage to get their way.  
In addition, Uganda’s health system became highly decentralized. Decentralization in the health 
sector was defined as“bringing health services nearer the people” (Okuonzi and Lubanga, 1997 
). It entailed the MOH ceasing to be operational and assuming the roles of policy, strategic 
planning, technical guidance and supervision. The MOH was re-structured accordingly. Health 
planning was to be carried out and approved by districts. Health funds would be transferred 
directly from the treasury to districts and urban councils. Local authorities would become 
responsible for the management of health personnel, including hiring and firing. Local 
authorities would manage district hospitals and funds for service delivery. The decentralized 
administrative levels corresponding to the health system are presented in figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Uganda’s administrative and corresponding health system levels  
Source: author’s compilation 
The emergence of the World Bank as health sector leader 
By 1992, with the assistance of World Bank advisors, a three-year plan frame had been made  
(GoU, 1993). This provided the blue-print for subsequent reform programmes. The plan frame 
laid down six policy measures: no further expansion of health care; restore functional capacity of 
existing facilities; orientation of services to PHC; a basic-package approach should be used; to 
respond swiftly in managing AIDS, while mitigating its social and economic consequences; and 
promoting user-fees as a way of financing health care. In 1990’s, the World Bank had begun to 
play a leading role in the health sector. In 1994, after three years of negotiations, the bank and 
the government agreed to implement a wide range of health sector reforms. This resulted in the 
health sector reform programme led by the World Bank. 
First Health Project 
The World Bank made its first appearance in Uganda’s health sector in 1988 with the approval 
of USD 42.5 million for the First Health Project (FHP). The FHP was conceived as an “emergency 
project” to rehabilitate the badly devastated health infrastructure following a twenty-year 
period of civil wars and social instability. FHP had three objectives (GoU, 1998). One objective 
was to rehabilitate Mulago national referral hospital, the national blood bank, 8 rural hospitals 
and 30 health centres. A new hospital was to be constructed in Rakai district, a famous area 
where AIDS in Uganda was first identified locally as the “slim” disease. Another objective to 
Administrative/ 
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Health system level 
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District, LC-V 300,000 District Hospital 
Medical Officers 
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III 
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Parish, LC-II 5,000 Health Centre II 
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promote health education through mass media and training; and community-based distribution 
of drugs, counselling HIV/AIDS affected people, including assisting the families and promoting 
household hygiene. The last objective was to strengthen planning, budgeting, financing and 
partnership with CBOs and NGOs. A number of short-term achievements were made. These 
included preparation of the national health plan, establishment of a health education 
programme and the rehabilitation of 8 hospitals and 27 health centres (GoU, 1996). 
Major challenges included the failure of the government to provide counterpart funding due to 
the low revenue base, which was worsened by the collapse of coffee prices; the continued under-
funding of the health sector; demoralized and inadequate health workers; the badly structured 
MOH (along vertical programmes); and the lack of institutional framework to deal with NGOs 
and other civil society organizations. At the end of FHP in 1996, a number of lessons had been 
learned. Sustainability of health infrastructure and services emerged as the major issue for the 
health sector, which could not be addressed by a short-term and highly confined project such as 
FHP. There was dire need for institutional building across the health sector. 
District Health Services Pilot and Demonstration Project (DHSP) 
At the close of FHP, it was agreed that a follow-up project would be necessary to address the 
wider issues of the health sector and some critical issues such as health financing and 
sustainability. In particular, a World Bank appraisal (World Bank, 1995) noted the lack of 
capacity (in terms of human resource numbers and skills, infrastructure, systems and 
institutions) and the need to ensure a reliable delivery of basic health-care. Thus, a new project, 
DHSP, to cost USD 75.1 million, was conceived effectively as a vehicle for market reforms of the 
health sector. 
3.2 Evolution of health systems 
Health-care has a long history of evolution, which is quite distinct from the evolution and 
development of the free-market ideology (Abel-Smith, 1994). Traditional medicine and spiritual 
care have been with mankind for thousands of years. But the modern, organized health-care 
system for the public is about 200 years old. The development of the modern health-system 
started with the development and management of hospitals. Hospitals first emerged in India, 
Arabian Kingdom and in southern Europe. In Europe, they became part of monasteries and 
convents. Abel-Smith (1994) identifies six reasons for the creation and emergence of hospitals: 1) 
to provide residential treatment for the public; in Europe these were owned and run by religious 
institutions; 2) to serve the sick who had no families and support; 3) to serve soldiers and sailors 
who were often sent abroad to colonies to fight for the expansion of empires; 4) to manage 
epidemics, especially smallpox, cholera and typhoid; 5) to treat venereal diseases which started 
in Sweden, and 6) to treat leprosy which started in Norway. 
In Europe, where hospitals had been entrusted to and run by the Catholic Church, they were 
eventually transferred to public authorities. The reasons for the transfer were mismanagement 
of the hospitals, misappropriation of hospital funds, anti-clericalism and lack of funds. In some 
countries, churches continued to run hospitals (Abel-Smith, 1994). From 1870’s, hospitals were 
developed as a function and responsibility of local authorities in Sweden. In Britain, King Henry 
VIII suspended monasteries and transferred hospitals to public institutions and they began to be 
funded by charitable institutions. Public hospitals of this nature were supplemented by 
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numerous, small and private hospitals for those who could afford them (Palmer and Colton, 
1995). 
There is a close association between the poor on the one hand, and the development of hospitals 
and health systems on the other. In Britain, the poor law (and social assistance in other 
countries) enabled the poor to be catered for with respect to hospital services. For 350 years in 
Norway, salaried doctors paid by the government were employed to look after the poor. This 
practice spread to Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and Russia. Midwifery developed as a 
separate profession, and midwives were also paid salaries to look after the poor. Home-nursing 
developed as a charitable movement to help the poor in 1859 in Britain. Later, nursing homes 
were subsidized by local authorities and eventually taken over as a key function of the local 
authorities (Abel-Smith 1994). 
3.3 Evolution of health financing 
Thus far, hospitals and outreach services were funded by public authorities, charitable 
organizations, and the church. But modern methods of financing of health-care began to 
develop with voluntary health insurance. Voluntary sickness insurance developed as a 
movement in Europe, New Zealand, Australia, and later in South America. But in 1883, 
voluntary health insurance evolved into compulsory insurance for civil servants and miners. 
Chancellor Bismarck of Germany eventually introduced a law to establish compulsory insurance 
to create loyalty to the employer and state. This was in response to growing restlessness in the 
country about a possible socialist revolution (Palmer and Colton, 1995). The compulsory health 
insurance was gradually adopted in other countries around the world. 
Evolution of universal coverage 
But compulsory health insurance excluded a lot of people from health care, including fishermen 
and farmers. Many countries sought different ways to extend insurance coverage to the whole 
population. They did this either by reducing the premium to make it affordable by all, or by 
subsidizing using trust funds or tax funds. Eventually most high income countries adopted 
universal health care, starting with Russia (1938), Britain (1941), Scandinavia (1960’s), Canada 
(1970), Italy (1980), South Korea and Taiwan (1990-94), Singapore and Malaysia in 1990’s (Abel-
Smith, 1994). 
Various mechanisms were used to cover the poor, the aged, children and the disabled. One way 
was to cover them under the able-bodied, who were insured. The other way was to establish a 
specific social security scheme, which supported health-care and other benefits such as pension. 
A third way was to provide direct assistance in health-care by local authorities. The only high-
income country without universal health-care coverage to date is the USA. There are 47 million 
people without any insurance or access to health-care in USA. The main reason is the prevalent 
negative and racist attitude to the poor, and the association of poverty with blacks and recent 
immigrants. In addition, there are no strong union movements in USA, and the medical 
profession wields much political influence (Halvorson, 1993). 
Crisis in health financing 
Most of the low-income countries were colonies and inherited or adopted the universal model of 
health-care from their European colonizers. However, from 1960 -1980, pressure began to be 
applied on health expenditure for increased demands created by knowledge, technology, aging 
populations and disease patterns. The pressure to spend on health-care reached a “crescendo” 
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around early 1990’s when a “cost-explosion” was reached (World Bank 1993 ). In poor countries, 
the pressure was generated by the oil-crisis 1970’s that led to a slump in the world economy. 
This reduced economic growth, and so donor countries reduced the amount of aid they gave to 
the poor countries. The poor countries themselves experienced high interest rates, which led to a 
high cost of debt servicing. 
They also sold less of their produce to the outside world, lowering the level of foreign exchange. 
Consequently, the currencies of the poor countries lost value, making it even more costly to 
service their debts. With less aid coming in, and difficulties in balance of payment deficits, they 
had to reduce spending on health. This led to the widespread collapse or near collapse of health 
systems in most poor countries in 1980s to 1990s. Most have not yet recovered. 
Response to financial crises 
By late 1970’s, it had become clear that the third-world needed a different kind of health system. 
Under WHO and Unicef, third-world countries defined a new health system that became known 
as PHC. But within a few years of launching PHC, it became clear that the strategy was not 
implementable or fundable in its original form. So “selective PHC” was devised, where only a 
few affordable elements and cost-effective interventions would be implemented, giving rise to 
disease specific or vertical programmes that are now prevalent in third-world countries. 
But the introduction of PHC did not halt the downward spiral of health services in the third 
world. By year 2000 it had become clear that PHC had largely failed due to lack of funding. It 
was partly because of the difficulty with PHC that HSRs were started. Through the reforms, the 
health system was meant to fund itself, largely through health-insurance schemes or user-fees, 
which did not happen. Thus, health financing remains the most intractable challenge for the 
health sector today. This challenge has led to the development of the MDGs as a compact 
between nations. This global health compact is to be funded through scaled-up aid to poor 
countries on a long-term basis. 
3.4 Health system under the free-market 
Belief in market superiority 
The rise and spread of market solutions are rooted in the belief that market-based systems are 
superior to other types of systems (Amin, 2000). In particular, it is claimed that market-based 
systems are superior to government-run systems. The collapse of the former USSR and Eastern 
Europe are cited as evidence for the weakness and inferiority of government- or public-run 
systems. The emergence of USA as the only superpower in technology, economy and military 
might, is given as evidence for the superiority of the market, on whose principles the USA runs 
all its affairs. Heavily influenced by the US government, the World Bank and IMF - the two most 
influenced global financial institutions - have placed a particularly extreme version of the 
market philosophy at the heart of their policies. 
In the early 1990s, the US treasury heralded the triumph of capitalism. Together with IMF and 
WB, the US Treasury formulated the Washington Consensus Policies founded on the principles 
of the market (Stigliz, 2002; Sachs, 2005). The policies were projected as the true and only way 
for economic growth and development. They consisted of four policies: privatization, 
liberalization of trade, macro-stability and investment. Nothing else mattered. The consensus 
model was idolized to the extent of ignoring the context and process of implementation. In 
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many countries in South America and Africa as well as Russia, the timing, order, dynamics and 
pace of the reforms, which should have been considered, were ignored. Other important 
development factors such as land reform, taxation policy, financial regulations were not 
emphasized (Sachs, 2005). In countries such as Russia, the consensus policies have largely failed. 
But East Asian Tiger countries, which opposed these policies, or implemented them in their own 
terms, have experienced remarkable economic growth and social development over the past 20 
years. 
The market philosophy 
The underlying philosophy of market principles is libertarianism. This espouses individual 
freedom as supreme; there should be no restraint on it. The free market is regarded as the most 
beneficial means of production and distributing goods and services (Gilson, 1988). The market is 
a just and neutral mechanism. Above all, the free market protects and guarantees the freedom of 
the individual. Private property is outside government’s control and taxation is a form of 
robbery. Social justice is seen as being caused by the actions or inactions of individuals. These 
actions or inactions by individuals create large differences in socio-economic situations of such 
individuals. These differences should not only be accepted but expected, because it is in the 
nature of human beings under the forces of the impartial market forces for differences to arise 
among individuals. The government’s interventions are unjustified and unacceptable because 
they interfere with individual rights and freedoms (Gilson, 1988). The individual is viewed as 
autonomous, and he makes decisions based on self-interest and pursuit of his welfare. The 
individual is seen as maximizing his utility (satisfaction) from consumption decisions that he 
takes, a phenomenon called utilitarianism.  
Assumptions of a perfect market 
But the principles drawn from the market economics are based on a hypothetical perfect market, 
built on numerous impractical assumptions. The hypothesis is that the perfect market is in 
equilibrium, where demand and supply of goods and services are equal at prevailing price. 
Under such conditions, there are a large number of small-sized buyers and sellers in 
competition. There are no barriers to enter the market, and there are no monopolies. There are 
no external benefits and costs (or externalities) in the process of exchange to people other than 
the buyer and seller. And the consumers are all well-informed. 
In a rebuttal of the economics theory, as it is supposed to apply to health and health-care, Rice 
(1998) shows that no perfect market exists because no single assumption holds true in health-
care. Since the assumptions do not hold, the market-based health-care model is a myth. Rice 
examines fifteen assumptions of a perfect, competitive market from which the principles of 
market-based policies are derived, and found that none of them holds true. 
Assumption 1: There are no negative externalities of consumption. This means that when two people 
transact business, the transaction does not affect anybody else negatively or positively. The 
assumption totally collapses if one considers that goods or services consumed are affected by, 
relate to, are compared with, and affect the bundle of goods and services of other people. 
Happiness, for example, is relative to other people’s states of happiness or sadness. Employers 
can affect the welfare of employees. 
Assumption 2: There are no positive externalities of consumption. This is an extension of the first 
assumption focusing on the positive aspects a transaction between two people, one buying and 
the other selling. But people do have concerns for the welfare of others, and there is a common 
sense of social justice everywhere in the world on the right or moral things to do. 
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Assumption 3: Consumer tastes are pre-determined. This means that in a transaction, consumers 
know exactly what they want to buy, which is supposed to have been pre-determined. This is 
again not true because consumer tastes are malleable through exposure to different experiences 
and knowledge, environments and opportunities. 
Assumption 4: A person is the best judge of his or her own welfare. This assumption is in fact based 
on another assumption that everybody at all times has the capacity to make the choice of 
consumption in his/her best interest. But this is not necessarily true because people do not have 
full information on the consequences of their consumption decisions, they do not know the 
consequences, and people are not always rational. People who have cognitive dissonance (for 
example, through addiction to drugs) may rationalize risky behaviour. Drug addicts, gamblers, 
sex-workers, those who commit suicide, and those knowingly involved in very risky behaviour 
do not make consumption decisions in their best interest. 
Assumption 5: Consumers have sufficient information to make good choices. As already alluded to 
above, this is simply not true in real life. People do not have that kind of information, and much 
less so in health-care. 
Assumption 6: Consumers know, with certainty, the results of their consumption. Again as mentioned 
above this is not true. Nobody has the capacity for this kind of certainty. 
Assumption 7: Individuals are rational. This is true up to a certain point. But the problem of 
cognitive dissonance and similar situations often make individuals behave irrationally. 
Assumption 8: Individuals reveal their preferences through their actions. Drug addicts, gamblers and 
sex-workers do not necessarily prefer these consumption behaviours, but have been caught or 
trapped into such behaviour by circumstances. In addition, there is a great deal of inter-
dependence of people’s utilities. People are influenced by others to take certain actions when in 
fact their preferences are different. 
Assumption 9: Social welfare is based solely on individual utilities, which in turn are based solely on the 
goods and services consumed. But total welfare is not simply the sum of the welfare of individuals. 
Society distributes income and welfare. An individual’s welfare is relative to that of another 
individual. The welfare of individuals is affected by, and affects, the welfare of other 
individuals. This has profound health policy implication for solidarity and universal coverage 
health care through a national health insurance. 
Table 2: Assumptions for a perfect market and health policy implications 
Assumptions Policy Implications
 If assumptions hold true If assumptions do not hold true 
1. No
externalities 
Health care is private matter; 
people should buy it from the 
market 
Public goods should be funded by public 
funds or through solidarity. 
2. Consumer 
tastes are 
predetermined 
People determine the care 
they get when they fall sick. 
People are guided and educated about 
health care. 
3. Consumers 
have sufficient 
information 
-do- -do- 
4. Consumers 
know the 
results of their 
consumption 
People know the effect of 
health-care and do not need 
to be guided 
Nobody knows the full effect of health 
care. People need to be guided and 
advised. 
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5. Individuals 
are rational 
Health workers should do 
what patients order them to 
do
Health workers should assess what 
patients say and examine them to make 
the correct diagnosis 
6. Individuals 
reveal 
preferences in 
action 
Individual behaviour should 
form the basic criteria for 
deciding the type of health 
care.
Individuals’ actions and preferences 
should be assessed comprehensively in 
determining health-care requirements for 
the individual and for the public. 
7. Welfare is 
based on 
individual’s 
ability.  
Patients should be given 
treatment, which they ask and 
will be psychologically 
satisfied even though it does 
not help them. 
Individuals’ psychological satisfaction is 
secondary to the correct overall health 
care. 
8. Supply and 
demand are 
independent 
Patients and clients should be 
left on their own to determine 
whether they need health 
care.
Individuals can be educated and advised 
to seek for health care. 
9. No monopoly 
exists 
All health care should be 
provided by competition 
between many providers. 
Sometimes it is more efficient to have 
monopolistic health care provider due to 
the advantage of the economy of scale 
10. Firms 
maximize 
profit 
Services exchanged for money 
should be charged above the 
cost of production 
Other factors, like equity and inability to 
pay, may require subsidy of services. 
11. Production is 
independent 
from wealth 
distribution
Invest in “productive” sectors 
not in consumption such as 
health and education. 
Investment in health and education 
increase productivity. 
12. Health
distribution is 
approved by 
society 
Distribution of health care by 
the market is the best as it is 
impartial and does not cause 
discord in the society, even 
though some people miss out. 
Health care requires to be accessed by all, 
so other methods (other than the market) 
need to be used to “distribute” it. 
Source: author’s compilation 
Assumption 10: Supply and demand are independently determined. A common phenomenon in 
health-care is the physician-induced health-care demand. This example shows the linkage and 
interrelationship that can exist between supply and demand of goods and services. 
Assumption 11: Firms do not have the power of monopoly. Monopoly occurs when only one firm 
sells a particular good or service in the market. Power of monopoly is where the firm can change 
the price without loosing the market. This not only happens in real life, but is sometimes 
preferred by society. It might be more efficient for one firm (monopoly) to produce and sell 
goods and services than for this to be done by many firms. But such a monopoly firm needs to 
be regulated on the price and quantity of goods or services produced. 
Assumption 12: Firms maximize profits. This is not always true. The owners of a firm (called 
principals) may not have the same goals as the managers of the firm (called agents). Principals 
tend to maximize profit, but agents have other goals to pursue. Therefore, overall, firms will not 
always maximize profit. 
Assumption 13: There are no increasing returns to scale. In real economic cycles, there are 
increasing and decreasing returns to scale. If production is moved from many firms to one firm 
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(monopoly), there may be a situation of increasing returns to scale provided the monopoly firm 
is regulated on the price and quantity of goods and services produced. 
Assumption 14: Production is independent of the distribution of wealth. Many studies now 
demonstrate the relationship between health and productivity. The purpose of the 
Macroeconomics and Health Study (World Health Organization 2000) was to demonstrate and 
disseminate this relationship. If production is represented by the formula  
Q = f (L,K) 
where Q = output, f = technology L = labour and K = capital, it becomes evident that the poor 
health of the people providing labour will affect the overall output. 
Assumption 15: The distribution of wealth is approved of by society. The assumption is that health is 
redistributed through money-transfer payments to reach a final competitive equilibrium in 
accordance with society’s desires. This excludes the notion of equity and fairness which are key 
in resource distribution in any country. The assumption is based on utilitarian model and is 
based on cash-transfers. But redistribution is mostly in goods and services. In addition, people 
provide charity which is not a function of a competitive perfect-market. This assumption has 
profound policy implications - whether to provide health services rather than cash, or to focus 
on people’s health not their utility, or to provide universal health care coverage through a 
national health insurance or similar mechanism. 
The failure of these assumptions to hold true in real life is acknowledged as “market failure” in 
economic theory. But the acknowledgement is not nearly enough to deter market economists, 
ideologues and enthusiasts from holding market principles sacrosanct. Commonly, the reasons 
given for the failure of health-care markets include: uncertainty and asymmetrical information 
about health services and goods; the advantages of producing health-care on large of scale; there 
are natural monopolies (hospitals) in health-care; there usually exist professional barriers and 
regulations to entry into the health care market; there are external costs and benefits; and 
markets have no regard for the ability to pay or for people who have low income but great 
needs. Table 2 summarizes the assumptions and policy implications.  
Hsiao (1995) argues that the uncritical belief in the market as the best mechanism for 
restructuring economic and social sectors has been wrongly pushed on to low-income countries. 
According to him, economic theory only applies to the market for producing and distributing 
private goods and services. He concludes that markets in the health sector are massively 
plagued by market failure and that markets in the health sector are intrinsically complicated. 
Market competition in the health sector engenders high transaction and administrative costs. 
Market principles must be severely bent in the health sector for them to work, and even then at 
an unacceptably high cost of administration. Thus, there is no efficient and simple free-market 
solution to the financing and provision of health services. 
3.5 The evolution of the market system 
Today the structure of the international development is built around the free-market concept. 
The vision of market-based development is the globally integrated free-market, with no trade 
barriers, using market-enabling institutions to spread wealth and the Western-model of 
development. The global hope is to enable all economies to grow, increase overall wealth, and 
reduce poverty, improve international equity and reduce conflict (Raskin et al, 2002). But there 
are inherent contradictions in this model. Untrammelled free-market globalization has severe 
consequences on the environment through uncontrolled use of resources and opulent or reckless 
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lifestyles. Concerns of human impact on the atmosphere, land and water include toxic 
substances, loss of species and degradation of ecosystems. There are also changes in the climate 
arising from carbon dioxide emissions as an industrial waste. This undermines global climate 
stability, further risking ecological, economic and human health impacts. Increases in wealth 
inequity have given rise to social polarization, terrorism and conflicts. 
The evolution of the market-based economic model of today has been chronicled by Shutt 
(1998). He argues that the current economic-model based on the market is unsustainable and 
could spiral into cataclysm. The problem with the model starts with redundant and excessive 
capital in the West. Capitalism is fairly new in relative terms in human history, having begun 
only about 200 years ago. Before that wealth was distributed through a system of customary 
rights and obligations in a stratified social ladder – a system called feudalism. But technological 
breakthrough with the steam power multiplied manifold the potentials and possibilities of 
manufacturing, mining, agriculture and transport. With so much production, capital 
accumulated very fast. New rules were needed to manage the large capital; customary rules 
became inapplicable and irrelevant. New rules created property rights and were rationalized by 
philosophers and other intellectuals. 
Rationalization of the market economy 
Economic misadventures were also rationalized by the church. At first religion played a 
significant role as an obstacle to untrammelled and exploitative nature of venture economy 
based on market-forces (Shutt, 1998). The church, for example, resisted the lending of money at 
interest as immoral. But the growing power of emerging merchants gave rise to an ideological 
rationalization of the values associated with moneyed wealth. And the Calvinist religion, a 
splinter Christian faction, and the philosopher Locke later rationalized private property rights in 
eighteenth century. This Christian rationale of private property made founding fathers of the 
USA endorse the ownership of slaves and the industrial magnates in England to rationalize the 
displacement and degradation of millions of people to take advantage of the new technology 
allowing large-scale agriculture. The moneyed class rationalized, through different doctrines, 
the centrality of property rights and protection of wealth. The continuing accumulation of 
capital was not without perils. The resulting destitution and the cyclic economic disasters that 
followed plunged Europe into social unrest. In France, this led to Napoleonic wars in 1815. 
Britain averted similar rebellion by savagely repressive laws.  
Detractors of the free-market, notably Marx and Engels in their Communist Manifesto, warned 
that such a system was unsustainable. But its supporters, most notably Adam Smith, in his 
Wealth of Nations, asserted that morally questionable consequences (such as economic 
exploitation and slavery) were a necessary price to be paid for “enhancing the prosperity of 
society as a whole” (Shutt, 1998). These events prompted the classical economists Malthus and 
Ricardo to rationalize and conclude about the inevitability of and the need to accept such cyclic 
disasters and suffering as part of the “invisible hand” of the free-market. Thus, the ruling class 
plus the elite did nothing to avert the suffering of the masses. Such conspiracy and lack of 
action, which is being repeated today with new globalized capitalism, led to an inevitable 
consequence – worldwide wars. 
Results and lessons of economic exploitation  
The growth of capitalism led to and was interrupted by the two world wars. In 1945, the West 
entered a new period of economic dispensation. Two lessons had been learned from the wars: 
that the state should ensure economic security for everyone; and international cooperation 
would be institutionalized to curb the effect of morbid nationalism like that of Adolf Hitler 
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(Shutt, 1998). Although the West was tilted to market orthodoxy, it was not fully applied. The 
state played a leading role in wealth creation and distribution. Employment was a key goal 
under the Keynesian economic doctrine. There was substantial growth of the economy in this 
period. But the period – called the boom period – lasted for thirty years, from 1945 to 1975. Then 
the oil-crisis started and there was a slump in economic growth. Markets became saturated and 
inflation rates soared. The control of inflation became the number one economic policy. Inflation 
was identified as the main cause of economic recession. 
Thus, in 1970s there was a return to market orthodoxy. The policies that evolved were aimed at 
keeping price stability and balancing budgets. Formerly, under the economic boom period, 
economist Keynes had propagated the use of control of prices and wages in the control of 
inflation (Shutt, 1998). But in the new economic dispensation, inflation was to be controlled by 
the control of money supply. This became the monetarist economic policy pioneered by Milton 
Friedman. But this approach has not, since 1970s, led to a rebounded economic growth. The 
global economy has been growing at only 2.5-3% at best, whereas in the 1950s and 1960s it grew 
at around 5% per annum. 
Shutt (1998) identifies the redundant, overvalued capital in the west as the root cause of reckless 
and uncontrolled market-globalization, which he argues is destructive. To deal with this huge 
capital, the West, through its governments and corporations, began to expand outlets 
throughout the world for investment. The public sectors of the OECD countries took debt out of 
the capital to finance their own budget in the face of inadequate revenue generation by the 
governments. Since 1970s, these countries have not recorded a budget surplus. US, France and 
Canada, in particular, have been in perpetual budget deficit. On average, an OECD country has 
a budget deficit of USD700bn in 2000s compared to only USD100bn in 1970s. In addition to 
investment through expanded outlets, the West privatized state-owned assets and government 
services. Other ways of coping with the excessive capital accumulation included, mergers and 
acquisitions, and high risk venture investments such as bonds. 
Using international financial institutions, these same policies were prescribed to other countries 
as a condition for getting aid. Typically, the prescribed policies are: decontrol prices, remove 
import barriers, remove barriers to capital movement, liberalize the financial sector, privatize 
state-own assets, balance your national budget, and introduce high interest rates to control 
inflation. With few exceptions (such as China, Poland and Czech Republic) most countries did 
not succeed in improving their economies. Those that did succeed (e.g. East-Asian Tiger nations) 
did not follow all the policy prescriptions, defying many.  
Easterly (2002) argues that for over 50 years since the World War II, the rich countries have 
applied all angles and interventions of the market economies to enable poor countries become 
rich, and have failed. The central problem seems to be the failure to sustain a high enough 
economic growth to support the value of existing capital at levels demanded by the capital 
market. The net result of this market capitalism is that it has increased public/private debt; 
reduced public services; increased deprivation even in rich countries (25% of the British 
population was deprived in 2002 compared to only 10% in 1970); increased fraud, corruption, 
organized crime, loss of state and corporate accountability, all because of deregulation and 
liberalization; increased conflict and terrorism; and increased unemployment. 
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New rationalization of the free market  
After the world wars, the free-market model was pushed to the periphery. But academics and 
intellectuals began to rationalize it again by 1950. Most notable is Friedrick von Hayek who 
published his essay “The Intellectuals and Socialism” in 1949 (Alkire and Ritchie, 2007) in which he 
tells his readers “to have courage to be utopian” by embracing the free-market ideals. Hayek’s 
publication of The Return to Serfdom established him as a high-profile theorist. He and his 
colleagues used mass communication methods of dissemination of their ideas. These included 
teachers, news-media, novelists, films and entrepreneurs. They recruited financiers, formed 
think-tanks and intellectual community through networking. Notable among these are Mont 
Pelerin Society, the University of Chicago Economics Faculty, the Institute of Economic Affairs 
in the UK formed in 1955, and American Enterprises Institute formed in 1943. The intellectual 
community outlined “fundamental principles” and chose “battle issues” to tackle, which 
included workers’ unions, inflation and privatization. They were supported and financed by 
corporate firms to polemicize for the market ideology and carry out technical and empirical 
studies.  
The now widening network of free-market enthusiasts begun to invest in talent: recruiting, 
training, supporting and rewarding brilliant young people. By 1970s their influence to revive the 
free-market and neo-classical economics had begun to have effect. Under President Jimmy 
Carter, USA carried out deregulation of the economy. In 1974, Hayek was awarded the Nobel 
prize in economics and Milton Friedman one of the bright early recruits in the network got a 
Nobel prize in 1976 (Alkire and Ritchie, 2007). These high profile awards signalled rapid 
changes towards free-market ideology under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in 1980’s. 
The ultimate signal to intervene massively in the global economy was the global oil-crisis, a 
disaster Hayek said he had predicted. Other opportunities of introducing the free-market 
policies included strategies, such as supporting dictators like Pinochet in Chile, because 
dictators created “a positive and necessary situation …to allow historic vices of statism to be 
corrected…” (Alkire and Ritchie, 2007). It was argued that an authoritarian regime would allow 
such reforms to take place. Thus, the return to free-market economics is not accidental, but was 
strategically plotted and planned. Some of the strategies were and continue to be immoral and 
evil. 
The eminent collapse of globalized capitalism  
But the market economy appears to be collapsing under its own weight. Some (eg Shutt, 1998; 
Amin, 2000; Raskin et al, 2002; Stigliz, 2002; Bello, 2004) have predicted that the market capitalist 
system will run its course over a few more decades and give rise to another economic and 
political order. The signs of this eminent collapse now occur more frequently. These signs 
include: trade cycle and market crushes (the collapse of Northern Rock bank in the UK and of 
housing mortgage market in the US are recent examples); rising inflation and public debts; 
rising food prices and food riots; huge surplus capital; increasing knowledge-based economy 
which will not need huge capital; weakening of states vis-a-vis powerful multinationals; erosion 
of legality; and lessening prospects for economic growth recovery.  
The current global financial crisis sparked off by the US mortgage market crunch appears to 
confirm that the free-market capitalist system has begun to disintegrate.  Current efforts to prop 
up the system by bailouts are superficial and do not address the structural flaws.  The root cause 
of the current wave of crises can be traced to October 12, 1977 when the US President Jimmy 
Carter signed the “anti-redlining” law which, with good intent, allowed people in poor 
neighbourhoods to get cheap loans for housing mortgages (Butler, 2008).  Western countries 
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were being flooded with cheap credit from the floating capital.  After September 11, 2001 attacks 
on the US by Al Qaeda terrorists the Federal Reserve took the US interest rate down from 6.25% 
to just 1%, to improve on the falling investment confidence.  Crotty (2008) argues that the flaw in 
the New Financial Architecture (NFA) is deep both in the institutions and the practices.  NFA is 
a global integrated system of giant bank conglomerates.  Based on the free-market, the financial 
institutions under NFA are hardly regulated at all.  Without regulations, perverse incentives 
driven by greed, has generated excessive risk-taking.  In addition, the mortgage-based securities 
to the short-lived boom were non-transparent and overpriced.  As NFA is interconnected and 
integrated, the high risk accumulated over time can be transmitted around the world easily and 
rapidly – as is happening now.  
Analysts have reached the following conclusions, that: true free markets do not exist, but are 
supported by the state in the West, acting in the interest of the multinationals; contrary to the 
optimism created by market economic system and globalization, there has not been an 
appreciable general rise in prosperity: instead poverty has spread around the world; 
unacceptable social consequences of market-based capitalism are set to worsen with the erosion 
of the power of the state; crippling economic policies have made more people worse off, while 
making the West and multinationals better off. In establishing a new and fair economic order, 
we must address the problems of capital surplus, public-sector deficits, and the huge gaps in 
living standards between the rich and the poor. 
The future of unreformed market system 
Although free-market capitalism has accelerated rapidly under the current phase of 
globalization, it is predicted not to be sustainable. In a study to forecast the future (Raskin et al, 
2002) it is predicted that under the market-driven development model, populations will grow 
almost uncontrolled. Incomes and overall economic outputs will increase significantly, but food 
requirements will also increase, which will leave over a billion people still hungry by year 2050. 
Poor countries will grow but the difference in wealth between poor and rich countries will 
widen. This will be a major cause for restlessness and war. The demand for water and energy 
will greatly increase and may become a cause for conflict. CO2 emissions will increase over the 
next 50 years causing further damage to climate stability. Forest cover will become further 
degraded. There will be more social instability from inequity and deprivation of some groups. 
The future envisaged is that of moving from one crisis to another, in environment, social and 
security and other aspects. But in the long run, the economic system will not be sustainable. Its 
logical destinies are conflict (wars) or “Fortress World”, where the rich 20% of the world and 
rich 20% of the poor countries will link up and barricade themselves against the rising anger and 
desperation of the rest. The privileged will control the disenfranchised through a police state, 
militarism and segregation. 
It is predicted that the current market frenzy, foot-loose market-driven globalization, cannot 
last. It may lead to economic boom in the foreseeable future. But its effects of environmental 
degradation, social polarization, increasing cost of living, the collapse of fisheries, stress on 
international food aid and water shortages, etc. will eventually lead to a global crisis (Raskin, et 
al. 2002). Attempts may be made to put in place rules to control the market frenzy, but the rules 
will be eroded by persistent poverty and social polarization. Gradually, widespread social revolt 
against global corporations will become inevitable. The current conspiracy and consensus on the 
market superiority will be questioned and will unravel. Responsible organizations, alliances and 
leaders will lobby governments to re-organize the economic system. There will emerge a giant 
coalition of individuals and organizations to respond to the world’s crisis.  
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The coalition will include enlightened groups, NGOs, corporations and individuals in all 
countries. In such widespread crisis, leadership at governmental and international levels will 
emerge to establish order, bring on board giant corporations, clean up the environment, 
improve equity and address poverty. Thus, the “wake-up” to sustainable development will 
begin. Ceilings will be imposed, with global agreements on CO2 emissions, ocean fishing, wood 
trade, etc.  International taxes will be charged to finance international health. Innovations and 
generous donations will finance poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods. 
A new drive to expand greatly information technology to all parts of the world will be inevitable 
as will be investing in the welfare of the poor and in the environment (Raskin et al, 2002). Only 
then will disparities among human societies reduce and improvement made in the environment 
and ecological stability. However, the basic incentives and values that drive markets will persist. 
The lure of materialism and opulence, driven by greed, will prevail in a good section of the 
globe’s population. Thus, there will inevitably be tensions between sustainable development 
and market-based economic growth. 
Market systems can be reformed 
As long as such values exist in society, and the market is placed above human life, divisions will 
always be with us. But in a scenario where there is a fundamental change in values, from 
materialistic lifestyle to less materialistic, sufficient and sustainable lifestyle, peace and stability 
can be achieved. This lifestyle is based on a satisfying the new art-of-living, which is culturally 
rich and pluralistic, of high quality within the context of global unity (Raskin et al, 2002). It calls 
for equal participation in governance and management of human and global affairs. This is not 
far-fetched. Value-based organizations (VBOs) could create giant networks and alliances 
advocating for a change of values.  
They could monitor governments to ensure that they are accountable and responsible. They 
could promote the reduction of prices and increase opportunities for employment in poor 
countries by making corporations and governments change their policies. Intense lobbying and 
education could make entire products be re-engineered with nanotechnology to save on energy 
and materials currently used in production. The corporate and government leadership could 
begin to adapt a more responsible attitude to the environment, social welfare and poverty. But 
to reach this situation, it is predicted that two factors would be critical: a crisis arising from the 
market frenzy, and the global realization that there is need for a change in values and lifestyle. 
Human societies have evolved through interactions with one another and through changes in 
lifestyle (Diamond 1997). So this would not be new or even the last in the evolution of human 
society. Human societal organization evolved from family to clan, tribe, and kingdom, empire 
and now global. It is becoming planetary. In the course of this long process of evolution, there 
were conflicts, wars and other forms of violence. Entire peoples were often annihilated; others 
subjugated by and integrated into dominant groups. Others are being exploited through unfair 
economic systems (Raskin et al, 2002). Fortunately mankind is equipped with enough 
knowledge and experience to reform the market system. If ultimate drivers are aligned with 
proximate drivers of change, the desired peaceful, healthier and equitable global society should 
be possible. Figure 7 shows the links between proximate and ultimate drivers of change. 
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Figure 7: Proximate and ultimate drivers of change 
Source: Raskin et al, 2002 
3.6 Health sector reforms around the world 
Reasons for reform 
A variety of reasons are officially given by the countries undertaking HSRs (Karlberg and 
Adamiak, 2002). First, they give economic difficulties, which range from the global economic 
crisis in 1980’s-90’s to specific problems, such as the slump in world prices of copper and coffee 
in Zambia and Ethiopia, respectively. Economic difficulties also arise from countries emerging 
from conflict, such as Mozambique, Angola and Uganda. Second, countries cite the escalating 
costs of health care. This is mostly cited by rich nations where the cost of new and better 
technology is higher and the level of expectations from health-care is rapidly rising. Third,
changing medical and health care technology, and methods of management are cited. For 
example hospitals had to be merged , in Sweden and others were closed down when it became 
difficult and costly to operate numerous small specialist hospitals in 1960s. 
Fourth, increasing expectations of better quality and effective services are given as another 
reason for reforms. This arises from better-informed patients and clients, more rights legislated 
or guaranteed in policy, and better technology, especially in the richer countries. Fifth, a 
common reason and trend in both poor and rich countries is the changing pattern of disease. In 
rich countries, diseases have shifted from infectious to non-communicable, and in poor 
countries, there is a double disease burden where both categories of diseases are prevalent. 
Previously the major problems were infectious diseases in poor countries. But with increasing 
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life-expectancy and changing life-styles, even in poor countries where the proportion of non-
communicable diseases has reached significant levels, there is need for reform of national health 
systems. 
Sixth, demographic changes are given as a major reason. Populations are getting older, i.e. the 
proportion of elderly people in the population is increasing. This brings with it changes in needs 
and demands on the health systems, and in turn the need for a change in the way the the health 
system is organized and managed. Finally, ideological and political reasons are given by 
different countries. In particular, there is a trend to regard the state as a poor provider and 
manager of health services. Market mechanisms are seen as superior in health and other types of 
service delivery. 
Reform aims and objectives 
Although the reasons vary in different countries, the aims and objectives of the HSRs in the 
countries undertaking them are strikingly similar (Papers II and IV). The main aim is to improve 
health service delivery. But specifically the following are often mentioned: to improve health, to 
respond to the population’s expectations, to provide financial protection to citizens, to raise 
resources for health service delivery, to improve equity, to use resources efficiently in order to 
improve the quality of care, and to make health-care systems effective. Often five or fewer of 
these objectives are given for HSR in different combinations (Walt 1994; World Health 
Organization 1997 ; Eriksson, et al. 2002). 
Process of reform 
Two distinct processes used by different countries to initiate and implement HSRs can be 
discerned. One is an internal political process. Here, a political group that is in power, usually in 
an established democracy, believes in the ideological values of market reforms and sets HSRs in 
motion. Technocrats remain to work out the details. It usually turns out that the details are the 
models of reforms used everywhere, which diffuses around the world. This diffusion of ideas 
occurs through pressure created by experts and consultants through advocacy. The models also 
get to be associated with legitimate, progressive and successful organizations (Eriksson, et al. 
2002). These organizational models become institutional standards and every country tends to 
adopt them. They are not adopted because they are proven to be efficient, but because they are 
perceived to be good and legitimate structures, processes or ideologies. 
The other process is one that is usually initiated and driven or directed by external agents, 
usually donor agents, using aid as leverage. This happens in poor countries, usually with 
limited or disorganized internal capacity, either because they are emerging from conflict or  
some economic/ social crisis. Depending on how functional and firm a poor country is on 
internal values, there may or may not be any internal control of the reform direction. For 
example, Uganda and Burkina Faso’s HSRs have largely been driven by international donor 
agencies, especially the World Bank, with little internal control (Haddad et al, 2006; Bodart et al, 
2001). But in Vietnam’s HSR, although also leveraged and implemented through an aid funding, 
there was sufficient control and maintenance of the socialized health system framework. This 
appears to have stemmed from the socialized health system that had been firmly established 
and is functional in Vietnam, and because of the strong belief in the values of equity and 
solidarity in Vietnam. 
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Content of HSRs 
Eriksson et al (2002) identify at least twelve distinct reforms have been commonly adopted and 
implemented in the health sector by different countries. The content, intensity and extent of the 
reforms tend to depend on types of approaches in the implementation of the reforms. These are 
whether 1) the reforms are managerial, without too much political direction and participation; 2) 
they are political in order to improve accountability and local democracy, or as a way of 
providing collective goods that are not effectively provided by the private sector or through the 
market system; 3) they are part of holistic economic reforms, affecting all sectors; or 4) the 
reforms are focused on the health sector alone. 
Commonest of the reforms seems to be decentralization. The other reforms include contracting; 
public-private partnership (PPP); priority-setting, commonly using an essential or minimal 
health package; hospital autonomy as a single reform or part of wider hospital restructuring; 
health insurance with various methods of co-payments and reimbursements; human resource 
reforms, mainly retrenchment and various incentive mechanisms, provider-payment reforms; 
purchaser/provider split; mergers; and financing reforms, which include user-fees (compare 
with the reforms in Uganda set out in Paper III).  
The result of reforms 
The result of HSRs follows a similar pattern, whether in high or low-income countries. Initially, 
there is usually a strong enthusiasm about HSRs in all countries. But the positive attitude is 
typically not matched with the actual results of the reforms. The ultimate benchmarks to assess 
the results of the HSR should be the health sector objectives – equity, efficiency, quality and 
financial protection. A review of HSRs in over 20 countries, shows no clear achievement of any 
of the health sector objectives (Papers IV and V). The same findings and trends were also noted 
in WHO,1997; WHO, 2000; Raskin et al, 2002;  Meredeth, 2005; Hancock, 2006). Instead, HSRs 
have had the following effects: a)they have solved management problems, but without 
significantly improving the health sector objectives, b) created new problems, with or without 
solving the old problems, and c) worsened the old problems. Table 3 summarizes the review of 
selected countries and table 4 provides an overview of HRS evaluation across different 
countries. 
Table 3: Health sector reform results in selected countries
Country Key problems 
identified for 
reform 
State of problem 
after HSR 
New
Problems 
created 
Effect of HSR 
on state of HS 
objectives
Burkina 
Faso
Inequity Access 
problems
Not changed Project-based 
HS
fragmentation 
Nil; have 
remained as 
bad as before 
Kyrgyzstan Inadequate funds. 
No private sector 
participation 
Increased funding 
through SHI 
Private sector 
involved
Increase in 
inequity 
Nil; same or 
worse 
Sweden Soaring costs. 
Services for the 
Partial cost 
containment 
Increase in 
waiting time 
Not evident; all 
objectives
Sam Okuonzi 
50
elderly established and inequity already had 
high scores. 
Uganda Access problems  
Inadequate funds 
Inefficiency 
Same
Same
Same
Fragmentation 
by projects 
and NGOs 
Nil; largely as 
before 
UK Waiting time (WT) 
Soaring costs 
WT better for 
only some 
Cost somewhat 
contained 
Increasing 
inequity 
Not evident; 
inequity is 
worse. 
Vietnam Inadequate funds 
No private sector 
participation. 
Increased funding 
through SHI 
Private sector 
involved
Increasing 
inequity 
Increased
inequity, no 
effect on others.
Source: GoU 1998; Eriksson et al, 2002; Haddad, Nougtara et al 2006 
Some beneficial health care reforms 
Despite the clamour for market solutions, there are numerous examples of successful non-
market health-care solutions leading to better health services in many countries. These reforms 
have often been ignored and even suppressed by market-oriented donors, such as the World 
Bank. It has therefore not been possible to get wide publicity and financial support to spread 
these good innovations around the world. Some of the reforms are small-scale and need to be 
scaled-up, and so require considerable funding. 
First, identifying good initiatives using low-cost interventions, but producing remarkable health 
outcomes, was done as far back as 1980s (Abel-Smith, 1994). The Rockefeller Foundation 
selected five outlier countries that seemed to have had much higher life expectancy for their 
level of the economy. These were China, Costa-Rica, Cuba, Kerala state of India and Sri Lanka. 
The study identified that these countries emphasized nutrition, land reform, universal coverage 
of primary education including females, a good degree of income equality, priority given to 
health ad community participation, and universally accessible and well-developed rural health 
care. 
Second, Chile is another country that has done well in reducing infant mortality through two 
phases of health reforms (Jimenez and Romero, 2007). The first phase focused on poverty 
reduction, PHC, environmental and demographic factors. The second phase focused on specific 
risks to children: parental risks, acute respiratory disease, congenital heart disease, and vaccine 
preventable infections. Chile with per capita income of less than USD5000 reduced its infant 
mortality to 8.9 per 1000 in the year 2000, matching the rates of wealthier countries. The strategy 
targeted public investment in social services. 
Table 4: Overview of evaluation of HSRs across countries 
Reason for 
reform 
Reform 
measure 
Results New problem 
created
Source of 
information 
Inequity: 
Uganda, 
Project based 
reforms 
No significant 
health system 
Health system 
fragmentation 
GoU 1998; 
(Haddad, 
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Burkina Faso improvement Nougtara and 
Fournier 2006) 
Inadequate 
funds for health 
services:
Kyrgyzstan 
SHI; user-fee 
policy 
Increased health 
sector funding 
Increased 
inequity 
Eriksson et al,
2001
Soaring health 
costs: Sweden;  
Variety of 
market
measures 
Partial cost 
containment 
Increased 
waiting time; 
increased 
inequity 
Eriksson et al
2001
No or little 
private sector 
participation: 
Uganda and 
Kyrgyzstan  
Facilitate 
greater private 
sector 
involvement 
Achieved  Increased 
inequity 
GoU, 1998; 
Eriksson et al,
2001
Source: author’s compilation 
Third, Ugandans had been battling against unpopular and regressive health user-fee policy for 
over ten years (Deinenger and Mpuga, 2004). In 2000, the government took a firm stand and 
abolished user-fees and marginally increased health funding to compensate for the revenues lost 
by the abolition. The impact of the abolition of user-fees on welfare was that health-care 
utilization increased dramatically and the aggregate benefits from the abolition of user-fees were 
significant. 
Fourth, the Netherlands enacted a health-care system in 2006 to achieve universal insurance 
(Naik, 2007). This was done to address the common problems of incomplete coverage, risk-
based fragmentation of the population, selection of less at-risk people for coverage leaving out 
those at high risk, such as the elderly, as well as people disabled and/or with chronic diseases. 
The law requires that all adults purchase insurance and all insurers offer a policy to anyone who 
applies, regardless of age or status of health. Individuals who cannot afford health plan 
premiums are subsidized by taxes. The government compensates insurers for providing 
coverage to high risk patients such as the elderly and those with chronic diseases. 
Fifth, a number of beneficial reforms have arisen out of research ( Savigny, Kasale et al, 2008). 
Tanzania Essential Health Interventions Project (TEHIP), through investing in improved district 
level planning and priority-setting together with modest investments in health services and 
careful and honest evaluation, demonstrated considerable returns inform of reduction in infant 
and child-mortality to the strengthening of district health management. 
Sixth, the Thai Universal Coverage Scheme was set up through research in financial protection 
and coverage, designing a new universal coverage, and setting up a monitoring and evaluation 
system (Hughes and Leethongdee 2007). At every step of the process, multiple studies were 
undertaken to help inform decision-making. Recent studies suggest that the scheme has 
increased financial access for the poor and provided much improved financial protection. A 
similar reform is being carried out in Mexico under the “Comprehensive health system reform”. 
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Seventh, a multi-country evaluation study of IMCI has highlighted that clinical training and 
interventions alone are unlikely to lead to positive impact (Bryce, Victora , et al 2004). It has 
underlined the importance of working through communities to extend service coverage as well 
as to enhance public accountability of service providers to the community.  
Eighth, in Ghana, antenatal care (ANC) was typically chaotic, inefficient and of limited benefit to 
mothers. The cases of malaria in pregnancy were high, accounting for 10% of admissions of the 
pregnant women and 9% of maternal deaths. Most health facilities practice “factory assembly-
line” approach, with separate unlinked services to the ANC. But in Tema General Hospital, a 
new system was introduced to improve the quality and effectiveness of ANC services, especially 
of integrating malaria in pregnancy (MIP) (Deganus 2007). The system employs individualized 
and comprehensive system of continued care. MIP strategies and DOTs for anti-malarial 
treatment and prevention are used. Information and education are given to the patient. 
Promotion of ITNs has been adopted under this new health care system. The promotion of 
partner (husband) involvement in ANC services has also been incorporated. The results over 
from 2002 to 2006 have been remarkable. There has been significant and consistent increase in 
utilization of ANC, delivery and post-natal services. Stillbirths and maternal mortality have 
markedly declined. There is also job satisfaction among health workers and client satisfaction 
with the services. Male involvement in ANC has tripled. 
Ninth, performance-based financing has become increasingly popular form of contracting in 
low-income Asian countries. The evidence from these countries shows that it can improve health 
service delivery. In Rwanda, this approach has yielded remarkable results(Soeters et al. 2006). 
Performance-based financing requires an independent well-equipped fund-holder organization, 
separating purchasing, provision and regulatory roles of local authorities from the role of 
contract management (negotiation, disbursement and monitoring). Local authorities are asked to 
respect the autonomous management of health facilities competing for public subsidies. A 
survey showed that the performance of health facilities had significantly improved, and there 
was remarkable consumer satisfaction with the new system. 
Tenth, in Malawi a multi-pronged strategy is being used to tackle malaria and human resource 
crisis (Okuonzi, Ali and Birungi, 2007). The problem-oriented approach based on evidence is 
used. Tailored responses to specific problems were found to be effective in addressing 
management problems. The government subsidized insecticide-treated mosquito nets (ITNs) 
and anti-malarial drugs as a way of reaching more vulnerable populations with these life-saving 
products. The malaria policy and guidelines were simplified for use by end-users. Directly 
observed treatment (DOT) was used to ensure compliance with the treatment regime. A 
gestational wheel was designed locally to help health workers estimate the age of gestation in 
order to determine the course of prophylactic dosages of anti-malarial drugs, which had 
previously been problematic. The combined use of private- and public-sector outlets for the 
distribution of the life-saving products was effective. Free mass retreatment of mosquito nets 
with insecticides was highly publicized and ensured that most of the nets were treated and 
effective in repelling or killing mosquitoes. 
These innovations stem from a policy where the national leadership, backed by donor-partners, 
has put malaria control as the number one priority of the health sector. Consequently, about 70% 
of pregnant mothers sleep under the ITNs, and 80% of them now take a second dose of the anti-
malarial drug, up from 37% before the new strategy. Indications are that there is a declining 
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prevalence of malaria. Placental malaria has decreased by 10%, malaria anaemia is down by 35% 
and low-birth weight, usually due to malaria, reduced by 13%. 
Malawi’s human resource crisis includes difficulties with staff retention, and net staff loss from 
the public-sector to the private-sector and abroad. Health staff shortage is thus a major problem. 
A strategic human-resource plan supported with financing from DFID, GTZ and Norwegian 
Church Aid has a staff retention programme. Started in 2005, this programme aims to retain and 
attract staff into public sector facilities by topping up salaries and providing non-monetary 
incentives (water, electricity and housing). Hardship allowance is also provided to those staff 
working in difficult areas, and to nursing tutors. 
The conclusion from these beneficial reforms is that they were generally initiated or driven 
internally. They were based on evidence or linked to locally done situation analyses. They were 
not tied to ideologically defined solutions, and they employed both market and government 
interventions – whichever was appropriate. They did not allow market solutions to obstruct the 
wider goal of equity and social justice. 
The health system of the United States 
Countries around the world often see USA as a market-driven success. This, it is assumed, 
includes the US health-care system, which is the market-based prototype. It is what is supposed 
to inspire other countries about how well a market-based system efficiently operates without 
government interference, but only with the guidance of the market’s “invisible hands”. But the 
US health-care system is probably the worst among high-income countries. Health-care 
expenditure in the USA has now reached an all time high of USD 6,697 per capita, twice that in 
any other developed country (McCarthy, 2007). Moreover, 47 million US inhabitants do not have 
health insurance or reliable access to health-care. Furthermore, by any measures such as infant 
mortality and life expectancy, US citizens are less healthy than people living in other developed 
countries that spend far less on health care.  
Today, the US health system, which is 100 percent market-driven, is much more problematic 
than systems that are less market-oriented. The system creates the highest health-care 
expenditure for the worst comparable health-care outcomes. It is highly inequitable. Because of 
unquestioning faith in the invincibility of the market, it is not regulated. As a result, the 
insurance system has segmented the population into risk classes or categories. Health-care has 
been left to the innovation and management of investors and entrepreneurs, who have taken full 
advantage of it. They have innovated methods for getting the highest possible profit, and have 
no energy or regard left over for the distributive ethic of health-care, which is cardinal in health 
service (McCarthy, 2007). 
In addition, the fee-for-service (FFS) is inherently complex and costly to manage. There are 
perverse incentives within the system that create waste and unnecessary procedures. Up to 30% 
of medical procedures in the US are unnecessary (Halvorson, 1993). Purchasers of health-care 
(both government and private sector) are unsure of and do not demand record quality or 
efficiency. The entire American health system lacks national control. It has become highly 
fragmented into numerous different organizations (White, 2007). The system needs non-market 
reform. Put another way, it needs the “visible hands” of the government. Costs have to be 
controlled, which requires government intervention. It is difficult to raise capital to set up health 
institutions such as HMOs that are unattractive to investors. This also requires the government.  
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There is a general lack of cohesion and sense of direction in the American health system, calling 
for further government intervention. The government is also a critical factor in ensuring equity, 
which is weak and getting worse in the US. And yet health-care systems are in fact about equity. 
The system requires to be “reformed”, and to get away from its extreme market orientation. The 
US health system, besides being relatively inefficient, is fast becoming unaffordable through 
health insurance. The system presently works in such a way that it fails to cater for people who 
are sicker, more at-risk and more in need. It is geared to individual profit, with individuals 
preferring to work alone rather than in teams. There are virtually no mechanisms for rewarding, 
demanding, monitoring and accounting for quality. Problems in the US health system are 
managed on ad hoc basis without addressing the bigger and whole health-care system 
(Halvorson, 1993). 
The US National Association of Community Health Centres, The George Washington University 
and the Robert Graham Centre, 2008 have, in a joint report, summarized the US health sector 
situation succinctly as follows: 
The US health care system is in a tailspin and in need of systemic reform. Rising  
numbers of people are uninsured or even underinsured, forced to delay care 
at the risk of imperilling health. Health care disparities continue to widen  
between the haves and have-nots. And tragically the US is rated dead last among 
19 other industrialized nations when it comes to premature deaths that could  
have been prevented by timely access to care. Access remains the most pressing  
challenge to our health care system, where the landscape continues to fragment  
with costly and diminishing health care choices for consumers…
The Nordic experience 
But the Nordic (or Scandinavian) experience is totally different. It is distinguished by the 
relatively short-time it took to attain human development and poverty eradication. This is based 
on the cardinal principles of universalism and equality of opportunity and outcomes, regardless 
of social class, income and gender differences (Lundberg, Yngwe et al, 2008). Internationally, 
Nordic countries have some of the lowest poverty rates, a direct outcome of welfare state 
redistributive system. These countries are distinguished for their low poverty rates among 
vulnerable groups such as families with many children, single parents and the elderly. Low 
poverty rates and compressed income distribution are beneficial to health and are curvilinearly 
associated. The key factor is the control and conscious directing of resources, both material and 
intangible, to conditions of life. Social spending and coverage by social insurance were found to 
be linked to significant overall improvement of life expectancy from a study of 17 OECD-
countries from 1900 – 2000. 
The strategy to reduce poverty in Nordic countries was relatively short and it was phased. 
According to Diderichsen et al, 2001, there are a number of points of entry and interventions to 
achieve universalism and equity, a strategy that Nordic countries followed: 
a) Modifying social stratification (eg creating parity between females and males) 
b) Modifying exposure, risk levels and distribution (eg control of alcohol consumption,  
     employment provided by the government) 
c) Modifying susceptibility (eg encourage and promote breast feeding, vaccination, and  
      screening for diseases 
d)  Modifying the consequences of diseases (subsidized insurance, labour market laws to ensure  
      the disabled are employed, sickness insurance, access to quality and effective health care) 
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e) Modifying social context (promote social participation, cohesion and capital) 
The Nordic experience may not work every where, but it provides important lessons to poor 
and rich countries. For the rich countries, the lesson is that universalism is the cornerstone for 
social and human development and sustainable poverty reduction. Another lesson is that life 
cycle perspective of social interventions is critical.  That is, interventions should be made at 
every stage of human life, throughout the life. Lessons for poor countries include: 
• It is critical to have or create the ability to coordinate, plan and implement policies. 
• Local actors (local authorities and NGOs)  need to be empowered to provide services 
• An educated or literate population is easier to deal with when applying social 
interventions 
• Economic growth should be converted into health or welfare promoting investments 
such as water, sanitation and education 
• Universalism should be planned at the onset; it is not the product of economic growth or 
better wealth 
• Inter-sectoral collaboration on health promoting interventions is critical 
• Trade and free-market policies should not trample on and dislodge beneficial social 
policies and programs 
• Universalism requires ambitious design of social programmes, without having to wait 
for economic growth to lift a country to a certain targeted level of the economic status 
• Poverty can be eliminated even by low income countries if social spending is well 
directed and managed according a well thought out social policy 
3.7 Update of key issues and reforms 
The quagmire of aid (from Papers I and II) 
International aid is a tool with which donors manipulate and influence policies in poor 
countries. The thesis papers (Papers I and II) show that using aid, donors have destroyed or 
disorganized social services. Since these papers were published, much more knowledge about 
international aid has become available, much of it supporting what the papers say, and filling 
gaps in these papers. 
Donors provide aid to poor countries with supposedly good reasons. These are to: 1) contribute 
to global public goods, 2) provide global health security (against epidemics, for example), 3) 
provide a show of solidarity, and 4) support their own domestic policy( Schieber et al, 2007). But 
these honourable intensions are often betrayed through the process by which aid is channelled 
and administered. Aid is often earmarked and spending is not usually in the short-term linkable 
to any concrete outcomes. Tax-payers in rich donor nations have begun to question the results of 
aid in poor countries. Hence donor agents are less inclined to fund health systems and provide 
budget support. They would rather focus on single diseases where spending can be linked to 
clear and usually numerical outputs, not necessarily linked to the desired outcomes. Studies 
have increasingly shown astonishing disconnect between country needs and priorities on one 
hand, and what donor-aid funds on the other. 
It has become clear that there are intrinsic problems with aid today (Schieber et al, 2007). First,
no one is in charge of aid globally. There are no mechanisms globally to ensure compliance to 
aid commitments or on how aid should be administered. Aid is short-lived, volatile, 
unpredictable, and often misaligned with recipient country needs and priorities. The Global 
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Health Initiatives (GHIs), for example, use application criteria to determine who gets how much 
aid, but not on who has the greatest need. Second, there are too many aid management 
instruments. Transaction costs of aid are therefore often high. Often there are no frameworks for 
measuring the results of aid spending. Third, many of the recipient countries are plagued with 
poor governance (usually corrupt and dictatorial regimes), weak public management, weak 
institutions, poor policies and low domestic revenues. In addition, at least 50% of donor 
assistance is usually off-budget and off balance-of-payments. Governments often reduce 
spending their internally generated revenues in areas favoured by donors, thus undermining 
the principle of additionality. 
Fourth, the health sector is complex, whereby recurrent funding is long-term, and hence largely 
unsuitable for aid funding. There are usually many organizations in the health sector, making 
agreement and consensus difficult. The private sector predominates in financing and delivery of 
health-care, but is not often involved in policy formulation. The regulatory framework for health 
systems is complex and requires a lot of investment. In health care, costly financial protection is 
essential, and this is unique only to health-care. These unique features of health-care do not 
match with the characteristics of aid. 
Hancock (2006) argues that aid is not assistance, but has become an aloof and mechanistic 
industry. The industry has increasingly become non-transparent and impenetrable. “Expertise” 
is bought from donor countries even when it is unsuitable or available in recipient countries. 
There are increasing cases of arrogant aid workers and leaders with paternalistic attitudes. 
Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is quoted as remarking about Ethiopian peasants 
that “We have to try to teach them the basics of long-term husbandry.”  
Aid through the Bretton Woods Institutions has become even more bizarre (Hancock, 2006). To 
get aid from the World Bank is a long and tortuous process, and yet much of the aid often funds 
only salaries and equipment. It is easier to get a loan for structural adjustment project, such as 
privatizing electricity or water supply, than for health services. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) determines which country gets loans from the World Bank, in conformity with the 
IMF rules. IMF conditions include devaluation of local currency, drastic cuts in public spending, 
especially education and health, reduction in food and other consumable subsidies, reduction of 
wages, abolition of price controls, privatization of public utilities, high taxes and high interest 
rates. Countries that obtain a World Bank loan find it difficult to spend it due to IMF rules. 
Under the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), only 28% of ODA receipts was 
spent during 1999-2005. This is because of the IMF’s rulings to keep inflation below 5% 
(McKinley 2007). And yet IMF’s own research suggests that up to 15% of inflation is benign and 
does not affect economic growth or investment. Such constraints on spending mean that social 
welfare targets, such as MDGs, cannot be achieved. 
Goldsborough (2007) argues that small fiscal deficits are assumed to lead to higher levels of 
private investment. But in reality investment chances are also influenced by other factors 
specific to a country, and not necessarily the inflation rate. Also, that medium-term and long-
term benefits of public spending are not factored as key drivers of economic growth. Most IMF 
inspired plans have short-term horizons. Projections of aid are usually conservative, and 
shortfalls in actual aid available are matched with spending cuts, usually on health and 
education. Schiebar et al. (2007) recommend that, given such a scenario with aid, a) countries 
should reject aid which is not aligned with national priorities, b) governance and public sector 
management should be improved as a precondition for an aid package, c) accountability 
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mechanisms should be set up for both donor and recipient countries, d) poor countries should 
begin to raise revenue for social services and wean themselves off aid in a well defined time-
frame, e) spending decisions should be unlocked from IMF conditions and based on cost-
effectiveness and equity considerations, and f) leadership at the highest national levels needs to 
be trained in the political economy of aid. 
A recent study on the quality of aid identified four criteria for deciding whether aid is bad or 
good. Bad aid is unlikely to produce any benefits and may even damage existing social welfare 
(Rodman, 2005). The criteria for bad aid are: 1) tying aid to ideological, bureaucratic, and profit-
oriented conditions; 2) aid administration structure that is huge and inefficient, and takes >15% 
of the total budget; 3) uninformed or ill-prepared and non-participating prospective 
beneficiaries; 4) the use of project approach in administering aid, in particular, where there is a 
proliferation of grants or sub-grants within the project. Some effort has been made to address 
the weaknesses of the current aid management.  
The “Paris diagnosis” which underpins the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness represents an 
unprecedented effort to rein the fragmentation that characterizes development aid today. It 
proposes a system to make aid work better by supporting country-led development (Fritz and 
Menacol, 2007). The declaration was signed in 2005 by 61 donors and 56 aid-recipient countries. 
The Paris framework consists of five components: 1) ownership by aid-recipient countries, 
where these countries set the agenda 2) alignment between donors and aid recipients, where 
donors align to recipient country agenda and systems, 3) harmonization among donors, where 
simple and common arrangements are used, and information is shared 4) managing for results, 
and 5) mutual accountability.  
The British House of Commons identified in a recent report two areas that are critical to make 
aid effective: a) division of labour among donors, and b) recipient country ownership of 
programmes and policies that aid funds ((Fritz and Menacol, 2007)). The report notes that the 
Paris Declaration defines ownership as “partner countries exercising effective leadership over 
their development policies and strategies, and coordinating their actions”. The report also makes 
reference to Christian Aid, a charitable NGO based in the UK, which identifies a strong link 
between ownership and the successful implementation of development policies: “the current 
development consensus is that countries are more likely to implement a policy if they own it”. 
According to this report, of the five principles of the Paris Declaration, “ownership” of policy is 
the “most fundamental”. Democratic ownership of policy involves the key stakeholders in the 
governance of a country - parliament, civil society, the executive and the public. 
For aid to be useful it is also essential that it is effectively used for capacity building.  
Development implies independence, which in turn implies adequacy or progress in the capacity 
of countries to solve their own problems.  Potter and Brough (2004) argue that aid can be used 
effectively to build capacity in the health sector of developing countries if the approach is 
systematized. They suggest a four-level hierarchy of capacity needs to be addressed, with nine 
elements altogether.  The four capacity needs are 1) structure, systems and roles; 2) staff and 
facilities (taking care of support service, facility, supervisory and workload capacities); 3) skills; 
and 4) tools (performance capacity).  Systematic capacity building entails diagnosis of sectoral 
shortcomings, designing an appropriate programme and monitoring framework to address the 
shortcomings, and more effective use of resources.  Based on extensive action research in 25 
states in India, this approach can be put to practical use anywhere.  The approach could provide 
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the best value for donor money if governments and development partners agreed to implement 
it. 
Sector-wide Approaches (SWAPs) (from Paper II) 
One way of streamlining aid management and coordination is through Sector-Wide Approaches 
(SWAPs). SWAPs were conceived to address the multiplicity of actors and funds in the health 
sector, which usually lead to duplication, confusion and lack of direction in the sector. Early 
efforts to conceptualize SWAPs started in early 1990’s. But a definitive guide based on a 
conceptual framework was made in mid 1990’s (Cassels, 1997). It was conceived as a partnership 
for a negotiated programme of work, which it was assumed would have a better chance of 
success than health projects. This meant that health policy and strategies would recast resource 
management, planning and capacity development differently. The implications were that 
donors would lose the right to select programmes to fund; the agreement between donors and 
recipient countries would be based on development objectives, not on conditions; local priorities 
and systems would be used as a basis for planning, funding and reporting; projects would be 
realigned; and donors would realign their aid instruments. SWAP was defined to cover the 
entire health sector including public, private and voluntary sectors. 
Paper II notes that SWAP was to be structured in such a way that it would be compatible with 
decentralization, as local governments would become a sector in their own right. While budget 
support was the preferred funding method, certain priorities would be ring-fenced or 
earmarked. Indicators of progress and performance would be agreed for the sector as a whole. It 
was preferred that some funds would be transferred directly to the people in the spirit of 
poverty alleviation and decentralization. SWAP was to have the political support and 
ownership of the country. Corruption and accountability were to be effectively addressed by 
SWAP mechanisms. While governments of recipient countries would take the lead in SWAPs, 
donors would now scrutinize national authorities more critically. SWAPs would require clear 
and agreed policy goals, instruments and priorities. SWAP resource requirements would be 
projected over short, medium and long terms.  
It would be critical to get the balance between the health-care package to be funded and its 
sustainability (Paper II). The instrument for this balance would be the medium-term 
expenditure framework (MTEF) (Paper IV). Institutional capacity building would include 
leadership development; structures, systems and incentives; and establishing management 
systems. Common management arrangements would be agreed for monitoring and evaluation, 
financial management and procurement. Agreement with partners would include guidelines, 
statement of intent by donors (partners), memoranda of understanding (MoUs), code of conduct 
and practice. The SWAP programme would require joint appraisal, reviews and planning. 
Planning cycles of the different partners would be harmonized with that of the recipient 
country. The role of technical assistance (TA) would be clarified and aligned to the agreed 
programme of work, and staff development would ensure continuity of programme 
implementation. 
In a number of countries that embarked on SWAPs in the early days (Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Mozambique, Zambia and South Africa), SWAPs were found to be unstable due to constantly 
changing groups of actors, many of them fiercely protective of their independence and 
autonomy (Walt et al. 1999). There were numerous setbacks and crises. But there were also 
unexpected good spin-offs. SWAPs depended very much on the institutional and systematic 
issues in donor/recipient contexts. They also depended on the capacity of the recipient 
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government to develop the health sector on its own and on the capacity to negotiate a realistic 
programme package with donors. 
In Uganda, SWAP was adopted in 1999. The agreed programme of work was the Health Sector 
Strategic Plan (HSSP) and its structures included Health Policy Advisory Committee (HPAC), 
Health Sector Review Committee (HSRC), Joint Supervision, the National Health assembly, and 
Health Sector Working Groups. MoUs were signed to use the government budget as the basis of 
donor funding (Murindwa 2001; Örtendahl 2007). According to an early assessment (Murindwa 
2001) SWAP made some achievements in Uganda. It raised the health sector profile in the 
national politics and helped mobilize more resources. It increased funding to PHC by fourfold. 
It helped to increase immunization coverage (DPT3) by two times (41% to 73% from 1999 to 
2003) and increased OPD attendance by two times from 1999 to 2004. But this situation was 
dramatically reversed since 2005 (Örtendahl 2007). GoU’s budget increments from own revenue 
have ended. The health budget as a proportion of the national budget has declined from over 
10% in 1990’ies to 8.3% in 2006. The ministry of finance attributes the decline of the health 
budget to increased project funding, the poor quality of budget prepared by the MoH and more 
funds now being channelled to the energy sector, the current number one priority for the 
government. Annual project funding increased dramatically through the Global Health 
Initiatives (GHIs) - mainly GFATM, PEPFAR and PMI - from USD250 million in 2004 to USD500 
million in 2006, bringing per capita expenditure on health from USD9 to USD15. 
The current decline in SWAP’s performance is attributed to four factors (Örtendahl 2007). First is 
the weakness in the health sector leadership, especially the long period of leadership vacuum at 
the MoH after the Director General left the MoH. In addition, the current new team at the MoH 
is inexperienced. There is also dire interference by the State House whereby presidential 
advisors/ ruling-party activists have been posted to manage the MoH. Second, GHIs have 
destabilized the health sector greatly. GAVI’s lack of clarity and transparency led to huge sums 
of money being channelled by health ministers to the State House, a scandal in which the three 
health ministers were arrested and are now in court. Uganda’s GFATM programme was rocked 
by a mega-scandal where millions of dollars were embezzled and by gross mismanagement. 
This has paralyzed policy-makers, implementing agencies, and relations with the MoH for over 
two years now.  
PEPFAR has fragmented HIV prevention by insisting on abstinence-only methods, when the 
success of Uganda’s HIV prevention has been ABC (Abstinence, Being faithful, and Condom 
use). US President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) has started a new malaria control programme 
outside the MoH and the government system. The programme has so much money that it would 
overwhelm the counter-funding by GoU and all sustainability strategies. It has disrupted the 
national malaria programme completely. Such huge projects have directly clashed with SWAP 
and HSSP principles. The GHIs have re-introduced duplication, administration burden, and the 
burden for coordination of many parallel efforts and systems, the very reasons why SWAP was 
introduced.  
Third, it has been argued that dependence on external aid causes macro-economic instability 
because aid unduly appreciates the value of the Uganda shilling making exports difficult and 
more expensive. It drives up interest rates and hence discourages investment and so reduces 
GDP growth. It causes inflation of staff and material costs, for which aid competes against the 
local currency. In addition, dependence on aid reduces the demand for internal resources and 
hence reduces tax revenue.  
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Fourth, donor countries like to flag-show the projects they fund. Through SWAP, flag-showing 
tends to disappear as achievements are seen as collective effort. But for donors who like to 
show-off their contribution and achievement, this is an unwelcome trend, which they want to 
stop. The key lesson is that SWAP does not suit everybody’s interests, both within the country 
and in the donor community. So, major compromises have to be made for SWAP to work. A 
balance has to be struck between the project-approach and budget support, as the two 
approaches will most likely continue. An agreement for SWAP needs to be extended to non-
SWAP partners on integrating projects. New discussions to reform SWAPs have been held 
based on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.  
The new initiatives that were recommended include: The Global Fund’s Country Coordinating 
Mechanism (CCM) to be the SWAP arrangement based on a common fund. TAs should be 
integrated into government’s staffing structure of the MOH and other ministries. Aid 
partnerships should be rationalized to reduce transaction and administration costs. Guidelines 
for managing partnerships should be simplified and made easy to implement. SWAP 
arrangements and plans should support macro-economic balance, and the balance between 
projects and the budget-support. There should be an agreed strategy to share and use effectively 
non-financial resources such as staff and materials. Finally, SWAP should be informed by an 
overarching national planning framework. 
But a reformed and highly compromised SWAP is unlikely to meet the original purpose for 
which it was established – that is, to prevent health sector fragmentation, duplication of roles, 
and high cost of management (Paper II). From the start, some (eg Hancock, 2006) doubted the 
viability of partnership with donors to develop national health systems. 
The abolition of user-fees (from Papers IV and V) 
User-fees were finally abolished in Uganda’s health sector in 2001. The political cost of user-fees 
had risen sharply. A survey had only recently concluded that the greatest problem people had 
was with accessing health-care, and the biggest obstacle was identified to be user-fees (GoU, 
1999). A household survey also reported that 51% population living within walkable distance 
from health facilities did not use the facilities due to user-fees. With presidential and 
parliamentary elections due soon, user-fees became a major issue in 2000. When an analysis was 
made on the benefits of user-fees, they were found to be negligible.  
User-fees contributed only 3.6% of public sector health revenue. The cost-recovery of health 
facilities was 3-5%, with only two hospitals raising over 10% of total revenue from user-fees 
(GoU, 1999). The abolition of user-fees led to a dramatic increase in health facility attendance 
estimated to be over 100%. Donors demonized the abolition of user-fees, arguing that it was 
causing a crisis in the payment of staff and in drug supplies. But the “crisis” of patients 
overwhelming the health-care system was not caused by the abolition of user-fees. It was due to 
the paucity of the overall health financing, as the contribution from user fees was so small. 
A study compared household funding data for Uganda for 1999/2000 and 2002/03, i.e. before 
and after the abolition of user-fees in public sector health services (Deininger and Mpuga, 2004). 
The policy to abolish user-fees was found to have improved the use of health-care, and reduced 
the probability of sickness in a way that was particularly beneficial to the poor. The study noted 
concerns about the poor quality of health-care, but demonstrated that aggregate benefits of no 
user-fees were significantly larger than those with user-fees in place. Another study to assess 
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possible changes in the quality of health in public health facilities was also carried out following 
the abolition of user-fees in Uganda (Nabyonga, Karamagi et al, 2007). It showed that both 
technical and consumer assessed quality of health-care was maintained at the same low levels 
even after the abolition of user-fees. This indicates that, in the context of Uganda, user-fees had 
negligible role in improving the quality of health care. 
The user-fee policy continues to be controversial. Some think that at least a moderate level of 
cost recovery is justifiable to put social services on a sound footing. That, the potential negative 
consequences of a modest user-fee is a small price to pay. But others argue equally strongly that 
user-fees discriminate against the poor. In theory, both outcomes are possible. But the practical 
implication for policy is that the empirical evidence in any given setting to determine whether or 
not to levy user fees will be critical. 
Private sector and public-private partnership ( from Papers IV and  V) 
The role and influence of the private sector in the health sector has multiplied many fold in 
recent years. In Uganda during the 1960s, the health system was fashioned on the UK’s National 
Health System: public funded and provided (Paper I). The private sector was small, serving 
white expatriates and Indian traders. During the 1970s and 1980s, the health system collapsed 
due to economic decline following political mismanagement and prolonged civil conflict. This 
brought about the emergence of informal private sector (unregistered and unrecognized by the 
State). In the 1980’s and 1990’s, the Government begun to acknowledge the increasing and 
important role played by the church health sector, and later by the private-for-profit providers. 
Paper I notes new laws that were enacted in 1995 to promote and regulate the private sector. 
Most health professionals were permitted to operate private practice. Previously, only doctors 
and midwives were allowed to practice. Those employed in government services were not 
prohibited from operating private practice. Recently, a public-private partnership policy in 
health (PPPPH) was completed. It recognizes that the private sector consists of private-not-for 
profit (PNFP), traditional and complimentary practitioners (TCP), and private-for-profit (PFP). 
However, except for PNFPs, no formal partnership has yet been developed between the state 
(public) and the private sector. 
A study (Konde-Lule, Okuonzi et al 2006) showed that the informal health sector (i.e. those not 
recognized by the state) made up 77% of “health facilities” in the community. But only 7% of the 
population had ever visited these informal facilities; 56% preferred formal facilities, and 42% 
preferred self-treatment. In practice, the theoretical demarcations between sectors are 
dismantled through a dynamic interaction between formal and informal health-care systems, 
and public and private sectors. Of all referrals, 60% is between public and private sectors. The 
two sectors also share services (such as x-rays) in 20% of cases, and personnel in 8% of cases.  
This study was an effort to justify a greater partnership between private and public sectors. But 
the global study involving China, India, Laos, Vietnam, Zambia and Uganda concluded that the 
concept of public-private partnership needed to be further refined (Sunderwall and Forsberg, 
2006). It emerged that partnerships have three dimensions: co-existence, competition, and 
collaboration. But true partnership with a shared vision does not exist in the real world. Rather, 
partners aspire to work together while pursuing different visions. The public sector is always 
grappling with funding, efficiency and political pressures. The private sector has to meet the 
challenges of profitability, legal framework and personnel. The study also found that 
partnership is not always a desired intervention, with the two sectors intrinsically suspicious of 
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each other. The study has thrown light on what has been labelled as “partnership”, when in fact 
it is privatization. The public sector, having failed to provide services to the whole population as 
often planned, unintentionally creates a “market” for health-care. This opportunity is seized by 
entrepreneurs, many coming from the public-sector, itself. PPPH has become a mainstream 
development agenda in developing countries.  
In Europe where partnerships have worked there are certain prerequisites in place (Nikolic and 
Maikish, 2006). These are: functional regulatory systems, available skills to manage partnership, 
enough time has been given to nurture the partnership, in-built business and management 
functions, well-defined consultations, and clear channels of communications with all 
stakeholders. Most of these pre-requisites lack in Uganda and other African settings and require 
cultivation. 
Health insurance and health financing (from Papers II, IV and V) 
The initial excitement about user-fees gave way to disillusionment and frustration (Paper II). 
The miserable generation of revenue from user-fees, and its negative impact on equity, ruled out 
user-fees as a viable financing method of health services where the majority are too poor to 
afford the basic requirements. The projected health expenditure of Uganda’s outstrips the 
current health expenditure four-fold. Without another source of funding, it would require the 
Government’s budget to grow at 6% per annum (Paper I).  
It has been argued that the best way to assess how much a country should spend on health 
should be through international comparisons of national incomes and health spending 
(Musgrove, 1996). Thus, in a country below the GDP of 500USD per head, no additional 
expenditure can in fact make a significant difference in health gains. Such health gains are 
possible between GDP of 500-2000USD per head. Above 2000USD, child-health gains nearly 
reach their peak, and adult life expectancy continues to increase. These gains are mainly through 
education and environmental improvements. Above a GDP of USD 500, even life expectancy 
reaches the peak. By this logic, the cost of supply health-care based on need would be too high 
for the corresponding income and a minimal defined package of health care would be advisable. 
For Uganda, the package is around USD 28 per head (or USD 40 including anti-retroviral 
therapy (ART). This is not affordable. One group of advocates has called for increased donor 
funding of the “basic” package and to address MDGs. A typical example of such advisory is 
Jeffery Sachs, advisor to the UN Secretary General (Sachs, 2005).  
But Uganda’s economists in its finance ministry argue that increased donor funding of health 
under the guise of MDGs is flawed (Browbridge, 2004). It necessitates increased internal public 
expenditure. This shifts resources away from export industry and private investment. Also, 
there are usually absorptive and spending problems with aid. In addition, donor funds distort 
public budget allocation patterns, cohesion and stability. They argue that MDGs would require 
a budget equivalent to 13.6% of Uganda’s entire GDP, which is arguably not possible. Instead, it 
is advised that Uganda should concentrate on economic growth. In ten years, it is estimated that 
the country’s revenue will have increased by 150%, which will enable the government to spend 
about 15% of its budget on health. Then, MDGs or similar social targets will begin to be 
addressed; and this has become policy for Uganda. 
With such an economic policy, government funding of health and related services will be greatly 
limited and social targets such as MDGs will remain a mirage. There have been efforts to 
identify other viable sources of health financing. Social Health Insurance (SHI) has become a 
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popular possible financing option for Uganda. A feasibility assessment was done in 2000 
(Berman et al, 2001). Feasibility was defined in three dimensions: financial and affordability, 
capacity and experience, and knowledge of users and funders. A key objective of the SHI is to 
mobilize funds through contributions of co-payment and co-insurance. SHI is distinguished 
from National Health Insurance (NHI) and tax-funded systems by being restricted to only those 
who are eligible, making benefits correspond with benefit packages, separating the funds from 
general tax, maintaining its own solvency, and by the fact that contribution rates and benefits 
are only altered by legislation. SHI has the advantages of being stable, good for risk pooling as 
well as mutual support. It can ensure efficiency and quality in health-care, and can free 
resources for other services. It can also provide an orderly transition to NHI. 
However, it is often limited to formal employees, creates funding deficits, requires supporting 
public funding, and may create unnecessary demands (Berman et al. 2001). In Africa, the 
National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) of Kenya has been relatively successful. But success 
elsewhere in Africa in SHI has been greatly limited. In Uganda, the feasibility study 
recommended 8-10% contribution rate, and an intense preparation and investment in a) the 
mechanisms for collection of funds, b) management and regulation, c) improved health care 
provision, and d) accreditation and quality control. 
Macroeconomics and health (from Papers IV and V) 
Macroeconomics has recently become the single most important factor determining how health 
care can be financed and reformed (Paper IV; WHO, 2001). Macroeconomics stability refers to 
the national budget balance against domestic debt burden (internal balance) versus balance of 
payment against debt-service burden (external balance) (Ekman and Gerdtham, 2006). 
Macroeconomic stability became a key feature of the IMF/World Bank programming model, 
which was imposed on countries as a condition for loans. The macroeconomic stability model 
has three components: fiscal, monetary and financial policies. Fiscal policy deals with taxation 
and expenditure, and monetary policy deals with the government’s regulation of money supply 
and interest rate. And financial policy deals with mobilization of savings and resources for 
investment and employment, and also addresses social problems (Vernengo, 2006). 
The macroeconomic stability model preferred by the World Bank and IMF stems from orthodox 
or mainstream economics. It opposes the Keynesian neo-classical economic theory which was 
applied in 1950’s and 1960’s in the golden age of capitalism (Epstein and Grabel, 2007). The 
Keynesian approach was that the state was the general agent of economic growth. The state 
mobilizes savings, directs investment and employment creation, creates and directs credit, and 
provides financing for investment. But using orthodox or neo-classical economics, the IMF, 
World Bank and the US Treasury put together a new policy called the Washington Consensus 
(Stigliz, 2002; Sachs, 2005).  
The basis of this consensus policy was that state regulation of the economy is counter-
productive. The economy should be controlled by price and competition, that is, through market 
mechanisms. It was argued that state regulation lowers interest rate and increases inflation, 
making people save abroad, and increases consumption. When consumption increases, prices 
increase, resulting into more inflation. When inflation is high, there is low saving, and banks 
have only a small pool of money. Therefore, there is reduced investment, employment and 
economic growth. Domestic markets are fragmented and dominated by politically connected 
borrowers. As a result, genuine borrowers get disenfranchised and consequently 
entrepreneurship, employment creation and economic growth suffer. 
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Under the Washington Consensus, it is claimed that domestic financial systems should be 
liberalized to increase investment and efficiency of the economic system (Stigliz, 2002; Sachs 
2005). Efficiency can be attained through the discouragement of corruption, enforcement of 
market discipline, and innovation of different financial instruments, such as capital markets. 
Indeed, this policy did help in integrating global markets and enabling governments to borrow 
from financial capital markets. But most of the envisaged benefits did not materialize. There 
were negative effects on the poor and many cases of capital flight. The real interest rates were 
often high, not low. There was slow credit creation. Credit and capital became cyclical, and long-
term capital was not available. There was always insufficient capital for small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). 
However, recent studies and analyses (Vernengo, 2006; Epstein and Grabel, 2007; Filho, 2007; 
Weeks and Patel, 2007 ) show various ways in which these macroeconomic policies of the 
Washington Consensus have been damaging to the poor. The net effect of the policies has been 
to starve the poor of basic social services. But a variety of interventions have been proposed to 
achieve macroeconomic stability, while at the same time addressing equity and unemployment, 
and keeping inflation low and achieving economic growth. Under fiscal policy, it is suggested 
that in order to achieve a pro-poor macroeconomic stability, one needs to identify the desired 
outcomes, specify the macro-variables, and differentiate between excessive and non-excessive 
economic fluctuations. Commonly, the macro-variables are: a) the rate of economic growth, b) 
distribution of income, and c) investment and expenditure. Under the monetary policy, it is 
suggested to target credit for investment in pro-poor sectors and control capital flow into the 
country, since uncontrolled capital inflows destabilize the economy.  
Under the financial policy, pro-poor interventions suggested include depositing insurance to 
enhance confidence in the economy; directing credit allocations and subsidized-lending to the 
poor; establishing and implementing lending-targets, ceilings and tax incentives; establishing 
specialized lending-institutions and development banks; establishing credit-guarantee schemes 
to reduce premiums on long-term investments; introducing variable asset-based reserves for 
stocks, bonds and mortgages; improving and easing lending through information and business 
services by linking formal and informal financial institutions; providing technical support to 
micro-credit institutions to serve borrowers better; and introducing employment-oriented 
financial policies. 
Without pro-poor macroeconomic policies, it would be impossible to achieve MDGs (Vernengo, 
2006). The necessary domestic resources would not be mobilized and allocated effectively to 
pro-poor sectors and activities. Also, external aid would not be adequately mobilized under the 
orthodox macroeconomic framework, which discourages aid inflows because it is deemed to 
increase inflation. Under the auspices of WHO, a Commission for Macroeconomics and Health 
(CMH) was created which made two key recommendations. First, in order to achieve MDGs, aid 
must be significantly scaled up. Second, low income countries should mobilize higher levels of 
resources for health and related services through increased domestic budgets (WHO, 2001).  
The report also urges poor countries to determine an essential package of interventions as a 
priority based on their efficiency, ability to target the highest burdens of diseases, ability to 
provide the highest possible social benefits at the lowest cost, and ability to address the needs of 
the poor. It was calculated that a minimum basic package would cost about $30-40 per head. The 
report lays out an agenda for action, urging countries to form national committees on macro-
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economics in health and to formulate national strategies. It also urges donors to commit funds, 
estimated at US$38billion, by 2015 globally. Other action points include defining effective 
funding mechanisms, funding global public goods (surveillance, data collection and 
dissemination), and develop ing drugs for neglected diseases. 
The GoU has carried out a consultancy to chart the way forward to develop a strategy for 
macro-economics and health. The Government currently prefers tax revenue generation to 
getting more aid through grants. But its current tax revenue is only 12% of GDP, below the 
critical 15% (Ekman and Gerdtham, 2006). While aid is feasible over medium term to long term, 
in the short term the government is urged to mobilize funds from projects to fund its health 
budget. One way in which it was thought funding would be increased to social sectors was 
through the debt cancellation of the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC), of which Uganda 
was one. But after the debt cancellation, resources to health sector did not increase significantly. 
At the same time, the debt problem has not been solved since new loans have been taken. In 
addition, the domestic loan in Uganda is now larger than the external debt. The report 
recommends a rigorous analysis based on evidence of what works and what does not, and why. 
Based on available information, the key issues to address are water, sanitation, education, family 
planning, evidence-based policy development and systematic use of impact evaluations. 
Decentralization of health services (from Paper III) 
Decentralization is said to be important for proper implementation of PHC (WHO, 1978) 
planning, community participation and for HSRs (Paper III and Okuonzi S and Lubanga F 1997). 
In Uganda, decentralization has been defined as the transfer of authority or power for planning, 
management and decision-making, and for resources, responsibility and accountability from the 
central government to local governments. Decentralization in Uganda is holistic, i.e. it covers all 
sectors of the economy. The health sector is just one of the sectors. Uganda planned and 
implemented an elaborate decentralization. Local and community structures were put in place, 
and real authority and roles were devolved to lower level units.  
The reasons for decentralization in Uganda included community participation, local self-
reliance, promotion of accountability, overcoming administrative constraints, promoting 
coordination at the implementation level, and promoting market surrogates for efficiency. 
Although many responsibilities are decentralized in Uganda in theory, only planning, some 
resource allocation, limited policy-making, and service delivery are practiced by local 
authorities. In designing decentralization, the critical issues are the capacity to raise revenue, 
institutional capacity and the use of incentives.  
Mills et al. (1990) differentiate between political and managerial decentralization. In the former, 
the aim is to achieve collective services for the public, and emphasizes accountability, which is 
good for local democracy. But the latter’s aim is to improve services and efficiency through 
market mechanism. Although Uganda combined both features in the design, it appears that 
decentralization in the country has turned out to be political, more focused on local democracy 
than on efficiency and improvement of services. Major management problems in the health 
sector have thus remained unabated. Other problems have even increased with decentralization. 
Decentralization overwhelmingly changed the organizational landscape of health care delivery. 
But access to health care has remained difficult (Saito, 2004). 
Decentralization was meant to bring services nearer to the people (Saito 2004).In addition to 
reduced access to health services, the quality of health care has worsened. Drugs have become 
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less available, patients wait long to be seen by health workers, and the attitude of health workers 
has remained unfriendly and rude. There are more unqualified staff working in rural health 
units than before and are preferred by local authorities because of their low salaries. With poor 
health worker motivation, the overall perception by the population of health-care delivery in 
Uganda is said to be “worse than before” (Saito, 2004). Corruption appears to have been 
decentralized and increased. There is widespread practice of bribery, under-table payments, and 
“leakage” of drugs. Not only have the local authorities failed to control corruption, but they are 
also involved in it themselves (Saito, 2004). There are too many local units and not adequate 
funding to meet overhead costs. In less than 10 years, the number of districts has increased from 
33 to the current 80. Other lower level units have multiplied in the same proportion. The bulk of 
the funding to the local governments (85%) is from the centre, of which most (70%) is earmarked 
or conditional. 
Bossert (2000) argues that decentralization can improve or worsen health system development, 
depending upon how it is done. Lessons from the Philippines indicate that decentralization was 
planned in such a way that quality and other HSD objectives were kept in mind as a main focus. 
In particular, health workers were reassured, made confident and secure in their jobs and 
benefits. Simple changes in management practice, such as stopping an allowance (in the case of 
Uganda, immunization allowance), can cause enormous damage to health-service delivery. In 
Uganda, the decline of national immunization coverage in early 2000’s was attributed to the 
abolition of immunization allowances. Operational funds, drugs, supplies and infrastructure 
should also be catered for if the quality of health-care is to improve. In the case of Uganda, all 
factors associated with quality worsened with deepening decentralization.  
Other factors must also have contributed, but decentralization as a major vehicle of reform for 
“bringing services to the people” did not help in any significant way to curb the deterioration of 
health-service delivery (Paper III; Saito, 2004). It is clear that a review of the health-sector 
decentralization is needed. The choice of level of authority, the choice of authority, the tasks to 
be decentralized, and how to achieve HSD objectives within the decentralized framework need 
to be comprehensively reviewed. 
The poor performance of the health sector under the decentralization regime in Uganda can be 
attributed to four main factors (Saito, 2004). First, it turned out to be a political rather than 
managerial decentralization. Local governments increased exponentially in number and hence 
became less viable to operate. District status was granted to many small communities merely to 
reward them for their political support or to solicit support for the ruling party. Second, there is 
a huge discrepancy between the responsibilities given to districts and the resources they have at 
their disposal to perform those responsibilities. Third, due to the weakening of local 
governments by continuously subdividing the country into more and smaller districts, capacity 
building of institutions has largely failed. Finally, there has not been any viable incentive 
structure and mechanisms to enable an effective service delivery to be carried out. 
Pharmaceutical sector reforms (from Paper I) 
The National Drug Policy (NDP) clearly establishes the guidelines for the Ugandan drug supply 
system, and stipulates that the NMS is one of a variety of institutional entities responsible for 
drug supply being charged specifically with the quantification, procurement, storage and 
distribution of essential drugs to the government health care system (Paper I).  The NDP seeks 
to assure the attainment of a good standard of health for the population of Uganda, by ensuring 
the availability, accessibility and affordability at all times of high quality essential drugs, and by 
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promoting their rational use. A principal tenet of the NDP is that essential drugs should be 
accessible to all patients who need them.  This has the dual implication that essential drug 
supply must be assured at all times, at all levels of the health care system, and that all patients 
can afford essential drugs regardless of their socio-economic or health status.   
Though National Medical Stores Act calls for the NMS to be an efficient and effective supplier of 
medicines and medical supplies, this objective needs to be achieved in a manner that fosters 
distributive equity (Paper I).  The two objectives – distributive equity and efficiency – can be 
promoted and to a certain degree achieved simultaneously, but where a trade-off must be made 
between the two, concerns for distributive equity must prevail over the need for efficiency.  As 
the demands on the country’s healthcare system continue to grow, so too will the demands for 
the provision of essential medicines and medical supplies.  How effectively the national health 
care system responds to these demands will in a significant way depend upon how effective and 
efficient the NMS will be in satisfying its mission.   
However, NMS is only one of several institutions responsible for ensuring that the demand for 
drugs and medical supplies is adequately satisfied (MCDI and SCL, 2006). Uganda’s drug 
supply system is comprised of a number of supporting entities that have significant roles to play 
in the efficient procurement, storage and distribution of pharmaceutical products to the public 
health sector in all reaches of the country. Among the entities that comprise the drug supply 
system, the MoH together with the NDA is charged with planning and forecasting of the 
national essential medicine need as defined by the minimal health care package.  The NDA is 
also charged with the efficient regulation, registration and quality assurance assessment of the 
nation’s drug supply.  The MoH, together with the Ministry of Finance are responsible for 
funding the drug supply (through the essential medicines Credit Line and the Primary health 
Care (PHC) grant funds) to meet the public sector need and finally, since the enactment of the 
Local Government Act, the districts, and more specifically the District Director of Health 
Services (DDHS), are responsible for quantifying the local drug supply needs and 
communicating these requirements to the NMS to ensure the timely delivery of medicines, and 
through the use of the Credit Line and PHC Grants to finance the procurement of these drugs. 
Together, the GoU, through the MOH, MFPED, NDA and DDHS are responsible for working 
with the National Medical Stores to ensure the efficient procurement, storage and distribution of 
quality medicines and supplies to support the country’s growing public health needs. 
Reforms that have impacted on the drug supply system in Uganda are as follows (MCDI and 
SCL, 2006):  
1991: Public sector liberalization and privatization introduced by Government of Uganda: In an 
effort to improve efficiency and public sector service delivery effectiveness throughout the 
country, the Government of Uganda began evaluating the prospects for liberalization and 
privatization as part of their public sector reform strategy.  Initially, discussions regarding 
privatization covered a broad range of industries and government held enterprises and 
considered varying levels of privatization from complete divestiture to outsourcing specific 
functions within existing public sector organizations.  The government’s formal policy and 
statutes on liberalization and privatization were introduced under the Public Enterprise Reform 
and Divestiture Act (PERD) of 1993.  This Act coincided with the preliminary efforts to liberalize 
and privatize the national drug supply system – a process that included the creation of the NMS 
as a class II parastatal. 
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1993:  National Drug Policy and Authority Act is enacted: The National Drug Policy and 
Authority Act (NDPAA) committed the Government of Uganda to ensuring that essential, safe, 
efficacious and cost-effective drugs were made available to the entire population of Uganda as 
an integral element of its overall commitment to meeting the health needs of its population.  The 
NDPAA established the National Drug Authority to promote rational drug use based on an 
Essential Drug List of Uganda that is consistent with the National Health Policy enacted in 2000.  
The NDPAA further identifies the NDA as being responsible for establishing the Essential Drug 
List for Uganda (UDLU) and for overseeing the estimation of drug needs for the country. 
1993:  National Medical Stores Act is enacted: NMS was established in 1993 at the same time as 
the NDPAA to ensure equitable access by the population of Uganda to high quality, efficacious 
and cost effective essential drugs.  The NMS was charged with procuring these essential drugs 
primarily for public sector health institutions. In keeping with the Public Enterprise Reform and 
Divestiture Act (PERD) of 1993, the NMS was created as a Class II parastatal or a semi-
autonomous, not-for-profit organization, designed to operate on sound commercial principles, 
while above all maintaining equity of access to medicines.  In order to safeguard its distributive 
equity role and ensure that it had a sufficient market to enable it to break-even, the NMS was 
given a monopoly to supply all public health institutions. 
The specific objectives of the NMS corporation included:  (1) efficient and economic 
procurement of medicines and other medical supplies of good quality primarily to the public 
health services; (2) secure, safe and efficient storage, administration, distribution and supply of 
goods in question in accordance with the National Drug Policy and Authority; (3) establishment 
and maintenance of systems to ensure the quality of goods supplied; and (4) estimation of 
current and future needs as a basis for procurement, planning and budgeting by the corporation 
itself and the Ministries concerned. 
As a corporate body, the NMS was authorized to generate income through cost recovery, which 
was to be used to create and maintain an operating reserve and to improve the corporation’s 
services and facilities.  Cost recovery is achieved through the sale of 3rd party programme 
products or through the sale of drugs and medical supplies to the private sector.  The term cost 
recovery is also understood to imply any profits generated by the NMS from the delivery of 
drugs to the districts financed under the Credit Line budget.  Such profits, to the extent that they 
occur, are the result of being able to deliver the drugs and medical supplies at a cost under the 
agreed to sale prices.  The NMS can also generate potential cost recovery revenues if it fills 
orders financed under the PHC Grant.  Cost recovery in this context does not mean that NMS 
drugs are sold to patients as would occur under a standard revolving drug fund arrangement.  
In the Ugandan case, the “sale” takes place to the districts that are in turn using grant revenues 
provided by the Central Government to “pay” the NMS.  The cost recovery provision does not 
therefore contravene the NMS’s mandate to ensure access to affordable drugs, at least from the 
standpoint of the patients. Through this act the NMS was also given an advisory role to the 
NDA and MOH related to matters of estimation of drug needs and distribution and use of 
medicines in public service. 
1995:  Constitution of Uganda: The Constitution of Uganda enacted in 1995 committed the 
government to a policy of decentralization through devolution of previous centrally controlled 
powers and functions to the district level. A more formal delineation of the decentralization 
policy was subsequently articulated in the Local Government Act of 1997. 
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1997: Local Government Act and Decentralization: With introduction of this Act, districts began 
to assume responsibility for the provision of their own healthcare services and responsibility for 
drug procurement. This procurement was to be financed through two funding sources from the 
Central Government:  A Credit Line budget allocated to the MOH for each District and ring-
fenced for essential drugs procurement from the NMS, and at a later date a PHC Grant, 50% of 
which is in principle earmarked for drug procurement (both essential drugs and non-essential 
specialty drugs) procured either from the NMS or other sources. 
2001:  Study to improve logistics management: By 2001 the supply chain that had been 
established for public sector drug distribution and the distribution of 3rd party programme 
supplies (e.g. reproductive health supplies) was considered to be performing inadequately and 
inefficiently, particularly as it related to meeting the needs of populations residing in the rural 
areas of the country.  Among the more obvious problems that were identified at this stage were 
those associated with drug supply logistics.  It was recognized more specifically that inadequate 
logistics were negatively impacting healthcare programme outcomes and causing inefficiencies 
associated with the time and expense of getting drugs from the centralized drop point within a 
district to the HSDs.   
2002:  Introduction of the Pull System: The logistics study of 2001 noted a significant build up of 
expired products in many of the district stores.  This problem was attributed to the existing 
“push” system of drug delivery where kits and various medical products were delivered by the 
NMS based on gross estimates of need rather than on the demand of the health facilities 
themselves.  The Study recommended a change to the current “pull” system whereby the 
Districts quantify and plan for their own needs and procure supplies using the Credit Line 
funds which were allocated by the MOH based on district population and other demographic 
factors.
2002: Memorandum of Understanding between MoH and NMS is signed: To ensure that NMS 
procured and distribute drugs and supplies in support of the National Health Plan and the 
National Drug Policy, the MoH engaged the NMS’s services as a corporate entity through a 
document known as the Memorandum of Understanding.  This document obligated each party 
to certain activities – including the obligation that NMS would serve as the distribution arm for 
the MoH and its expanding number of third party health care programmes. 
2000: Liberalization of the drug supply market: Uganda’s drug supply system began to be 
liberalized during the early part of this decade.  Liberalization brought an increasing level of 
competition for the NMS; it was no longer the sole source of essential medicines for public sector 
health facilities.  Liberalization was introduced in part as a response to supply deficiencies by 
the NMS and the consequent stocking-out of needed drugs and medical supplies at government 
health facilities.  Since the liberalization of the pharmaceutical sector began, a series of 
middlemen suppliers or wholesalers have emerged.  These suppliers sell their pharmaceuticals 
products in geographically restricted markets around the country directly to the Districts, and 
one offer the national coverage or distribution services that the NMS offers.  In some situations, 
these same wholesalers supply both the districts and the NMS and compete with NMS for sales 
to the districts. 
2003:  Assessing the costs of distribution of drugs: In light of the emerging supply deficiencies 
associated with the NMS and in particular the difficulties the districts and Health Sub-Districts 
(HSDs) were having with the NMS in fulfilling their drug supply orders in a complete, regular 
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and timely manner, the Ministry of Health asked the Logistics Management Project to conduct a 
further study to determine how to improve delivery of drugs to the HSD level. 
Among the issues assessed was the monopoly status of the NMS vis-à-vis supplying the district 
stores, the exclusive use of credit line funds for procurement from the NMS, and inadequacies in 
the communications infrastructure and procedures between the NMS and the districts and 
HSDs.  Each of these issues was seen as having a potential impact on drug and medical supplies 
accessibility and on the efficiency of the system. 
The study revealed that district-based delivery costs were excessive relative to what should be 
achievable.  The study concluded, however, that the solution would not be in turning the district 
distribution function over to the NMS.  Estimates from the study suggested that distribution 
costs would be 82% higher if the NMS took over responsibility for delivery to the HSDs relative 
to the prevailing district-based delivery approach. The logistics study also noted that drug 
supply functions such as inventory control, order-processing, warehousing and transportation 
were being managed sub-optimally at both the district and HSD levels.  It further suggested that 
an absence of accurate consumption and morbidity data was making it difficult to forecast and 
plan for drug requirements. 
2003:  PPDPA Act and Regulations introduced: The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public 
Assets Act (PPDPA) of 2002/03 was enacted to guide public enterprises in the procurement and 
disposal of public assets.  As a Class II Public Enterprise, the NMS falls under the statutory 
purview of the PPDPA.  By placing restrictions on the manner in which the NMS must procure 
products – restrictions that do not apply to the NMS’s private sector competitors – the PPDPA 
has created an unfair competitive advantage for the NMS’s competitors, and undermined the 
NMS’s ability to generate cost recovery revenues. 
The impact of the PPDPA can be seen from a comparison between the revenue position of the 
NMS and the JMS.  While NMS sales have stagnated in the past several years (after experiencing 
a substantial growth due to the introduction of the Credit Line budget, which has guaranteed 
business for the NMS, and boosted sales to over Ushs.11 bn per year), JMS sales grew from 
Ush.10.8 bn in 2000 to Ushs.25.3 bn in 2005.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that consumers 
perceive that the JMS is more strategic and efficient in management that the NMS.  The reality is, 
however, that the JMS is not constrained by public procurement rules, and is free from political 
pressure and public sector obligations.  All its customers pay promptly while most NMS 
customers who are public sector institutions, have, at one time or another, defaulted in paying 
their debts. 
2004:  Euro Health Group Technical Review initiated to “fix NMS”: The inefficiencies within 
Uganda’s drug supply system have been evident for some time as noted by the various studies 
that have been conducted and the attention that has been given to improving the National 
Medical Stores through its restructuring and through offers of technical assistance.  The 
technical review was structured to look specifically at how to improve the performance of the 
NMS.  The Technical Review identified a number of operational problems within NMS that 
could be addressed with technical assistance or some degree of structural reform.  Although it is 
clear that the NMS is a central entity within the national drug supply system and that it suffered 
from deficiencies which necessitated remediation, it is also clear that the NMS is only one of a 
considerable number of entities engaged in drug supply.  As such it is now understood that 
overall drug supply systems performance enhancement vis-à-vis achieving the goal of equitable 
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access with efficiency requires a broader analysis that considers the interplay between the NMS 
and these other key entities.  This broader analysis was the focus of this study. 
2005:  Rapid expansion of third party programmes:  As a result of strong policies dedicated to 
health system reform and poverty reduction, Uganda has garnered the attention of numerous 
international aid agencies and NGOs.  This has resulted in generous contributions of 
pharmaceutical products and medical supplies to assist in achievement of its National Health 
Plan.  While the contributions offer tremendous benefits to the Ugandan people, they have also 
complicated the drug supply process for the NMS, undermining to a degree its effectiveness, 
and introducing new forms of inefficiency. 
Since the vast majority of donations are programme specific and are procured without the prior 
knowledge of the NMS, there has been little opportunity for the NMS either to negotiate with 
the donor for items needed to fill requirements gaps or to adjust its own orders so as to avoid 
duplication and reallocate its resources towards the procurement of other items.  The NMS has 
been the recipient of significant quantities of duplicate items – items which the NMS is often 
required to distribute on a priority basis to the districts even if it means that the duplicate 
products it has procured sit on its shelves. 
The financial position of the NMS has also been undermined by the fact that it has been unable 
to recover the full costs of storing and distributing third-party programme products.  Storage 
fees (overhead) agreements agreed to by the Ministry of Health and the donors have been 
inadequate to cover the true cost to the NMS.  The impact of these agreements has grown as the 
volume of third party drug supply has increased both in absolute terms and as a share of the 
total value of the NMS’s trading stock.  In 2005, for example, the value of third party stock 
holding exceeded the value of NMS trading stock by a margin of nearly 3:1. The burden placed 
on NMS by third party programmes has undermined its ability to effectively satisfy its mandate 
to procure and distribute essential medicines efficiently throughout the country. 
2005-07:  District proliferation – from 48 to more than 80 districts:  Not only is the NMS 
responsible for the procurement, storage and management of the public sector drug supply, it 
must also orchestrate distribution to Uganda’s growing number of districts.  As districts are 
added, the NMS must add a delivery point.  During the past couple of years the number of new 
districts created has increased significantly and the Government continues to add more.  
Districts are being added before there is the human resource capacity to quantify, procure and 
manage drugs and medical supplies.  This not only constrains NMS from the point of the work 
it must do and the places it must deliver, it compromises efficiencies because of inadequate 
infrastructure at the district level. 
2005: World Bank commissioned NMS study: The study was to assess the potential for 
enhancing efficiency of NMS through privatization.  But the study found that the attainment of 
the goals and objectives of the National Drug Policy was not self-evident. In particular, it was 
clear that the objectives of distributive equity were not completely convergent with those of 
economic efficiency and that a certain trade-off was required in the efficiency domain in order to 
maximize the possibility and ultimately the reality of achieving the overarching distributive 
equity objective.  In addition, it is inevitable that a certain level of inefficiency above and beyond 
that required by the trade-off for distributive equity would also be inevitable at least in the short 
to medium term as the health sector in Uganda develops.  Even where feasible avenues for 
improving efficiency were identified and where the resources had been allocated to enhance 
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systems performance in a way that was consistent with attaining these efficiency improvements, 
it was likely that time would be required to actually realize the efficiency gains.  These 
“persistent” or longer term sources of inefficiency plus the base level inefficiency that was due 
to the trade-off for distributive equity represent the cost of achieving the goals and objectives of 
the National Drug Policy.  And since this cost was not a cost that could be borne by either the 
private sector or the donor or NGO community, it was to be the responsibility of the 
government to finance them. The study concluded that it was an incontrovertible reality that the 
national drug supply system should in a very fundamental way remain a publicly financed and 
publicly provided system. 
The study made the following key recommendations: 
1. The NMS should remain under 100% government ownership.  Under no circumstance 
should the objective of the NMS be to maximize profits.  This would simply be 
inconsistent with the distributive equity objective of the National Drug Policy and the 
National Health Policy. 
2. The GoU should refocus its National Drug Policy largely on the supply of essential 
drugs, while allowing private drug suppliers to compete for the non-essential or 
specialty drug supply market. 
3. The donor community will need to step up in the short to medium-term to support the 
effort of fully developing the capacity of the NDA or MOH to undertake accurate 
procurement planning. 
4. The donor community and in particular those organizations that are funding 3rd Party 
national health programmes will also need to step up their commitment to coordinating 
their input supply with the national drug supply system (the NMS, NDA, MOH and 
Districts).  This analysis confirms what previous analyses have made clear:  there is 
considerable inefficiency, duplication, and resource wastage occurring as a result of 
inadequate coordination between the 3rd party programmes, their MOH managers and 
donors, and the NMS and NDA. 
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4.0 MATERIALS AND METHODS  
4.1 Study methods for Paper 1 
This paper originates from a study done from 1989- 91 to develop a medium-term post conflict 
health policy and strategic plan. One phase of Uganda’s civil war had ended in 1986 and a new 
regime was consolidating itself. A ten-year plan had been elaborated by the MOH to rehabilitate 
the infrastructure that had been destroyed and looted during the war. This plan had been 
rejected by the key donors and advisors of the government (World Bank, WHO and Unicef) 
because the budget exceeded available and foreseeable resources fourfold. And the plan did not 
have a strategy for financing. Thus, the World Bank, which was just coming on the health-sector 
stage, joined WHO, Unicef and GoU to agree on a) priorities, b) financing strategy, and c) 
appropriate reforms to be carried out in the health sector.  
Study team 
It was decided that a study be done to address these three issues.  A study team was appointed 
and was led by a World Bank consultant. Experts were sourced from Unicef, WHO, MOH, and 
MFPED. Altogether there were 6 investigators. I was on the team representing the MOH and 
also the main report writer. I also remained responsible for defending and implementing the 
recommendations of the study. I was the writing author of the paper.  
Study sites 
The study was done in five districts selected in each geopolitical region of the country. The 
selection was based on convenience, mainly the ease of access and security concerns. In each 
district one hospital and three health centres (government or NGO) were selected based on the 
same criteria.  Other sites of study were the district medical office, district administration, and 
district-based NGOs. At the centre, the National Medical Stores, Danida and five national NGOs 
were selected for the study.  Also, three active and functional national programs were studied: 
CDD, water and sanitation programme, and UNEPI.  
Approaches of the study 
A preliminary meeting of the researchers and key stakeholders was held. In this meeting four 
main areas of study were agreed upon: pharmaceutical supply, infrastructure, PHC 
programmes, and health financing.  An observation checklist was drawn to find out the status of 
equipment, staffing, buildings. Questionnaires were developed to gather views about the past 
and current states of the health system, and the future direction, from three key categories of 
respondents: national politicians (ministers and members of parliament); MOH decision-makers 
(the permanent secretary, directors, commissioners and programme managers); the district 
health team; and heads of health facilities. Key informant interviews were also held with NMS 
managers, Danida and the essential drug programme, national NGOs, and managers of national 
health programmes and of mission health services. Consensus meetings were organised to 
discuss preliminary findings and also agree on contentious issues. 
Method for the user-fee study 
This was a descriptive, cross-sectional study based on review of hospital records and interview 
of management teams and patients.  Eight hospitals were selected based on their regional 
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representation.  Hospital records were reviewed from the year 1989 – 1994 to assess the trends. 
Data was collected on a number of variables from each hospital.  These included: 
• Extent of user-fee reduction and the targeted population. 
• Exemption mechanisms 
• Outpatients utilization 
• Inpatients utilization 
• Expenditure on drugs and sundries 
• Total expenditure 
• Income from user fees 
• Total income 
• Delegated funds to each PNFP hospital 
• Government funding per standard unit of output (SUO) 
• Expenditure per SUO 
Data was analyzed to see the implications of each hospital fee structure and practices on 
sustainability and equity. The main income and expenditure items were also analyzed in the 
same way.  A standard unit of output (SUO) also called ‘outpatient equivalent’ was used after 
converting the various hospital outputs – inpatients, deliveries, antenatal care contacts and 
vaccinations - into outpatient equivalents.  The formula that we used was introduced by a World 
Bank consultant was 
SUO-op = (15 x No. IP) + (No. OP) + (5 x No. Deliveries)  
+ (0.2x No. immunizations) + (0.5 x ANC visits)  
which equated the cost of treating one inpatient to the cost for  treating 15 outpatients, 1 delivery 
to 5 outpatients, 0.2 vaccinations to 1 outpatient and 0.5 antenatal care visits to 1 outpatient.  The 
same method was used to determine how much expenditure on drugs etc, was spent on a single 
outpatient equivalent for comparison between hospitals. 
Method used for the pharmaceutical management assessment study  
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the performance of the drug supply system and 
recommend strategies for improving the drug sector’s ability to fulfill the policy mandate set by 
Government to assure an equitable distribution of drugs in as efficient a manner as possible.  
The performance assessment was framed by the organizational and functional assessment.  The 
NMS and other supporting entities within the national drug supply system were evaluated 
relative to their defined roles and responsibilities, taking into consideration their position within 
the overall institutional structure responsible for drug supply.  Where performance weaknesses 
are identified, consideration is given to the impact that organizational design may have on 
achieving the desired functions, and where relevant, recommendations for restructuring the 
institutional framework are posited as part of the mix of strategies presented for enhancing 
system performance.   
The method was based on the guiding principles of national health policy. Performance was 
assessed against explicitly defined objectives and verifiable performance criteria derived from a 
variety of disciplines. The performance indicators included: 
Equity of access, which included both a 
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Coverage or supply-side aspect (i.e. ensuring that required drugs are available at all 
levels of the public health care system, which is synonymous with effectiveness of the 
drug supply system); and 
Financing or demand-side aspect (i.e. ensuring that the cost of drugs are affordable for 
the entire population and most particularly for targeted or vulnerable groups, and that 
government subsidization is well targeted to reinforce this objective); 
Economic efficiency, which has a  
cost-minimization aspect subject to a given level of production (or production output 
target); 
market-failure-alleviation aspect which redresses problems associated with externalities 
(cases where individual illnesses or treatments impact on the welfare of other 
individuals), economies of scale or economies of scope which require a size or scope of 
production that are not economically viable without subsidization, incomplete markets 
(goods or services that are unwilling to supply given uncertainty, adverse selection, 
moral hazard, rent seeking, shirking, corruption, and/or high transformation or 
coordination costs), and/or inadequate information; and/or, 
consumer satisfaction or demand aspect which focuses on ensuring tht supply conforms 
to the preferences (expressed needs) of consumers (in this case either patients or their 
care providers); 
quality, or the extent to which the systems and/or procedures adhere to normative standards or 
protocols that define either minimum acceptable levels of performance or desired benchmarks; 
reliability, or the likelihood that the system and/or procedures will ensure that the desired 
quantity of goods and services re supplied at the time required; 
accountability, or the likelihood that the entities producing or supplying the goods or services in 
question do so in a manner that is consistent with production objectives and in a way that can be 
effectively monitored and evaluated; and, 
Adaptability and sustainability, or the likelihood that the production or supply process is flexible 
enough to respond effectively, and efficiently to changing endogenous or exogenous factors 
impacting on production both in the short run as well as the long run in anticipated and 
unanticipated ways.  These production-impacting factors include: 
contextual factors such as national commitment to goals, the political environment, 
administrative and financial decentralization policies and practice, macro-economic conditions 
or performance, donor involvement and the extent to which it is collaborative, complementary 
and reinforcing of government policies and objectives, and the extent of private sector market 
penetration; 
programme or project-related factors such as planning capacity and community participation; 
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design factors such as whether the programme or system is designed in a vertical (stand-alone) 
or integrated manner, whether appropriate technologies are incorporated or not, whether 
human capital development is incorporated or assumed (available from the open market), 
whether socio-cultural, ethnic and/or gender factors are accounted for; 
characteristics of the implementing organization such as whether it is integrated with other 
entities within the sector (intra-sectoral integration), the type of governance and leadership 
structure and systems it employs, its management capacity, the adequacy of its information 
systems the extent to which this information is the basis for decision-making, and the extent to 
which there are effective management systems in place to minimize the presence or impact of 
strategic behaviours that undermine productivity such as shirking, corruption etc; and/or, 
financing factors such as the capacity to budget and manage the fiancés of the organization or 
production process, the type and extent of government subsidization, the extent to which there 
is a foreign exchange constraint, the extent to which financing is diversified to include cost 
recovery, and the cost structure of the organization or production process. 
In light of the decentralized design of the government of Uganda, and the fact that much of the 
responsibility for equitable, efficient and effective drug supply was at the sub-national level, a 
meaningful performance review of these systems and procedures required a particular focus on 
the district level.  The purpose of the district-level assessment was, therefore, to identify key 
service factors critical to district drug supply that have a bearing on the performance of the NMS 
and to propose strategies and/or interventions that will enhance the overall drug supply 
system’s equity of access and economic efficiency. More specifically, the objectives of the district 
assessment were to: 
1. Assess the role of NMS in the district drug supply system 
2. Validate district motivations to procure from alternate sources (i.e. price, service, quality, 
availability, etc.) instead of the NMS 
3. Better understand the conditions that lead districts to procure drugs elsewhere (i.e. from 
vendors other than the NMS) 
4. Determine the level of accountability that the districts have in the equitable (affordable) 
and efficient procurement of medicines 
5. Assess the adequacy of district level quantification methods for assessing drug and 
medical supply requirements 
6. Identify factors that lead to procurement ineffectiveness or inefficiencies (whether 
staffing, communications, transportation, sourcing, financing, conflicting legal regime, 
etc.) 
7. Explore options for increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of district procurement 
from the NMS 
8. survey districts about their level of satisfaction with the NMS compared to alternative 
available (i.e. private sector) supply sources. 
A cross-sectional survey was carried out using both qualitative and quantitative methods of 
data collection: 
Qualitative data
This was based on the following methods: 
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Key informant interviews: Survey of key district health and administrative officials using the KI 
guide as instrument.  The key informants were: the Chief Administrative Officer, the DDHS, the 
officer in-charge of District Medical Stores, the accountant attached to the DDHS’ office, the 
Medical Officers in-charge of two urban local authorities. 
FGDs: Views expressed by district officials responsible for the procurement of drugs from the 
NMS, the JMS or other private suppliers were also gathered. 
Quantitative data
Quantitative data collection was based on the following methods: 
Semi-structured questionnaire: Questions were administered to key informants in the district. 
Observation: The following were observed: patient attendance registers, patient load, availability 
of drugs, drug-procurement procedures and constraints. 
Method for the study of the National Medical Stores 
Review of district reports/documents: Documents and reports on health services in general and on 
drugs in particular were obtained and reviewed.  This included district budgets and plans for 
the last two financials years.  Whenever possible, both hard and soft copies of documents were 
obtained from the districts. 
Sampling Procedure: In order to ensure a representative cross section of districts, four districts 
were chosen, based on the following criteria: region, performance and distance from NMS. The 
team traversed the country in all geographic directions and surveyed the following districts (see 
table 5). 
Table 5: Selection criteria for the study districts 
District Region Performance Distance 
Bushenyi West Good Medium 
Kapchorwa East Poor Medium 
Arua North Fair Far 
Mpigi Central Good Near 
In each district, two local authorities were randomly selected by the DDHS for the study. 
Though the study design foresaw data collection in eight sub-districts, in the end, only seven 
were included. All the DDHS and CAOs of the four study districts were interviewed. The 
overall number of health service points involved in the study was 17 (i.e. 7 local authorities 
(including where Kapchorwa and Gombe district hospitals are located), 1 regional hospital 
(Arua Regional Hospital) an autonomous (mission) hospital, 4 DDHSs and 4 CAOs. 
The study variables that were explored included: 
1. Drug quantification and procurement capacity; 
2. Reasons for recourse to use other sources of drugs 
3. NMS market share in the district 
4. Supplier preferences by districts and the reasons for these preferences. 
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5. The role of service delivery promoters in enhancing the NMS market viability at the 
district level. 
6. Management of funds. 
7. Satisfaction with NMS compliance with orders compared to other suppliers. 
8. District management of drug stocks including planning, projection, stock outs, expiry, 
etc.
9. Comparing NMS and other suppliers in terms of price, discount, timeliness of 
delivery/response and compliance and satisfaction with the order of drugs. 
10. Perceptions concerning the advantages and disadvantages of “pull” versus “push” drug 
supply systems. 
11. Acceptance of the NMS as the exclusive district supplier  
12. The impact of decentralization on district resource management (financial, human, 
material, time and information resources) and the availability of a functional district-
level transport system; and 
13. Existence of effective communication, including communication technologies, feedback 
mechanisms, possibilities for negotiation or flexibility by parties.  
4.2 Study methods for Paper II 
By the time the mid-term review (MTR) of the HSR programme (also called DHSP) was due in 
1998, UPE had already been in existence for two years and achieved a remarkable 80% 
enrolment of school age children, up from about 50%. Also, studies and surveys were showing a 
stagnation and even deterioration of health and other socio-economic indicators. This became an 
issue for the MTR and in particular it was thought that lessons could be learned by the health 
sector about the “successful” UPE and education sector reforms.  
Study team 
Funded by the World Bank, the Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC) based at Makerere 
University commissioned a study to understand why PHC was not producing good results as 
UPE, and what lessons the health sector could learn from UPE. An independent principall 
investigator was hired by EPRC and I was the co-principal investigator as I was the manager of 
the HSR programme. The principal investigators were supported by other researchers and 
assistants. I was charged with not only writing the report but also implementing the 
recommendations, including preparing policy briefs to the ministers to adopt into policy. I was 
the writing author of the report and the paper.  
HSR evaluation studies 
The evaluation of HSRs focused on: a) assessment of district capacity to deliver the essential 
health care package; b) assessment of new ways of delivering the health care package (the 
reforms); c) assessment of the implementation and impact MOH restructuring in support of 
decentralization. Different methods were used.  Reforms were assessed under separate, single 
studies.  I was the overall coordinator who issued terms of reference, commissioned and 
supervised the studies, and compiled various studies into one report. 
The evaluation studies were as follows: 
Evaluation study 1:  To assess the delivery of the essential health package (EHP) in 13 project districts. 
This study was split into a number of sub-studies, covering key aspects of the EHP: 
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Sub-study a) Assess the understanding and application of the concept of package of essential 
health services. 
Method: The national health policy, national strategic plan and annual district work plans and 
reports were reviewed to determine if EHP was applied and implemented. 
Sub-study b) Assess the implementation of plans based on the essential health services package 
by each district.
Method: District work plans, budget allocations and actual expenditures were reviewed  to 
establish the nature of health services delivered relative to the defined district essential health 
package. 
Sub-study c) Assess the coverage and access by gender to the essential health services package 
per district. 
Method: The latest demographic and health survey (DHS) and household integrated survey 
reports and district specific community assessment surveys were reviewed. Three project 
districts were sampled and within those districts 380 communities were sampled for in depth 
study. 
Sub-study d) DHSP’s financial contribution to the implementation of the defined essential health 
package desegregated by districts. 
Method: Financial expenditure records and reports were reviewed. 
Sub-study e) Assess whether quality standards were developed and implemented MOH with 
DHSP support, and were complied with by districts and MoH. 
Methods: i) QA reports and financial expenditure reports were reviewed; ii) A list  of quality 
standards was compared with what was observed; iii) The health staff were interviewed; iv) Exit 
interviews of patients and clients was done to assess satisfaction as well as their views on how 
the quality of health care could be improved. 
Sub-study f): Assess morbidity trends in the 13 pilot districts implementing the EHP 
Method: Morbidity data collected through routine HMIS was reviewed against recent population 
surveys. 
Evaluation study 2:  Assess the extent to which financial resources were mobilized for the 
delivery of the EHP. 
The study consisted of the following sub-studies: 
Sub study a) Estimating the level and trends of total public funding (both internal revenue and 
external aid) of the health sector. 
Methods: i) National Health Accounts study was done. The method used had been developed by 
World Bank consultants; ii) Financial and expenditure data collected or submitted by districts 
were reviewed. 
Sub-study b) Assess the availability and use of fee-for-service guidelines in government health 
units, and revenue from fees as proportion of total health expenditure desegregated by districts.
Method: HIMS information and financial reports on the collection, use and accounting of user-
fees were reviewed. 
Sub-study c): Estimate revenue raised from pre-payment schemes supported by DHSP as a 
proportion of public expenditure on health care. 
Method: Financial data on pre-payment schemes was reviewed. 
Sub-study d): Estimate the number of corporate bodies or firms with insurance schemes and the 
number of people covered by insurance by the schemes 
Methods: i) A list of firms and insurance schemes was obtained from the Investment Authority 
and Insurance Commission; ii) Questionnaires were administered to the firms. 
Sub-study e): Estimate how much the government spend on medical cases referred abroad and 
what nature of cases these are. 
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Methods: i) Interviews were done with MoH on expenditure on referral cases abroad and 
documentation on the nature of cases; ii) Review of MOH records on referral abroad was done. 
Evaluation study 3:  Evaluate specific policy reforms piloted to promote efficiency and cost-
effectiveness in the health sector. This consisted of the following sub-studies: 
Sub-study a) Assess the application of the contracting method of health care delivery  
Method: Comparison of service-contract details (of services contracted out as well as the benefits 
from the contacts) with actual reports and observations, and with services that were not 
contracted out, was done. 
Sub-study b) Assessment of partnership with NGOs and the private sector as a proportion of 
district public health expenditure 
Method: Analysis of district financial and audit reports and of the National Health Accounts was 
done. 
Sub-study c) Determine whether district authorities developed and implemented staff motivation 
schemes. 
Methods: i) Review district reports to identify such schemes was done; ii) Districts were sampled 
and in-depth interviews and observation was carried out on the identified schemes; iii) Districts 
that did not implement such schemes were studied by observation and  interviews to find out 
why not. 
Sub-study d) Assess the viability and sustainability of drug revolving funds 
Methods i) Review of drug revolving fund reports was carried out; ii) Projections of possible 
breakthroughs in self-financing were made; iii) Interviews and focus group discussions carried 
out.
Sub-study e) Assess districts’ ability to develop and operate a system of community-based 
commodity sales of drugs, bed-nets, etc. 
Methods i) Questionnaires, and ii)KI interviews were used. 
Sub-study f) Assess whether private health units were established in under-served areas 
supported by the project. 
Methods i)We reviewed of reports on project support to private health units in under-served 
areas; ii) We obtained a list of newly established private health facilities in the project from the 
medical registrar; iii) The facilities were visited and studied through a questionnaire and 
interview of KIs. 
Evaluation study 4: Assess district capacity building to support decentralization  
policy. 
This study comprised of the following sub-studies: 
Sub-study a) Decentralization of the health budget. 
Methods: i) Health budget and expenditure data at the Ministry of Finance and MOH were 
reviewed, ii) District financial reports and activity reports were also reviewed and compared 
with the period before decentralization, iii) Views were gathered from districts and the centre 
through interviews and questionnaire. The study focused on: 
• Allocation of decentralized funds for health services by districts. 
• Actual expenditures of the decentralized fund 
• Proportion of decentralized donor-external health resources 
Sub-study b) Assessment of staffing levels and institutions for decentralized operations  
Method: Analysis of actual staffing and institutional set up against the prescribed standards in 
the decentralization policy. This involved interviews and observation on the ground. 
Sub-study c) Assess whether budgeting, financial management, health information system, 
planning and supervision at the district level had been strengthened 
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Methods: i) Financial and annual reports were reviewed; ii) comparison of actual indicators 
against expected indicators under decentralization was done. The following were in particular 
assessed:
• District staff trained in financial management  
• Whether financial management systems were functional 
• The accuracy and comprehensiveness of quarterly financial statements 
• Whether financial audits were done and what issues were identified by the audit 
• Whether the HIMS was functional and used for planning and management 
• Whether reporting on health services by districts was comprehensive   
• Review of district progress reports 
• Whether district health management committee and other structures were functional 
Evaluation Study 5: Assess the restoration of the functional capacity and improvement of the 
efficiency of existing government health facilities. 
Methods i) Reports on different aspects were reviewed. Most of these were routine reports and 
others reports were from specially commissioned studies; ii) Verification of facts and figures 
was carried in the field to check the accuracy of the reports, or where there were doubts, or 
conflicting facts. The studies covered the assessment of: 
• physical rehabilitation and re-equipment of health facilities 
• compliance with quality standards of rehabilitation and equipment 
• compliance with minimum staffing standards 
• drug needs quantification desegregated by district 
• whether demand-driven drug procurement system was established and functional 
• whether legislation on greater autonomy of hospitals and health training institutions was 
established and implemented  
• whether policy on how to improve the effectiveness of training was established and 
implemented 
Evaluation study 6: Assessment of the extent to which a greater role of NGOs, the private sector 
and communities had been achieved. 
Methods: i) Supervision reports submitted by districts were reviewed; ii) Records on NGOs and 
private firms were obtained from the Registrar’s office and reviewed; iii) Memoranda of 
understanding were analyzed against financial and audit reports; and iv) Reports of studies on 
contracting out services to NGOs were reviewed and the analysis was integrated with the 
reviews of other reports and data.  This study focused on the following variables: 
• Supervision of government health facilities  by NGOs 
• Participation and recognition of NGOs in district health service delivery 
• Financial support to NGOs per district as percentage  of district public expenditure 
• Total support to the private-for-profit sector, as percentage of the total district health 
expenditure 
• Lessons on contracting of health services to NGOs 
• Whether annual reviews of NGOs and CBOs are carried out 
Evaluation study 7: Assessment of the capacity of the MoH for policy, planning, research, 
training, setting of standards and supervision 
Method i) The following were reviewed and analyzed:  
• MOH structure in relation to the constitutional provisions 
• Policies and policy documents  
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• The National Strategic Health Plan and how it relates to the health policy 
• Health service standards, plans and reports.  
• Current laws and regulations against the old ones, and studies to find out if there is 
compliance.  
• National joint supervision reports by GoU and donors; against other independent 
reports on progress in the health sector 
Method ii) Through KI interviews and physical attendance in 6 project districts the process of 
health policy-making and planning was studied. The key variables were: 
• Reduction of the size of MOH  
• Consistency of MOH’s new roles with decentralization 
• Capacity of MOH to analyze and set policy agenda 
• Health policies address key health sector issues and problems 
• The use of the National Strategic Health Plan to guide district planning 
• Availability of health care and service standards are available, and in use 
• Availability of updated laws and regulations governing the health sector, and a 
mechanism for ensuring compliance 
• Proportion of annual work plans (both central and districts) prepared in time for the new 
financial year 
Review of primary school reforms  
Reports and documents on UPE were reviewed for the 3 pilot districts under DHSP: Masindi, 
Mukono and Soroti.  The following variables were studied: 
• Enrollment of school-going age total and sex 
• Physical structure 
• Scholastic materials 
• Classroom condition: spacing, ventilation, safety etc 
• Availability and cleanliness of water source 
• Availability and adequacy of toilets 
• Hygiene of students 
• Availability/access to health service 
• Student performance in national exams. 
Review of health policy and regulation  
The study of the effect of policy and regulation on the health sector in Uganda was done 
through document review and key informant interview of policy-makers and other 
stakeholders.  Themes covered in the interviews with policy makers included:  
 How public policy affects the private and public sectors: specifically looking at overall 
economic framework, regulation/laws, effectiveness of policy/law implementation 
 How policies are made: normative process, actual process, who makes decisions, what 
causes the difference between normative and actual process? 
 Problems impeding the health sector reform 
 How does the private sector contribute to or solve these problems? 
 The desired role of the private sector 
 Actions that have been identified and are being supported to increase private sector 
contribution to health sector performance 
 Implementation and evaluation of policies and regulation 
 Perceived and actual policy implementation 
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The target groups for the interviews were:   
Policy-makers: Decision-makers and advisors were limited to: Permanent Secretary, Directors, 
Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners, and Technical Advisors in the ministries of Health, 
Finance, Local Government, Justice and Labour Gender and Social Development.   These 
ministries were selected upon realizing that policies affecting the private sector for health 
include those made in other ministries which were listed above. 
Donor s:  These include all categories of donors plus their agencies and collaborators 
District Authorities: These included district, sub-district and urban authorities 
Non-Government Organizations: These included local and international NGOs, including 
community based organizations and civil society organizations. 
4.3 Study methods for Paper III 
This paper was based on a study to compare decentralization in Uganda with that in Zambia, to 
learn from the Zambian experience. The Zambian health-sector decentralization was said to 
have been successful and was becoming a model for other African countries to learn from. 
Uganda had embarked on holistic or political decentralization but the health sector’s 
decentralization had not been well defined and was not operating well. The work was divided 
between the two authors: Jeppson mainly worked on Zambia and I on Uganda. My overall task 
was to design a workable health-sector decentralization in the context of Uganda’s overall 
decentralization policy. The study was based on four approaches: 
Approaches 
a) Systemic literature review:  This was done on decentralization concepts, principles and issues 
in general, and about decentralization in developing countries. We categorised the literature 
papers as follows: i) papers on principles and theory; ii) decentralization in developing 
countries, especially Africa; iii) decentralization in Zambia; and iv) decentralization in Uganda. 
b) Joint tours: An 8-member team travelled to Zambia and another Zambian team of six 
travelled to Uganda three months later. Zambian MOH officials were equally anxious about 
some of the drastic changes that had been made in the health sector and wanted to learn about 
its model of political decentralization, which had become a model for other countries to emulate. 
The Ugandan team to Zambia included the two authors of the paper (my advisor and myself). 
The team developed questionnaires to interview six categories of respondents: government 
officials (from MOH, MOF, national/referral hospitals); managers of lower level health facilities; 
district health, administrative and political leaders; and leaders of NGOs and private sector 
health institutions. An observation checklist was drawn to record the following: type and level 
of decentralization; level of re-organization; health facility management arrangements and 
functions; new roles of the MOH; Collaboration with NGOs and the private sector; lower level 
health facility and interface with the community; planning and budgeting at different levels; 
financial management arrangements; user-fee implementation; health care package selection 
and sizes at different levels of care; staffing at different levels; donor coordination at different 
levels. Similar interviews and observations were done for Uganda.  
c) The Ugandan Study: Four methods were employed to carry out the study.  First, available 
literature about decentralization and health systems in general, and in the context of Uganda in 
particular, were reviewed. Second, existing data from the routine health information system was 
reviewed since special surveys were not required in the study. Third, key officials at national, 
district, sub county and health unit levels were interviewed both informally and using semi-
Sam Okuonzi 
84
structured questionnaires. Fourth, focus-group discussions were held with district, sub county, 
community and health unit leaders and officials.   
Six districts were selected on the criteria of distance (from MOH headquarters), region and 
phase of decentralization.  Districts were selected from all regions except northern region. The 
northern region was not studied owing to financial limitation and insecurity. Four districts were 
in the first phase of decentralization to which recurrent funds started to be transferred in July 
1993.  One district was in the second phase where financial decentralization started in July 1994.  
And one district was in the third phase where financial decentralization had not yet started but 
was due to start in July 1995. 
Each district visit started with a courtesy call on political (elected) leaders.  In some districts 
(Tororo, Masaka and Kiboga) elected political and appointed leaders formed discussion groups.  
In the other districts, leaders were seen separately.  Except for Mbarara and Kasese districts, at 
least three government health units were visited in each district including a hospital, a health 
centre and a dispensary. Discussions were held with four key officials of MOH and MOLG, and 
the Director of the Mulago National Referral Hospital.  The total number of respondents was 
101. 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 summarize the distribution of districts, number and type of 
respondents/participants, and number and type of health units. 
Table 6:  The selected districts, number of health units and respondents 
DISTRICT REGION HEALTH UNITS RESPONDENTS/PARTICIPANTS
Kasese West 2 5 
Kiboga Central 5 30 
Masaka South 3 21 
Mbarara West 1 3 
Mpigi South 4 20 
Tororo East 5 22 
Total -------- 20 101 
Table 7:  Types of respondents/participants in the study  
DISTRICT POLITICAL 
LEADERS 
ADMINISTRATORS HEALTH 
WORKERS 
COMMUNITY 
LEADERS 
TOTAL 
Kasese 0 0 5 0 3 
Kiboga 3 1 10 16 30 
Masaka 2 2 8 9 21 
Mbarara 0 0 3 0 3 
Mpigi 1 2 7 10 20 
Tororo 2 2 12 6 22 
Total 8 7 45 41 101 
Table 8:  Types of health units visited 
DISTRICT HOSPITAL HEALTH CENTRE OTHERS COMMUNITY 
PROJECT 
Kasese Kilembe Kilembe -
Kiboga Kiboga Bukomero Ntwetwe DMU Ntwetwe 
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Kyanamuyonjo 
DMU Gayaza 
SD 
Maternity
Kyanamuyonjo 
Integrated 
Bukomero 
Inpatient Ward 
Masaka Masaka Kinoni 
Kalungu
- - 
Mbarara Itojo - - - 
Mpigi Entebbe  
Grade B 
Wakiso Ngando DMU Ngando Inpatients 
Ward
Tororo Busolwe 
Tororo 
Masafu 
Nagongera 
Busia Disp. Masafu 
Operating Theatre 
DMU  = Dispensary and Maternity Unit 
Disp   = Dispensary 
SD      = Subdispensary 
d) Consultation and consensus meetings: These meetings were held to discuss and agree on the 
findings, recommendations and the way forward. 
4.4 Study Methods for Papers IV and V 
These papers arose from a study that was conducted to find out why despite years of HSRs, 
infant and maternal mortality increased rather than decreased. This was according to UDHS 
2000/01, in which it was found that mortality of infants and mothers had increased between 
1995 and 2000. Concerned about this trend, the government through MFPED formed a multi- 
sectoral mortality task-force. Concerns had been raised about funding ceilings set up by the 
MFPED which restricted funding to social sectors. This was said to be a measure for stabilising 
macro-economic drivers, especially inflation. Also, a new policy on aid was that for any amount 
of health aid brought into the country, the equivalent would be offset from the national budget 
allocation for the health sector – in effect leaving with health sector with the same level of 
funding, but less and less funding per capita since the population was growing at 3% per 
annum.. Another policy on aid was that health aid could be rejected if it was determined that 
this would upset macroeconomic stability. But no evidence of how the upsetting would be 
caused was given. Nor was there a transparent process of how it would be determined that a 
certain amount of external aid would cause macroeconomic upset. I was appointed principal 
investigator and writing author for the study.  Five approaches were used in the study: 
a) Sub-national health systems assessment
WHO in its 2000 World Health Report had proposed a framework for assessing the health 
system performance that has been extensively modified.  The framework provides a systematic 
approach to analyzing different aspects of health system performance from inputs through to 
functions, achievements in intermediate goals such as coverage and provider performance, to 
overall health system goals and efficiency. The methodology relies on using information from 
different sources for issues that impact on the overall performance of a health system. A tool 
developed by WHO to guide the assessment of health system performance was used.  
The four components on which the assessment was based were: 
a) Health system inputs/resources 
b) Health system functions 
c) Health system outcomes/goals 
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d) Health system efficiency 
In the assessment, the following available data sets were used: 
i) The Uganda Demographic and Health Survey (UDHS) of 2001/02. The Demographic 
and Health Survey provides data on demographic patterns, utilization of health 
services, morbidity and mortality of populations. 
ii) The Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) of 1997, 2000 and 2003. The 
National Household Surveys provide data on illness patterns, health-seeking 
behaviour, expenditure on health by different social economic categories, age groups, 
gender and vulnerable groups e.g. orphans. 
iii) The Ministry of Health Statistical Abstract of 2002. The Ministry of Health Abstract 
provides data on access to health services, availability of beds and human resource 
by districts and, utilization of health services. 
iv) Uganda National Health Accounts data for 1998/99-2000/01. The National Health 
Accounts provides data on health expenditures at the different levels of service 
delivery. 
v) The Population and Housing Census of 2000, which provided population figures by 
district and by sub-county. 
b) Study to develop a mortality reduction M&E framework 
A framework for monitoring the reduction of infant and maternal mortality was developed. The 
study involved: 
1) Review of relevant documents 
2) Interview of stakeholders 
3) Reviewing sector specific reports  
4) Preparing and discussion of a synthesis report by stakeholders. 
5) Assessing M&E approaches currently used for their strengths and weaknesses in 
addressing mortality. 
6) Identifying specific indicators for mortality  reduction 
The key elements to assess as M&E and feedback are summarized in the table 9. 
Table 9: Key elements for M&E and for feedback 
Elements M&E Feedback
Identification of the key 
causes of mortality 
Reduction of the causes 
over time. 
Indicators: Mortality Rates 
Identification & inclusion of 
new or other causes of 
mortality. 
Poverty reduction policy is 
oriented to focus on 
mortality reduction 
Economic policy is pro-
poor
Growth ahs human face. 
Social sectors mainstream 
mortality reduction. 
Gender equality 
Women Empowerment
Identify and include other 
issues or why sector goals 
are not being achieved, and 
how this should be 
addressed. 
Economic growth  
Rate of real poverty 
reduction 
Social welfare 
Rate of economic growth 
Income equity 
Access to social services 
Quality of social services 
Identify and include other 
factors that may be 
hampering progress. 
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Gender equality 
Mortality reduction Infant mortality 
Maternal mortality 
Gender equality 
Assess pace of change 
versus strategies & 
resources. 
Include better strategies. 
Source: author’s compilation
c) Systematic review of literature, reports and related materials on mortality 
The materials reviewed were categorised to cover: i) general concepts, issues and knowledge 
about infant and maternal mortality; ii) general and specific issues about health and economic 
policies in Uganda; iii) official reports of major surveys and studies; namely: UDHS 1995, UDHS 
2000/01, Populations Census and Housing Census 1992, and Household Surveys 1995 – 2002; iv) 
all policies that had a major bearing on mortality of infants and mothers. “Major bearing” was 
derived from the determinants of health and agreed on by the task force. The policies were on 
such health determinants as nutrition, health, agriculture, education, transport, the economy, 
water and sanitation, land, gender and women empowerment; v) reports on the implementation 
of various programmes such as young child and mother nutrition, UPE, EPI, reproductive 
health, child welfare and rights, gender equality, and gender equality and women 
empowerment; vi) reports from international organizations about health, the economy and 
mortality. These included the World Bank inspired PRSP/PEAP, various reports by WHO, 
Unicef and other international organizations. Review methods are summarized in table 10. 
Table 10: Methods of systematic review of literature on mortality 
Key Tasks Method Outputs 
1.  Identify Causes Literature review 
Comparative analysis 
Causes in general 
Causes in Uganda 
Causes by level 
2.  Identify interventions Literature review 
Comparative analysis 
Evaluation of Uganda’s 
policies 
Critical interventions 
Lessons from successful, 
unsuccessful countries and 
from Uganda. 
3.  Review existing policies Evaluation against policy 
objectives related to 
mortality 
Key policies affecting 
mortality  
Gaps and weaknesses in 
policies 
Recommendations 
4.  Identify household and 
community challenges 
Review of reports 
Evaluation against key 
problems 
Problems and issues 
identified 
Existing strategies to 
address these effectiveness 
& weaknesses identified 
5.  Formulate a strategy Based on outputs in 1-4, 
deduce strategies 
Strategic issues identified 
Strategic actions identified 
Strategic plan in log frame 
with M&E indicators 
developed.
Source: author’s compilation 
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d) Routine task-force meetings
These meetings were to discuss and agree on the report format, key issues and their 
interpretation. 
e) Consensus meetings:
Meetings of stakeholders were held to agree on recommendations and a way forward with 
respect to addressing the escalating mortality.  
4.5 Ethical considerations 
The thesis studies were done over a period spanning more than 15 years.  In the earlier years, 
ethical committees/procedures were not readily available.  Today, such studies would all have 
to be approved by the National Council for Science and Technology.  For the study on paper II, 
approval was obtained from Makerere Institute of Social Research and Economic Policy 
Research Centre ethics committees.  For studies on Papers I, II, IV and V, approval was done by 
a research committee of the MOH.  Permission to carry out the studies was granted by the 
Permanent Secretaries of MOH and MFPED (Papers I & III and IV & V respectively).  In 
addition, permission to carry out the study in the selected districts was sought from District 
Local Councils, the Chief Administrative Officers and District Health Officers, (formerly called 
District Medical Officers or DMOs).  Written informed consent was obtained from each 
respondent and confidentiality was ensured throughout data collection, entry, analysis and 
dissemination. 
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5.0 RESULTS 
5.1 Uganda: A context of instability and poverty 
Uganda is a poor country that has been unstable politically and socially. Table 11 summarizes 
the country context in which the reforms were done. 
Table 11: Uganda country context 
Variables Findings Sources of information 
Socio-economic status Poor country with GDP per 
capita of 250 USD 
Papers II & IV 
Political and social stability 45 years of total or partial 
instability 
Papers I & IV 
Status of health system Infrastructure completely or 
partially destroyed by 1986; 
only 4% of facilities can handle 
emergency 
Papers I, II, IV 
Health system models Hospital-based, PHC-based 
and market-based: None has 
been found satisfactory 
Paper IV 
Health sector objectives Little progress made; some 
indicators are at the same level, 
others have worsened. 
Paper II 
Source: author’s compilation 
5.2 Overall evaluation of health sector reform  
The overall evaluation of HSR in Uganda was based on two sets of indicators, those that assess 
health care and status (Table 12) and those that assess specific reform objectives (Table 13). 
Under health-care and status, except for some improvement in access to safe water and 
sanitation, all other indicators show a worsening trend during or after the reforms. The recently 
published Demographic and Health Survey (2006) shows that mortality rates (IMR, MMR and 
CMR) have been significantly reduced. The rates are now officially taken as 76/1000, 
435/100,000 and 137/1000 respectively. Thus, while some reduction has been achieved, 
maternal and childhood mortality rates are still high. 
Table 12. Health care and status trend in Uganda over 20 years 
Indicator Before reforms 
1985 – 1995 
After reforms 
1996 – 2005 
Trend 
IMR/1000 81 89 Deterioration 
MMR/100,000 506 505 Persistently high 
CMR/1000 147 151 Deterioration 
Child nutrition (%) 6.2 7 – 8 Deterioration 
Access to EMOC (%) --- 14 Probably worsened
Access to facility-based delivery 
(%) 
38 38 Persistently low 
Life expectancy (in years) 51 47 Deteriorated  
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Access to safe water (%) 34 51 Improved 
Access to sanitation (%)  39 54 Improved 
Sources: Paper IV 
Table 13: Performance of specific reform objectives 
Reform objectives Expected result Actual result Evidence 
Equity Increased physical 
and economic access 
Physical access 
improved, but not 
economic access 
At least 40% sick 
people are discouraged 
by costs from seeking 
health care
Efficiency Increased output 
DALYs /input 
(resources) 
No evidence of 
improved efficiency 
Recent studies show 
significant resource 
increase in health 
sector, but not reflected 
in better outcomes  
Quality Increased technical 
and client perceived 
quality 
No improvement or 
even worsening of 
both types of quality
MOH’s own reports 
point out major issues 
of quality (GoU, 2006b) 
Health status Remarkable 
improvement  
Deterioration, stag-
nation or marginal 
improvement 
UDHS 1995, 2000, 2006. 
Sustainability  Dependence on 
external funding of 
health care will 
significantly reduce 
Dependence has 
remained same or 
even increased, with 
even the private 
sector depending on 
donor aid  
Global Health 
Initiatives have double 
funding to Uganda 
since 2004, but 
Government health 
budget has stagnated or 
even reduced in real 
terms  
Source:  Report of study for Paper II 
The HSR reform objectives have not been achieved (Table 10). In addition, HSRs are associated 
with some issues in the health sector that have worsened or complicated the performance of the 
sector. These include aid, through which the reforms were imposed or enforced; macroeconomic 
policies, to which the health sector has to conform; the primacy of economic growth over human 
development; the deepening and widening of corruption due to the erosion of legality 
associated with free-market economics; the weakening and disorganization of the national 
health system and capacity by parallel arrangements like projects, international health initiatives 
(e.g GFATM, GAVI etc) and SWAP; and the fact that HSRs have in effect increased dependence 
on aid and technical assistance, and hence pushed the country further away from independence 
and sustainability (Table 14). 
Table 14: Issues associated with health sector reforms 
Issues Findings Sources of Information
Aid Interruptive & destructive to health 
systems 
Papers I, II 
Macro-economics and 
health 
Macro-economic stability achieved 
through under-spending on health 
Paper IV 
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Economic development Government policy position is that 
economic growth should be 
achieved first, before social services 
can be improved 
Paper II 
Corruption Levels of corruption have deepened 
and widened. The massive 
embezzlement of GF and GAVI 
funds
Paper II 
Capacity Weakened and disorganized 
national capacity to build and 
sustain HSD. Key factors are aid 
and SWAP. 
Paper II and IV 
Sustainability HSD and financing not sustainable 
in foreseeable future: 60-80% of 
health sector funding is from donor 
aid 
Paper II 
Source: author’s compilation 
5.3 Individual reforms implemented under DHSP 
The overall objective of DHSP was to demonstrate on a pilot basis the feasibility of delivering an 
essential health package (EHP) through improvements in policy, institutional organization and 
financial management. The specific objectives were to pilot new policies (reforms), strengthen 
district level planning and management, and restructure the MOH. The project was divided into 
two main components, pilot and capacity building. Under the pilot component, the following 
ways were tested for delivering an essential health-care package (EHP). The results below were 
obtained from the final evaluation of DHSP, which was the basis for papers IV and V.  
Under new financing mechanisms to be introduced, user-fee was the main strategy promoted 
under this project.  
Figure 8: Out of pocket expenditure by quintile (1997 -2003). 
Source: Report of study for paper IV
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User-fees 
The user-fee bill had previously been rejected by the Parliament (Paper I). But a loophole was 
found in the Local Government Act of 1997 which allowed local authorities to charge fees at 
their discretion for services they provided. Under the project, numerous studies were completed 
and a user-fee policy was finally drafted. It had been proposed by the project to price services,
but this was eventually left for the health unit management committees to decide. The 
committees preferred flat user-fee rates to graduated fees. Graduated prices were found to be 
difficult to calculate, understand and manage. Experience has shown that health systems, which 
rely less on out-of-pocket payments (OOP) as a way of paying for health-care, generally protect 
the poor better from catastrophic spending.  
User-fees as a deterrent to seeking care: Figure 8 gives the percentage of people who did not 
seek care, mentioning user-fees in health facilities as a deterrent. There is a decreasing trend 
over the surveys as a result of local resistance to user-fees and their eventual abolition in 2001. 
Generally, there were no significant changes over the three surveys, although a slight increase is 
noted between 2000 and 2003 in the poorest quintile, and quintile 4 shows an increasing trend 
(Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Out-of-pocket expenditure on health as a share of total household expenditure by 
quintiles (1997-2003). 
Source: Report of  study for Paper IV 
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Hospitals and drugs constitute the bulk of out-of-pocket spending across all income groups and 
across all surveys (Figure 10). 
Figure 10. Components of OOP health expenditure. 
 Source: Report of  study  for Paper IV: 
Catastrophic health expenditure: This is defined as out-of-pocket health expenditures that is 
equal to or exceeds 40% of household non-subsistence spending. This results into reduction of 
expenditures on other basic commodities. 
Figure 11. Percentage of households facing catastrophic expenditures. 
2.9%3.2%
4.8%
730 6 95
847
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
1997 2000 2 003
%
 
of
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
s
0
300
600
900
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
(1,
00
0)
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
1997 2000 2003
others
traditional
consultation
hospital
drugs
Sam Okuonzi 
94
Source: Report of  study  for Paper IV 
Figure 12: Percentage of households incurring high levels of spending (1997 -2003). 
Source: Report of  study  for Paper IV
The proportion of households facing catastrophic expenditure is low for all the surveys and 
shows a decreasing trend (Figure 11). The lowest reduction was recorded between the 1997 and 
2000 surveys. The proportion of households incurring catastrophically high health spending 
(over 40% of disposable income) fell from 5 to 3% between 1997 and 2003 (Figure 12). The 
proportion of households at risk of catastrophic spending (those already spending between 20-
40% of disposable income) also decreased from 11 to 8% over the same period, signifying that 
the government had not provided adequate financial risk protection prior to the abolition of 
user-fees. 
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Figure 13. The proportion of households with catastrophic spending by quintile. 
Source: Report of  study  for Paper IV
Catastrophic spending occurs in all income groups, although for all groups together, 
catastrophic spending was significantly reduced between 1997 and 2000 (Figure 13). It fell again 
after the withdrawal of fees for the 4 richest quintiles from 2000 to 2003, although it increased for 
the poorest quintile after the withdrawal of fees. There are two possible explanations. After the 
reform of user fee, utilization of health services in both public and private facilities increased 
significantly for the poorest quintile. Even though the consultation in public facilities is free, 
patients may have to pay for tests, hospitalisation and some medicines when they are not 
available in public facilities and transport costs. Public health system, which is free, may not 
offer most of the services that predispose the poor to catastrophic expenditures. The capacity to 
pay for these services among the poor has reduced, as shown by the increase in the proportion 
of people living below the poverty line from 35% in 1999/2000 to 38% in 2000/2003. There may 
be under the table payments. 
Causes of catastrophic payments: Not surprisingly, the use of health facilities inevitably 
increases the risk of incurring catastrophic expenditures in countries where comprehensive risk 
protection mechanisms are limited. This is the case in Uganda where OOP share of total health  
expenditure is high (>40% in 2003). People using public facilities are at less risk than those using 
private facilities, but the former does not fully protect people from catastrophic spending, since, 
as mentioned before, patients still have to pay for various items. Households with elderly 
members are at greater risk of incurring catastrophic spending, as are poor households, holding 
all other factors constant including the use of facilities (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Risk to incur catastrophic expenditure. 
Source: Report of  study  for Paper IV
Impoverishment: Households are pushed into poverty as a result of seeking health-care. The 
percentage of households impoverished by OOP expenditure on health is generally low and 
shows a decline overtime time (Figure 15). There were fewer households impoverished as a 
result of health spending in 2003 compared with 2000. This resulted from the abolition of cost 
sharing in all public facilities, a policy decision taken in March 2001. 
Note that the percentages started falling before the abolition of user-fees. The decrease in  
Figure 15: Percentage of households impoverished as a result of seeking care. 
Source: Report of  study  for Paper IV
poverty could have contributed to the improvements seen between 1997 and 2000 (from 44 to 
35% of the population living below the poverty line in 2000). 
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Revolving funds (Paper II) 
It had also been proposed that funds should be generated through revolving drug funds. But it 
became logistically difficult to create a fund at the district level since there were many sources of 
pharmaceuticals and the procurement system for each source was different. It was eventually 
concluded that revolving drug funds were not possible until the management of drugs from the 
different sources was harmonized.  
Prepayment schemes (Paper II) 
Other health financing mechanisms piloted were prepayment schemes linked to hospital 
services, and income generation ventures. The prepayment schemes were small-scale and 
proved to be successful. They were supported by donors who financed the operational costs and 
the reinsurance. The schemes were in communities that had reliable and regular harvests of 
cash-crops, which enabled households to make their contributions. In one scheme, the 
communities already had sickness societies upon which this scheme was built. The schemes 
were neither sustained over time nor scaled-up. Income generation activities were tried but were 
not found to be sustainable or useful for addressing entrenched poverty and ill-health faced by 
most of the communities.  
Health insurance (Paper II) 
An evaluation study under DHSP to assess health insurance feasibility in Uganda proposed 
compulsory mutual funds for large firms and for civil servants. It also proposed voluntary 
health insurance for the rural population and for those in informal employment. The study 
recommended medi-save programmes for those who could save money on prepaid health-care 
plans (Berman et al. 2001). But these proposals required major changes in the laws governing 
employment and salaries. This has, up to now, been a contentious issue, with civil servants 
arguing that their salaries are too small to raise the insurance premium. Estimates of potential 
enrolees for social health insurance (SHI) in Uganda presented in Table 15. 
Table 15 Estimates of potential enrolees for SHI in Uganda  
 Estimated number of 
potential enrollees 
Average monthly salary  
(Uganda Shillings) 
Most reliable estimates
- Civil servants   67712 122783 
- Teachers 116194   90571 
- Total public sector 183906 102431 
Less reliable
- Private sector employees making 
regular payments to NSSF 
  80000 168589 
- Private sector employees 
registered by Uganda Revenue 
Authority as taxpayers 
120000 139991 
Source: Report of study for Paper II 
After a systematic assessment of potential enrolees and their incomes and other related data, it is 
estimated that just over 300,000 workers could potentially be reached with SHI. Another 100,000 
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could be included by the Uganda Revenue Authority as having regular taxable income, and 
making a contribution of 4% of income to the SHI. Table 16 presents projections of revenue from 
groups of workers. 
Table16: Estimates of expected monthly revenue for SHI in Uganda  
Number of 
contributors 
Total monthly 
revenue base      (Ug 
Shs)
Expected monthly 
revenue at 4%      
(Ug Shs) 
Civil servants   67,712   8,313,882,496    332,555,300 
Teachers 116,194 10,532,806,774    420,952,271 
Total public sector 183,906 18,837,689, 270    753,507,571 
Private sector 220,000 30,798,000,000 1,231,920,000 
Total 403,906 49,635,689,270 1,985,427,571 
Source: Report of  study  for Paper II 
The total annual revenue from SHI would be about Ugsh 24 billion (compare with the total 
annual public sector health budget of Ugsh 300 billion). And yet there is no guarantee that the 
government would not reduce (instead of maintaining or even increasing) the health budget. 
The principle of additionality of the budget (to meet the MDGs) has been broken by the 
government, in the case of GFATM, thanks to the macro-economic policy. There is inadequate 
institutional capacity, which requires investment and time to build. Above all, SHI requires 
changes in attitude, knowledge and expectations. All these require time and investment on the 
part of the government. SHI is only a means to an end, which is the equitable and sustainable 
health-care system. SHI is a long-term contract and requires long-term commitment. This has so 
far not been demonstrated by the government. In SHI, people show perverse behaviour: 
providers demand more payment; payers want to pay the minimum premium, and employees 
want more pay for less work. Getting the right design and structure of the SHI is critical. But 
without initial investment by the government to get the SHI structure right and operational, it is 
highly unlikely to succeed. 
Encouraging private health insurance (Paper II) 
The project sought to encourage health insurance for private firms. Not only did a study under 
the project find private insurance feasible, but an on-going practice. However, this did not 
address the fate of the vast majority who had no health insurance or access to basic health care.  
Health trusts (Paper II) 
Health trusts were first to be tried in Mulago Hospital. Health trust funds were to go hand-in-
hand with the creation of 12 hospitals as autonomous entities. But the policy and law to carry 
out this reform got embroiled in politics.  
Hospital autonomy (Paper II) 
Studies (eg Ssengooba et al. 2002) have shown that there is little evidence in Uganda or 
elsewhere that autonomy improves hospital performance. A study of mission (autonomous) and 
government hospitals (non-autonomous) did not show any significant difference in patient load 
(Table 17) or quality of health care (Table 19), but mission (autonomous) hospitals appear to be 
more efficient in staff use mainly a result of motivational incentives (Table 18). The efficiency, 
however, is not reflected in the total expenditure or bed-use. Instead, hospital autonomy and 
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trust funds were seen as limiting access to public hospitals for the majority who have nowhere 
to go for hospitals services.  
Table 17: Hospital workload over two years 1998 – 2000  
 Rukungiri district Masaka district Luweero district 
 Kambuga 
Public 
Kisiizi  
Mission 
Masaka  
Public
Kitovu 
Mission
Nakaseke  
Public
Kiwoko 
Mission 
Maternal 
patient load 
15,192 24,560 38,152 20,374 15,408 24,931 
Child
patient load 
40,356 65,352 33,856 59,174 54,326 33,288 
Adult
patient load 
63,967 43,163 84,497 48,701 57,130 49,351 
Diagnostics 19,691 19,033 19,533 30,494   4,567 16,878 
Source: Sengooba et al, 2002 
Table 18: Average annual workload per health worker  
Districts Public/ Not autonomous Mission/Autonomous 
Luweero 1,480 1,510 
Masaka 857 1,211 
Rukingiri 1,808 2,500
Source: Sengooba et al, 2002 
Table 19: Perceived average quality scores in 1998 
 Public hospitals  Mission hospitals 
Availability of drugs  1.25 1.57 
Attitudes of providers 1.50 1.50 
Technical skills 1.64 1.45 
Privacy 1.66 1.67 
Total 1.61 1.62 
Source: Sengooba et al, 2002 
Greater autonomy or privatization of National Medical Stores (Paper I) 
National Medical Stores (NMS) is 100% state-owned. It was established to ensure efficient and 
economical procurement of pharmaceuticals, and to provide secure, safe and efficient storage, 
administration, distribution and supply. It was also to ensure quality of medicines, and to 
estimate current and future medical supply needs of the country. But in line with free-market 
principles, the NMS was to be restructured to become autonomous or privatized. Numerous 
studies were carried out, the latest being that commissioned under the Privatization and Utility 
Sector Reform Project, funded through a World Bank loan (Medical Care Development 
International (MCDI) and Serefaco Consultancies Limited (SCL), 2006).  
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But recommendations that NMS be made autonomous or privatized have met with three main 
snags: it is the only institution in the country 1) with adequate capacity to handle donor / NGO 
drugs that are donated, which constitute a sizable proportion of pharmaceuticals in the country; 
2) that has capacity to provide drugs to the under-funded district local governments on loan; 
and 3) that can stock unprofitable drugs such as vaccines and certain obstetric drugs (eg 
oxytocin). Thus, NMS has continued to be funded by the government through grants. It has 
been realized that the much-desired self-financing status of NMS cannot be attained without it 
breaking even in financial terms. To do so, it has to abandon its “public goods” role of stocking 
and distributing unprofitable but essential pharmaceuticals, such as rabies vaccine. 
Contracting (Paper II) 
Contracting as a management strategy was promoted by the project. This was done successfully 
for health-care and non-health-care services to the private sector, NGOs and missions. The idea 
was that services would be more available and efficient. While contracting in itself was found to 
be a good thing, the experience in Uganda was that it did not make services more available for 
the population, and there was no evidence that contracting of services was more efficient or 
cheaper as has often been claimed (GoU 1998, a study report for Paper II). 
Payment incentives (Paper II) 
Payment incentives for health workers were a key reform to be introduced. A study 
commissioned under DHSP was done in Kabale district to identify and recommend ways of 
motivating health staff through payment incentives (Kabwiga 1996). The study found that the 
staff salary was below their monthly expenditure. Most of the incentives were not met because 
of a public sector system that had been weakened and disorganized by free-market reforms and 
under-funding (Paper I). Table 20 provides a summary of the state of incentive mechanisms in 
Kabale hospital. 
Table 20: Status of incentive staff mechanisms in Kabale hospital (Kibwiga, 1996, a study report 
for paperII) 
Mechanisms Yes No Total no of staff 
Night allowance 0 41 41 
Safari allowance 0 41 41 
Transfer facilitation 11 8 19 
Salary 41 0 41 
Lunch allowance 29 12 41 
Further training 3 38 41 
Uniform 9 30 39 
Residential accommodation  24 17 41
Medical treatment 0 41 41 
Leave 3 38 41
Transport 36 5 41 
Confirmed in service 3 12 15
Promoted in service 0 15 15 
Informed about policy 0 41 41
Involved in planning 0 41 41 
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Involved in meetings 0 41 41 
Supervised 9 1 10 
Source: Report of study for Paper II
The staff took off part of their official work-time to earn a living through trading and farming. It 
was recommended that health workers get at least a living wage to deter them from taking off 
work-time to make ends meet. In addition, performance-based rewarding, co-ownership of 
motorcycles and bicycles (to acknowledge and incentivise the staff, who were using these 
transport equipment for private purposes already anyway), and improved staff appointments 
and promotions were recommended. A bonus-scheme to reward good performers was tried but 
was stopped because the rewards were corruptly changed to pay workers by seniority rather 
than by performance.  
Community based commodity distribution (Paper II) 
Community-based mosquito-net distribution was stopped due to the doubt cast by a World 
Bank mission team about the cost-effectiveness of such a scheme (GoU 1998 and Paper I). But 
today, widespread distribution of nets throughout communities is acknowledged as one of the 
most effective ways of tackling malaria (Cohen and Dupas 2007; Okuonzi et al. 2007).  
Eliminating barriers to health care market (Paper II) 
To eliminate legal barriers to health care market, a study (for Paper II) was done to identify 
such barriers and recommend how barriers could be eliminated. The barriers were identified as 
centralized and bureaucratic registration and licensing, long and mandatory pre-certification 
period before private practice, not allowing stock-piling of drugs in private clinics, restriction of 
ownership of private practices only to professionals, no incentives to attract private practitioners 
to undeserved areas, and substantial critical capital required to start a private practice. The 
study made the following recommendations: 1) Licensing should be every 3-5 years, not 
annually; 2) Decentralize registration and licensing of private practice; 3) Rescind laws 
preventing stock-piling drugs in private clinics; 4) Government to provide soft loans to private 
practitioners; 5) Selected public health services should be licensed; 6) Formalize the relationship 
between the government and the private sector; 7) Government to increase grants to non-profit 
private health care providers (the mission health facilities); and 8) Enforce laws and regulations 
Many of these recommendations had begun to be incorporated into the law and policy by early 
2000’s, but the process has stalled. However, the formalization of the public-private partnership 
has been achieved. Also, government grants to non-profit private health facilities have 
increased, but still fall short of what is required to make the facilities operate effectively. 
However, soft loans to the private sector and the enforcement of laws were not achieved, 
because they required better funding and management of the health sector.  
Promoting the private health sector (Papers II and IV) 
Learning to work closely with private sector health-care providers included: private-sector 
participation in district health planning, direct support to private organizations, training health 
workers without discriminating between public and private sectors, creating a private-sector 
liaison office in the MOH, and allowing competent private-sector staff with good performance 
to supervise government facilities. These initiatives were successful to a considerable extent, and 
became adopted as policy, but the practice has not been sustained.  
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A private sector programme study (PSP) was carried out to assess its potential to improve health 
and health-care outcomes (Konde-Lule et al. 2006). This was done against the background that 
the private sector might offer the best chance for improving health outcomes, which had 
declined or stagnated. The study found that 45% of the population goes to mission (subsidized) 
health facilities, 42% to public (free or greatly subsidized), and only 13% to private facilities. The 
poor and those with very serious illnesses were more likely to go to public health facilities and 
be hospitalized (Figure 16).  
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Figure 16: Comparison of reported hospitalisations by type of facility 
Source: Konde et al, 2006 
The key reasons for choosing health care providers were different for different categories. Public 
facilities were chosen for perceived better technical skills (45%) and low cost (29%), while 
mission and private facilities were selected for convenience of location (56 and 59%, 
respectively). The main reason for doing nothing about a health problem (Figure 17) besides the 
perception of its being a minor problem is lack of money. It seems evident that there is nothing 
inherently unique about the private sector that will dramatically improve health outcomes 
without the improvement of public-sector services in a country where the majority live on less 
than two dollars a day. 
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Figure 17: Reasons why household members did nothing about health problems  
Konde et al, 2006 
Defining and using the essential health package ( Papers II and IV) 
To define the essential package of health services, the burden of disease/cost-effectiveness 
(BOD/CE) study was commissioned. The idea was to calculate disease-burden for the ten most 
common diseases and to identify interventions which would best reduce the burden. In theory, 
these interventions would constitute the essential health-care package. But there were serious 
methodological problems. Information was not adequate or reliable for such a task. It was 
difficult to classify some disease conditions, such as anaemia, which cut across many illnesses. 
After defining the EHP, “cost-effective interventions” – those with the lowest price per life year 
saved – as a package were found to be largely meaningless in practice (Table 21). For 
interventions to be effective in public or clinical practice several (usually preventive, curative 
and promotive) are combined. Health professionals argued that the whole process was time-
consuming, complicated and costly, and did not provide any new knowledge. The most “cost-
effective interventions” were not the ones that could maximize the attainment of health sector 
objectives. There was a general lack of confidence and credibility in this mechanical approach to 
priority-setting (Paper II; GoU 1998 ).  
Table 21: Cost-effectiveness of health care interventions for ten common diseases: Selected 
interventions  
Diseases Interventions 
Cost-effectiveness in 
UShs per discounted 
life year saved 
AIDS Sensitization of high risk groups                  23,057 
AIDS Sensitization of trained TBAs                107,658 
AIDS Sensitization of religious leaders               155,350 
AIDS Training of community peer educators              638,378 
AIDS Drama shows                   9,350 
AIDS Condom supply outreach                   3,023 
AIDS Counseling AIDS patients              391,785 
AIDS Case management/treat complications 
Hospital IP (diarrhea, pneumonia, oral 
candidiasis and skin rash) 
1,276,791 
ARI Health education in the community                69,378 
ARI Immunization against measles  in a Health 
Centre 
               49,360 
ARI Immunization against measles at an 
outreach 
              25,060 
ARI ARI case management Health Centre                  1,563 
Acute Diarrhoea Disease Improved latrine construction.             125,823 
Acute Diarrhoeal Disease Water source protection.                  5,194 
Acute Diarrhoea Disease Health education schools                  3,177 
Acute Diarrhoea Disease Case tracing through home visiting             178,645 
Acute Diarrhoea Disease ORT communication strategic in the 
community 
                 4,333 
Acute Diarrhoea Disease Diarrhoea case management. HC/ OPD                 2,622 
Acute Diarrhoea Disease Severe diarrhoea case management hospital                 2,257 
Malaria Train a microscopist                  4,101 
Malaria Health education in the community                42,095 
Malaria Provision of impregnated mosquito nets            157,678 
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Malaria Chemoprophylaxis in hospital                   8,919 
Malaria Treatment of uncomplicated cases at health 
centre OPD 
                    696 
Malaria Management of severe malaria at IP hospital                39,261 
Maternal Complications Management of chloroquine resistant 
malaria cases at hospital IP 
                 3,893 
Maternal Complications Training of TBAs                31,483 
Maternal Complications Train Nursing Aides, at hospital                89,055 
Maternal Complications Antenatal Care health centres            197,303 
Maternal Complications Family planning with Lofeminal, Health 
centre 
             147,915 
Maternal Complications Family planning with Depo provera, Health 
center 
           145,191 
Maternal Complications Treatment of puerperal sepsis, hospital IP              112,097 
Maternal Complications Caesarian section, hospital IP                18,347 
Maternal Complications Safe delivery at health centre                    374 
Maternal Complications Safe delivery, at hospital              116,874 
Measles Health education schools                41,428 
Measles Immunization measles in a Health Centre                2,417 
Measles Immunization measles at an outreach                     107 
Measles Case management at hospital as IP                99,230 
Malnutrition Education  on malnutrition               24,326 
Malnutrition Establish school gardens               82,019 
Malnutrition Vitamin A supplementation during measles 
immunization outreach 
                 5,865 
Malnutrition Vitamin A supplementation  at health centre             335,658 
Malnutrition Conduction of growth monitoring and 
health education activities 
               22,487 
Malnutrition Case management at health centre level                7,739 
Prenatal Causes Health education in ANC                34,190 
Prenatal Causes Safe delivery health centre                82,662 
Prenatal Causes Neonatal tetanus treatment            122,159 
Sleeping Sickness Health education at outreach                28,994 
Sleeping Sickness Sleeping sickness care tracing in the 
community 
               92,549 
Sleeping Sickness Provision of tsetse fly traps              11,049 
Sleeping Sickness Treatment of sleeping sickness cases 
presenting in the early stages  at hospital 
               22,863 
Sleeping Sickness Treatment of sleeping sickness cases 
presenting in the early stages at hospital 
           139,732 
Tuberculosis Health education at outreach  
Tuberculosis Immunization health centre            107,392 
Tuberculosis Immunization outreach                31,894 
Tuberculosis Treatment of new smear (-)ve or (+)ve TB 
cases with long course treatment  
                 3,581 
Tuberculosis Treatment of new smear (-)ve or (+) TB 
cases with short course treatment 
               5,359 
Tuberculosis Treatment of new smear (+)ve TB cases with 
short course using treatment 
                 5,662 
Trauma/Injuries Health education on trauma/injuries 
outreach. 
               13,553 
Trauma/Injuries Treatment bruises and minor cuts at health 
centre OPD 
                  523 
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Trauma/Injuries Surgical toilet of wounds hospital OPD                     420 
Trauma/Injuries Treatment of injuries, e.g. gunshot wound 
fractures, hospital IP 
                 3,407 
 Source: Report of study for Paper II 
In the end, a combination of consensus by stakeholders, the identified “cost-effective” 
interventions and the size of the resource envelope guided the definition of the EHP. A 
contentious issue was the inclusion of private resources in the EHP, over which the government 
had no power over how such resources would be allocated – except perhaps by advising 
individuals owning such funds. But an individual would rather spend his money on treating 
malaria than on immunization, however “cost-effective” immunization may be. Thus, the EHP 
finally agreed upon was no different from what had always been known. As the current 
financial envelope is still inadequate to meet the EHP, the implication that it is not the basic 
package that is contentious; it is how to secure more funds to finance the package that is the 
issue. Thus, while a number of reform initiatives were potentially beneficial and innovative, 
they were overshadowed by unnecessary market and private-sector orientation. The emphasis 
on this orientation went beyond and out of context of the reality on the ground. A lot of effort 
and resources were wasted on fruitless interventions, when more obvious needs, such as drugs, 
staff remuneration and motivation, medical equipment, and service delivery systems remained 
ignored, unfunded or under-funded. Table 22 summarizes all the different reforms carried 
between 1987 and 2007. 
Table 22: Individual reforms carried out under DHSP 
Reforms Anticipated Results Actual Results Source of information
User fees Sustainable financing of 
health services 
Only 3-5% cost recovery rate. 
Removal of fees increased 
service utilization by 100% 
User-fees abolished 
Paper I 
Pricing of health 
services 
All services to be priced 
so people pay according 
to service received 
Found to be impractical; flat 
fee preferred 
Paper II 
Revolving drug 
funds 
A drug fund to be 
maintained through sale 
of drugs 
Drug fund not sustained; 
most people could not afford 
the market price of drugs 
Paper II 
Pre-payment 
schemes 
Schemes to be piloted, 
and scaled-up 
countrywide; to become 
a key strategy for health 
financing 
Two schemes done. Small 
scale, highly funded by 
donor aid and collapsed 
when donor support 
stopped 
Paper II 
Social health 
insurance 
To become the main 
method of financing and 
sustaining health 
services 
Feasible for a small well-off 
minority. 
Government funding will be 
greatly required for the rest. 
Paper IV & V
Private insurance All employees of private 
firms to get health 
insurance 
Most employees of big firms 
are insured. But not the 
smaller firms 
Paper IV & V
Income generation Provide seed money to 
poor families to raise 
incomes so they can pay 
for health care 
The poor had far more needs 
than just health care. Income 
was not enough or 
sustainable 
Papers II  
Payment incentives To pay workers by A study was done and Paper II 
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to health workers performance and reward 
good performers 
incentive scheme tried in one 
hospital. Scheme was 
mismanaged. It could also 
not be sustained 
Eliminate barriers 
to health care 
market 
Open up health-care 
market for 
entrepreneurs to make 
services available and 
better 
Market opened for health 
workers other than doctors 
and midwives. Market still 
restricted by other factors. 
Not regarded lucrative 
sector 
Paper II 
Make public 
hospitals 
autonomous 
Hospitals to be run like 
business firms, to 
generate income and 
sustain themselves with 
little or no support from 
Government 
Politically contentious; 
hospitals not able to generate 
adequate funds unless 
privatized. Access would be 
reduced for the majority 
poor 
Paper II & IV 
Create health trusts Autonomous hospitals 
to operate on money 
held in trust, with little 
government funding or 
involvement 
Initial trust fund difficult to 
get. Sustaining the fund 
without revenue generation 
or grants from government 
was not possible 
Paper II 
Work closely with 
the private sector 
Recognize the role of the 
private sector and pay 
private sector 
organizations to provide 
services because they are 
better at that 
Closer collaboration 
established. Contracting of 
private providers to provide 
services has increased. 
NGOs used more than 
private firms. Major 
problems have been found 
with involvement of NGOs 
Paper IV & V 
Establish a public 
private partnership 
Build a health system 
based on PPP 
PPP has been achieved 
mainly with non-profit and 
church-based organizations. 
But conditions for good PPP 
are not available in Uganda. 
Its benefits not seen in many 
countries 
Paper IV & V 
Establish
contracting as a 
method of health 
service delivery 
Value for money of 
health care delivered 
Contracting rules 
manipulated by the private 
sector (NGOs, especially 
under the Global Fund), and 
government had little 
capacity to manage 
contracting regulation 
Paper IV & V 
Community-based 
distribution of 
health commodities 
Communities to 
distribute condoms, bed-
nets, medicines, FP pills 
etc 
Tried with considerable 
success 
Paper II 
Define EHP using 
BoD/ CE analysis 
Using burden of disease, 
identify interventions 
that can reduce the 
burden most and finance 
only these 
There were methodological 
problems and the “cost-
effective” interventions 
could be effectively deal 
with diseases that require 
different approaches. 
Paper II 
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Decentralize health 
services 
Local governments to be 
fully responsible for 
health care planning, 
management and 
financing. 
Funding at local level was 
low (3-20%); much of the 
funding was from the centre, 
earmarked by donors. 
decentralized services 
deteriorated 
Paper III 
SWAP All donor funds and 
programmes to be 
harmonized 
Some donors joined SWAP, 
others did not. Global 
initiatives with big money 
disrupted the whole 
arrangement 
Paper II 
Restructure the 
MOH in support of 
decentralization 
MOH was down-sized 
and its role was to be 
limited to strategic 
planning, policy and 
technical guidance 
MOH continues to provide 
services through national 
programmes and is still 
highly compartmentalized 
by (donor) source of funding 
Paper II 
Make NMS 
autonomous 
NMS to operate like a 
private firm; self 
sustaining and without 
the control of the 
government 
NMS also distributes in 
drugs which are not 
profitable but essential. Most 
customers of NMS are 
government units. NMS is 
under capitalized. Its various 
funding sources disorganize 
its operations 
Paper I 
Source: Reports of studies for all papers
5.4  Key findings from literature 
The review of literature was on market-based economic systems, health reforms and systems, 
and health indicators in Uganda and around the world: 
Modern health system in Uganda 
1. A good and working system established in Uganda in the early 1960s was undermined 
by political and social instability, and by mismanagement (Owor, 1987). 
PHC
2. The failure of the PHC-approach, especially its financing, its infeasibility and 
impracticality led to other ways of improving health services which led to introduction 
of HSRs (Okuonzi, Owor et al 2002). 
AIDS 
3. HIV and AIDS pandemic took a disproportionately large attention, resources and  
effort of the health sector, leaving little to the rest for the rest of the services (Ortendalhl        
2007). 
Health system evolution 
4. Health systems evolved specifically to cater for the poor, marginalized; special groups  
such as soldiers, the elderly, children and women; and for public health problems such  
as epidemics (Abel-Smith, 1994). 
        
Sam Okuonzi 
108
              Financing  
5. Health services were originally financed by the church, then taken over by  
Governments and later complimented by solidarity arrangements in form of social or  
national health insurance (Abel-Smith ,1994). 
The free- market policy 
6. The free-market policy is regarded as superior and this is said to be evidenced by the 
triumph of the USA, which operates a free-market economy over USSR, which operated 
a planned economy. The World Bank, IMF and US government then developed the 
Washington Consensus to promote free-market principles in the global economy. But 
market principles fail almost entirely to apply to health, especially for equitable and 
sustainable health services. Classical market economics had led to economic exploitation 
and the world wars. The world under the League of Nations and the United Nations had 
resolved that economic and social security of all individuals would be the responsibility 
of governments. But in 1950s, multinational corporations begun to sponsor and promote 
free-market policy again until it became the prevailing system in 1970s to-date. The 
system reduces the role of government and encourages health care to be rationed by 
market forces. But the whole global economic system under the free market is 
unsustainable and is projected to fail sooner than later (Stigliz, 2002; Sachs, 2005). 
HSRs around the world 
7. HSRs were introduced as a political ideology in rich countries and as conditions of  
donor aid in poor countries. The reasons included hard economic circumstances, rising  
health care costs, changing technology, rising expectations in quality and outcomes of  
care, changing disease patterns, and aging populations. No country has demonstrated  
any significant achievement of health sector objectives by market based reforms  
(Eriksson, Diwan et al, 2002) 
Beneficial nonmarket reforms 
8. Nonmarket reforms have benefitted a number of countries. Significant government 
investment in social welfare in China, Chile, Costa Rica, Sri Lanka and Tanzania ( Abel-
Smith, 1994). Some countries such as Chile had to tackle poverty, environment and 
demography first, then focus on specific risks such as child and maternal mortality 
(Jimenez and Romero, 2007). User-fees were abolished in Uganda, Zambia and now 
other countries too (Deinenger and Mpuga, 2004). Universal coverage was promoted by 
law in Netherlands (Naik, 2007) and by trial, research and monitoring in Thailand 
(Hughes and Leethongdee, 2007). Community involvement was found beneficial in IMCI 
programmes in several countries (Bryce, Victora et al, 2004). In Ghana, the total-quality-
management approach turned around antenatal care and especially treatment and 
prevention of malaria in pregnancy (Deganus, 2007). In Rwanda, performance-based 
funding was implemented with remarkable success (Soeters et al, 2006). In Malawi 
problem-based approaches were used in tackling malaria and human resource crisis with 
excellent results (Okuonzi et al 2007). All these successes were based on evidence and not 
inspired by ideology. 
Donor aid 
9. Aid can cause and has caused health sector fragmentation through donor inspired  
programmes and choices. For aid to be effective some criteria need to be used whereby  
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recipient governments take lead in policy and setting priorities (Fritz and Menacol,  
2007).  
Factors complicating HSD 
10. Factors complicating health system development include foreign aid, macro-economic  
policy, policy of predominantly focusing on economic growth, corruption, inadequate  
internal management capacity, and ad hoc nature of the reforms. 
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6.0 DISCUSSION 
6.1 The failure of free-market policy 
The results show that HSRs have by their own objectives collectively and individually failed. 
The wider economic and social policies based on the free-market have not produced the desired 
results either. Of the twenty reforms carried out in the health sector over the past twenty years 
in Uganda, only two reforms – encouraging the establishment of private health facilities and 
community-based distribution of health commodities – were successful. The rest failed to be 
established or produced undesirable results, or their good results could not be sustained or up-
scaled. This is consistent with the trend in other countries (WHO, 2000). Countries set up free-
market policies to address economic difficulties, escalating health care prices, rising expectations 
from health services, and the changing demographic and disease patterns. But over 30 years 
down the road of HSRs, these have remained or even escalated (Eriksson et al. 2001). Thus, the 
continued faith of countries – both poor and rich – in the free-market is perplexing. 
6.2 Results of HSRs in general 
In the USA, the market approach has always been used. The reasons are historical, cultural and 
ideological. Abel-Smith (1994) bluntly says that racist exclusion of black Americans from welfare 
was at the heart of America’s rejection of a solidarity-based welfare system and preference to 
market-based distribution of welfare. And yet the American health system that is market-driven 
and often used by others (for example, by European countries) as a benchmark to reform their 
own systems is remarkably inefficient (Eriksson et al, 2002).  
In Europe, better public health and cost-containment - the key reform objectives - have not been 
achieved through market-style reforms in countries such as Sweden and the UK which have 
undertaken reforms in earnest. On the contrary, the most efficient and consumer-friendly 
health-care system in the European Union was declared at the end of 2006 to be that in France 
(Ionescu, 2007). The French health care system is solidarity-based, largely public-funded and 
non-market-based. All attempts at reforming the French system to become market-oriented have 
so far been resisted. However, the new French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has vowed to 
“reform” the system by introducing a non-refundable tax. He is faced with an outstanding 
health care budget deficit of Euros 6billion at the end of 2006. But with mounting opposition to 
this tax from various groups, he is less inclined to go into fully-fledged market reforms.  
The outcome of market-reforms in Eastern Europe is worse than elsewhere in Europe. It is 
characteristic of the outcome in Africa and Asia. The original attempt to orient health systems in 
poor countries to primary health care (PHC) dramatically changed. Both economic crises and 
reforms, and health sector reforms, weakened health and other social sectors. As a result, 
inequality of access to health care increased. In Africa all the major problems, which HSRs were 
introduced to address, persisted or even increased. In addition to the key health problems not 
being effectively addressed, African health systems continued to be weak, under-funded, and 
under-utilized (WHO 1997).  
Four specific concerns were expressed about HSRs in Africa: 
First, some of the individual reforms were clearly undermining or in conflict with health sector 
objectives. Health sector objectives in general are to improve equity in health and health-care, 
increase efficiency in resource use, improve quality, provide financial protection against 
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catastrophic expenditure (WHO 2000), mobilize resources, and accord greater satisfaction to 
consumers and providers of health care (WHO 1997 ). Some of the reforms go directly against 
equity and the protection against catastrophic expenditure. An example is the health financing 
policy of user-fees. 
Second, a number of reforms were introduced as isolated solutions, whether they were user-fees, 
health insurance or decentralization. The reforms were often unconnected and not linked to the 
overall working of the national health system.  
Third, adequate monitoring of the impact of reform was not in place, resulting in lack of 
information and evidence for decision-making.  
Fourth, the HSRs were often forced on poor countries as a condition for international aid, and 
not introduced as a result of careful situation analysis. The reform packages are usually pre-
packaged, with remarkable similarity across countries as far apart as Uganda, Bolivia and 
Russia (Eriksson, et al. 2002). 
6.3 Characteristics of a good health care system 
A framework for a good health system can be derived from three sources (see figure 23): a) 
observation and analysis of health system development (especially noting solidarity, charity and 
compassion as important elements), b) WHO framework (WHO, 2007), which provides most of 
the other elements but lacks in information about certain inputs (eg institutions, infrastructure), 
pillars and management, c) some good market principles (eg financing innovations, citizen 
control and payment incentives). 
Table 23: Derivation of the framework for a good health system 
Sources of information Elements of a health system References 
WHO Service delivery, health 
workforce, health 
information, medical 
products,
leadership/governance, 
safety, access, coverage and 
quality 
WHO, 2007; WHO 2000 
Market principles Payment, funding, efficiency, 
citizen control, organization 
Helms 1993 
 History of HSD  Solidarity, charity, 
compassion, resource 
generation, government 
guidance, evidence based 
Abel-Smith, 1994 
Source: author’s compilation 
From the above sources, it can be concluded that despite the market-orientation of health 
systems today, the nature of health care has always been consistent and distinct. The first
observable characteristic of a good health-care system to which societies aspire, is one that 
includes the poor. In fact, the health system was not evolved for those who could afford. It was 
developed for the poor, disabled, elderly, children and expectant mothers. This is as true today 
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as it was 200 years ago. Second, the health system has a major element of charity, where the rich 
assist the poor. The rich pay hospital services for the poor. In modern times, the rich still pay for 
the health-care of the poor. An example is the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria 
funded by Bill Gates for the purchase of antiretroviral drugs. Third, there is a major element of 
compassion, and the involvement of religion. Suffering and illness evoke emotions of sympathy. 
This drives some people to act and help. This is unique in health-care, or it is not as profound in 
other social services as in health-care. Fourth, is the element of solidarity. People may be divided 
on political, ethnic and racial grounds. But in health-care and other social concerns, there tends 
to be solidarity to help one another. The concept of risk pooling and sharing is the centre piece 
of health insurance.  
Fifth, the health system does not emerge spontaneously. It is planned, designed, directed and 
steered by the Government. The role of the government in a good health-care system is therefore 
eminent. Sixth, there is the element of legislation. To reach the poor and powerless, and to make 
things work, legislation is an inevitable mechanism in health system development and 
operation. Finally, the rich always want the best and they can afford it. And health services for 
all will always be available for the population who can afford. The private-sector providers can 
be mobilized and integrated to enhance the overall health system. This has been demonstrated 
in the history of health system. These good health-care characteristics can be summarized as 
being equitable, efficient in resource use, government controlled and directed, regulated by laws 
and rules, based on solidarity, provided with compassion, with elements of charity and based 
on the practice of public-private partnership. 
From the various country cases, different policy thrusts of interventions have helped improve 
the sector performance. Where health systems seem to be working close to what is desired –a 
health system that is internally sustainable and able to meet the needs and expectations of the 
population - certain factors are constant. These factors can best be described using the five-by-
five schematic diagram in figure 18. It has seven elements, each with 5 key contents. The 
elements are inputs, pillars; management functions, stewardship and outcomes (expected 
results): 
Under inputs are adequate human resources, appropriate and functional institutions, 
appropriate and adequate infrastructure, adequate funds, and reliable and quality medicines 
and supplies. The pillars include evidence-based solutions, guidance by the government, 
solidarity, compassion and charity. Under management functions are oversight (political 
oversight supported by a monitoring system and vibrant civil society), partnership with 
stakeholders, accountability to the population being served, monitoring and evaluation, and 
incentives to health workers to facilitate better performance. 
Stewardship is the conscious steering of the health system towards desired outcomes. 
Stewardship has five controls: 1) financing: raising of funds in adequate and sustainable 
amounts: 2) payment methods: paying of health workers in such a way as to provide incentives 
for them to work hard and usually include performance-based payment, bonus for good 
performance and rewards; 3) organization: structuring the sector in such a way that it is 
internally coherent and compatible with the rest of the national economy and social systems; 4) 
regulation: the establishment of laws to regulate the behaviour of individuals (both providers 
and consumers of health services) and of organizations so as to attain the desired health sector 
goals; and 5) citizen control: this is where citizens are empowered by information knowledge 
and institutions to influence the direction and functioning of the health system to suit their 
needs and expectations. Under values are equity, access, coverage, quality, and safety. There 
provide a radar to steer health services. 
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Under service delivery are preventive, curative, rehabilitative, promotive and advocacy services. 
Advocacy services deals with encouraging efforts to put on determinants of health such as 
education, child protection, water and sanitation, nutrition etc. Under outcomes are five expected 
results of a good health system: 1) equity: there should be no avoidable differences in access and 
health status between societies and individuals; 2) efficiency: the use of resources should 
maximize the production of health care outputs and health outcomes; 3) health improvement: 
the system should lead to an appreciable improvement in the health status of the population: 4) 
responsiveness: this deals with how the health system fulfils the client’s or patient’s 
expectations, needs and wants. They are divided into client-oriented responsiveness and respect 
for the individual. Client-based domains to which the health system responds are access and 
support, promptness of attention, quality of services, and choice of health institution and 
provider. In respecting the individual, the health system should provide and guarantee dignity, 
confidentiality, clarity of communication, and involvement in decisions about the service; and 5) 
protection from social and economic risks. Figure 18 is a proposed framework for a good health 
system. 
Figure 18: The framework for a good health system 
Source: author’s compilation 
6.4  HSR policy genesis and implementation 
Policy genesis 
This thesis focuses primarily on the evaluation and succession of HSRs as policy, but this is the 
end-tail of the analysis. It is essential to discuss first the genesis, policy development and policy 
implementation. In Uganda, HSRs were initiated and propelled by five factors (Paper I), most of 
which are common to other developing countries. First, Uganda in mid 1980’s was coming out 
of civil war, which had left much of the health infrastructure devastated. There was a dire need 
for major health infrastructure rehabilitation. Second, there had been economic decline for 10 
years during and following the political mismanagement of the country under dictator Idi 
Amin. Uganda’s economy had been contracting, not expanding.  
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Third, the contracting economy was worsened by the global economic crisis arising from the 
increase in oil prices in 1970s.  With the advantage of hindsight, this appears to have been the 
major factor behind Uganda’s accelerated economic decline in 1970’s. Even peaceful and 
politically stable countries, such as Tanzania and Kenya, eventually suffered similar degrees of 
economic decline in 1990s. Fourth, there was widespread dissatisfaction with PHC as a vehicle 
for health-care delivery among both politicians and health-care professionals. Even ordinary 
people, already disillusioned with the deteriorating health services, did not view PHC as a 
positive strategy. Instead, many people mistakenly associated the worsening health services 
with the introduction of PHC. Finally, the World Bank had asserted its strong views through the 
publication of the World Development Report 1993, and subsequently assumed the leadership 
of the health sector. WHO, which was championing PHC and viewed as failing, was “pushed 
aside” to leave way for the World Bank which seemed to have revolutionary ideas that struck 
deep cords in politicians and ministries of finance in low income countries. 
The usual process of policy discussion, issues-definition and forecasting of policy which should 
normally take place internally in a country among different interest groups (Hogwood and 
Gunn, 1984) did not happen. Some discussions initiated by the media and civil society were 
held, but these were peripheral and did not affect the content of HSR agreed between the GoU 
and the World Bank and other donors (Paper 1). The GoU wanted funding and the donors had a 
duty to promote their domestic policies through aid. Many HSR policies were extensions of 
domestic policies of donor countries and business interests supporting multi-national 
corporations of the donor countries. For the World Bank, the clear aim was to remove all 
barriers to a free-market global economy and ensure that all systems, including health systems, 
conformed to and became compatible with free-market principles. 
Policy development 
Health policy development in Uganda was ambivalent (Paper 1). It was driven by national 
political leaders on the one hand who wanted a genuine health sector development based on the 
usual agreed health-sector objectives. On the other hand, it was controlled by donors, led by the 
World Bank, which ignored most of the policy proposals made by Ugandan politicians and 
health professionals. A typical example is the “Three-Year Health Plan Frame 1993-1996” 
developed by World Bank consultants posted to the Ugandan MOH. Subsequent policies 
developed by MOH were shelved and they largely remained unimplemented. 
Only selected elements of the health policy (generally those market-oriented initiatives) were 
funded by the Bank and other donors under the Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSP) (Paper II). Similar parallel policies were thus developed every year under different 
names and funded through the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry virtually became an extension 
of the Bank in the country, acting as its agent. Broad policy frameworks were set by the Ministry 
of Finance and all sectoral policies had to fit within this framework. Thus, while health policy 
was progressive, its implementation was subjected to market-based economic policy framework 
known as the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). This framework set arbitrarily 
low and unrealistic ceilings for health and other social services. In the end, donors triumphed. 
Only donor-selected policies (the HSRs) were funded and implemented. 
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Table 24: How the National Health Policy did not fulfil implementation preconditions 
Conditions Comments 
External factors do not impose 
crippling constraints 
Crippling constraints in form of unrealistic budget 
ceilings, restriction to market reforms and other 
management restrictions. 
There is adequate time and resources NHP was devoted far less resources than was 
optimal. Most resources targeted donor 
determined priorities, in most cases market-based 
interventions. 
Required combination of resources is 
available 
Mostly impossible; usually there was lack of 
human skills, infrastructure and drug supplies, 
even when other supplies such as vaccines were 
available. 
Theory of cause and effect is valid There is some cause-effect relationship in the 
NHP, but no demonstrable link between market-
based HSRs and health system performance  
Cause-effect relationship is direct True for NHP, but not HSRs. 
There is an understanding and 
agreement on policy 
True for NHP, not for HSRs. 
Dependency relationship is minimal For most of the past 20 years, the health sector has 
depended on donor aid for 50 to 90% of its 
funding. So this condition was not met. 
Tasks are fully specified in the correct 
sequence 
In real life this is usually difficult to achieve. It is 
even more difficult in a dependency relationship. 
There is perfect communication and 
coordination 
There was no transparent communication on the 
HSRs, which became the de facto national health 
policy, displacing NHP. 
Those in authority can demand and 
obtain perfect compliance 
In real life this is not usually fully achieved, but it 
becomes even less achievable under dependency 
and non-transparent arrangements involving 
donors. 
Source: author’s compilation 
Policy implementation  
Implementation of the HSRs, which in Uganda doubled as the whole public-sector health 
service, was done through projects and NGOs. The HSRs were geared to activities with clear 
and immediate outputs for accountability to donors. These projects or programmes typically 
avoided funding health care infrastructure, health personnel, institutional development or long-
term plans. The implementation of HSRs also fragmented the health system. In many cases, with 
the increasing participation of numerous NGOs funded by donors, the system became 
uncontrollable by both donors and the government. The mismanagement of Uganda’s Global 
Fund programme exemplifies how donor rigidity and the involvement of too many NGOs with 
varying and conflicting interests made the programme spiral out of control (Okuonzi, 2005). 
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The implementation of HSRs thus disrupted and obscured the implementation of the HSD that 
was envisaged in the health policies of the government. The necessary conditions to have a 
genuine HSD implemented in Uganda and other poor countries were not achievable with a 
strong HSR agenda in place. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) laid down ten conditions for perfect 
implementation of policy. The genuine HSD in Uganda articulated in the National Health Policy 
(NHP) did not fulfil most of the conditions for implementation, which are summarized in the 
Table 24. 
6.5 HSR policy evaluation 
In evaluating the HSRs, it is taken that the reforms were meant to add, supplement or even 
replace HSD as originally conceived under the NHP. However, if the concepts underpinning the 
health policy are disaggregated, three categories of health policy objectives are discerned. It is 
important to distinguish them. They are health, health-care and health sector reform objectives. 
Health-care deals with prevention and treatment of disease as well as repair and rehabilitation 
of health. Health is a state of physical, mental and social well-being. HSR is the orientation of the 
health system to be compatible and in harmony with the free-market.  
Table 25: Categories of health policy objectives 
Category Proximate objectives Ultimate objectives 
Health overall Health care objectives 
HSR objectives 
HS HIV/AIDS objectives 
HS inequity objectives 
Reduce mortality 
Reduce fertility 
Reduce HIV/AIDS 
Reduce inequity 
Health Care Physical access 
Human skills targets 
Quality targets 
Efficiency targets 
Equity targets 
Access to all 
Good quality  
Efficient use of resources 
Financial protection 
Equity 
HSR Budget ceilings 
Proportion of public sector 
health financing 
Funds controlled by local 
authorities 
Efficiency 
Private sector dominated 
Minimal public expenditure 
decentralized 
Source: author’s compilation 
It is also important to distinguish between proximate and ultimate objectives ( see Table 25). It is 
usually taken that the ultimate objectives are those of the “health”, which, it is assumed, all 
other efforts including those outside the health sector, contribute to. But health services are not 
just about health status, which is clearly important. It is also about health-care that is 
increasingly seen as an ultimate goal in its own right. Health-care is not just a mechanism for 
good health. The permanency of health-care, even in situations of the highest possible health 
status, means that it is an ultimate objective in its own right. Therefore health-care objectives are 
not just proximate objectives of the overall health objectives.  
Table 26 identifies different types of objectives from the NHP and the PEAP in Uganda. 
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Although the presence of health-care in society is essential because it does help individuals, as 
has been articulated by others (Mckeown, 1965; WHO, 1986; Abel-Smith, 1994), health care by 
itself makes only a limited contribution to the health status of a nation. The ultimate goals for 
health status are the cumulative result of the overall development of a country. Attributions to 
different sectors may be difficult and contentious. Thus, the health sector evaluation is left with 
health-care as its main domain of evaluation.  
Table 26: Evaluation of Uganda’s health care by objective 
Objectives Assessment Sources 
Access to care Good for preventive services; 
unpredictable and low, stagnating or 
declining for curative care 
Paper II 
Quality of care Generally low; combined lack of or 
unavailable combination of the right 
inputs is common 
Paper II 
Efficiency Improved in some aspects, but increased 
wastage and mismanagement of 
resources in the public sector 
programmes have reduced efficiency 
levels further 
Papers II and IV 
Financial protection No target was set; not assessed in reports. 
But with increasing economic and social 
disparity, this is bound to increase even 
when user-fees are banned. Effective 
services are only available for a fee in the 
private sector. 
Paper IV 
Equity Considerable inequity arising from the 
fact that NGO hospitals which are more 
effective charge a fee; public sector 
facilities which largely provide no 
services are freely accessible. 
Paper IV 
Source: author’s compilation 
Although there have been minor reductions in mortality in recent surveys, mortality of children 
and mothers in Uganda has remained high - higher than for countries of similar economies and 
circumstances. But no significant improvements have been made in any of the health-care 
objectives. In fact, a number of health-care objectives have fallen short of previous achievements. 
Table 26 summarizes health-care evaluation. 
Overall, therefore, health-care performance has been particularly poor. This trend is also seen in 
other poor countries (WHO, 2000). The slight improvement in mortality reduction in Uganda is 
attributed to improvement in the economy. But this improvement is incremental and 
unpredictable, as it has been over the past twenty years. Sustainable reduction in mortality can 
only occur with increased social spending, which runs against HSR policy. Market-based 
objectives are diametrically opposed to the ideal HSD objectives. HSR objectives address 
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efficiency, and minimization of expenditure and private investment in health care. HSD 
objectives deal with improved access and equity through greater resources (more and efficient 
public spending). Some non-market based reforms have been implemented in Uganda and other 
countries. However, while the initiative had the potential of being beneficial, they have typically 
remained on a small scale and are often unattractive to donors. 
In evaluating of the global HSRs, it is interesting to note that, in no country - poor or rich - can it 
be demonstrated clearly that HSRs or market mechanisms, have improved the performance of 
health systems. But there is a linking relationship between four factors: aid, market reforms, 
politics and HSD. Aid, market reforms and HSD are linked in the case of poor countries where 
aid leverages market mechanisms to address HSD. In the rich countries, politics and ideology 
leverage market mechanisms to address HSD. This is presented as the Square of HSR (figure 19). 
Figure 19. The square of HSR 
Source: author’s compilation 
Two groups of poor countries have applied market-based HSRs with dramatically different 
results. One group comprises of countries with largely collapsed or non-functional health 
systems (such as Burkina Faso, Uganda and Zambia). These countries have ended up with 
worse states of HSD objectives, and with health sector fragmentation. The other group of poor 
countries includes Vietnam and Kyrgyzstan. These countries already have working health-
systems and all they need is to improve the system in the context of the changing global political 
and economic environments. But they want to retain their socialized health-system structure. 
What distinguishes these two groups of countries is the extent to which they have retained 
Market 
reforms 
Health  
systems  
development 
Politics 
Aid
HSR in poor countries 
HSR in rich countries 
Health sector reforms in Uganda 1987 – 2007 
119
sovereignty over the health system. The more functional a system is, the more sovereignty the 
country has been able to exercise.  
The other factors differentiating these two groups of poor countries are the levels of capacity 
and accountability to the people. The stronger the poor countries exercise sovereignty and 
capacity, and account to their own people, the better. The weaker countries have had their 
sovereignty seriously eroded by the dependence on donors and with weak democratic systems, 
have no accountability to their populations. Instead they usually account to please donors in 
order to get more aid. This further fragments national health systems. Therefore, it seems 
evident that to get a balanced HSR that is genuinely geared to real HSD, the three factors must 
be strongly in place. Figure 20 presents pre-requisites for a balanced HSD. 
Figure 20: Pre-requisites for a balanced health systems development 
Source: author’s compilation 
6.6 HSR policy succession 
Policy succession occurs when a policy has failed or has achieved its purpose and is no longer 
needed, or when there is need for change of direction (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). There is now 
a widespread acknowledgement of the increasing health problems, and the role of HSRs and 
globalization in creating and perpetuating the problems. As well as the breakdown of health 
systems in poor countries, there are non-responsive or deteriorating health systems in richer 
countries. There are also international health concerns of HIV/AIDS, emerging and re-emerging 
diseases; health problems during conflicts and disasters; human resource shortages; the 
damaging impact of aid on health services; inadequate and unsustainable financing 
mechanisms; and a multitude of health-sector actors independent of one another and having 
different views, principles and interests (Amorim et al, 2007). 
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In a review of safe motherhood initiatives over the past twenty years, Freedman et al (2007) 
conclude that it is now time to shift focus on the challenges of effective implementation. They 
note that political commitment along with forging coalitions across sectors, programmes, 
professions and countries and to tap the local knowledge, will be critical.  But they are cautious 
because “courage [will be] needed to confront what is wrong in health systems that do not 
function for people, especially those who are poorest, despite huge infusions of development 
aid”. And crucially they advocate for transformation in the health system.  This advocacy for 
transformation will inevitably confront hardened mindsets and world perspectives shaped by 
free-market values.  But to begin to question such fixed positions and values against the 
backdrop of glaring public health failures will be a step in the right direction. 
There is an increasing realization that there is need to end the ideologically driven, market-
dominated HSRs. Such HSRs are to be replaced with policies based on the lessons learned over 
the past twenty years. There is need to rethink, and to put the best of government-based and 
market-based approaches together to find a better policy. New actors in the new health system 
will have to be the giant corporations, which need to be reigned in as they continue to wield 
more powers in the affairs of the world. The UN institutions need to harmonize their action, but 
eventually the entire UN system will require to be overhaul in order to function well and to 
become useful (Bello, 2004). The importance of international health security has recently been 
highlighted (WHO, 2007a), and will require a new type of funding mechanism. Aid from ODA 
is becoming increasingly untenable as a method of funding HSD. International tax for health 
security and for the environment will become inevitable as suggested by WHO. Innovations and 
best experiences in sustainable livelihoods will have to be adapted and scaled-up for 
implementation by countries. 
The succession of HSR policy requires two steps for the long-term strategy. First, there is need to 
reform the current policies to address emerging problems especially of inequity, deepening 
health crises and social unrest. Second, there is a need eventually to have a change in values in 
our lifestyles and to adopt a culture that will sustain the world’s resources. This will take a 
much longer time scale, but a beginning has to be made. The immediate succession policy for 
the health sector is to address the emerging and prevalent problems. The efforts will need to be 
geared to international or cross-country problems.  
Global instruments (laws and covenants) should be enhanced. Global institutions should be 
reformed (Bello, 2004). Also, the character of aid should be improved through an international 
agreement on what is good or bad aid. More effort has to be put in tackling development, trade 
and governance so that these address quality-of-life issues. At the national level, countries need 
to carry out rigorous situation analyses, and identify health system problems and solutions. 
Solutions come from options that have been known to lead to good results before, best practices, 
and what has previously worked in other countries. Some good initiatives are on a small scale in 
many countries, and these will need to be scaled-up. 
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS 
7.1 Conclusions 
General conclusion 
From the foregoing discussion emerge three key reasons why the health system in Uganda 
collapsed. These are: 1) the free market policies (Papers IV and V); 2) aid as a factor for 
distorting priorities, fragmentation of the health system, creating a dependency syndrome and 
inhibiting initiative, and introducing unnecessary procedures and structures (Paper I and 
Örtendahl,2007); 3) poor leadership, management and bad politics that destroyed a 
decentralized system that had started well (Papers IV and V; Örtendahl,2007). 
While there is mounting evidence of the unsuitability of the free-market policy for developing or 
organizing health systems, and as the cause of health system failures and crises in Uganda and 
around the world, many leaders continue to have faith in the market as the solution for health 
system development. It is not possible to achieve health-sector objectives using HSRs or the free-
market. HSRs based on the free market were not democratically developed or owned by the 
developing countries. Democratic policy ownership has emerged as a fundamental factor in the 
success of implementing policies and programmes (Amorim, Douste-Blazy, et al, 2007; Fritz and 
Menacol, 2007)). While free-market principles in the health sector have also diffused to 
developed countries, these countries can cope with free-market economic and social crises 
through democracy. This is not possible for many developing countries, especially in Africa. 
But regardless of where a policy originates from, when it fails or becomes irrelevant to the 
problems it is supposed to solve, it should be succeeded or replaced with another {Hogwood 
and Gunn, 1984).  Thus, market-based HSR policy needs to be replaced with a HSR policy where 
fundamental changes in the health system are based on evidence and guided by the government 
through democratic ownership (WHO, 1997; WHO, 2000; Lundberg, Yngwe et al, 2008). For 
sustainable health systems development, enduring efforts have to be made through policy 
reform, consisting structural shifts in the organization and management of society. But health 
systems cannot be built in isolation. Indeed the change in health systems cannot be a sufficient 
reason for re-organizing society.  However, the breakdown of health systems and ensuing crises 
are not the only crises arising from the global free-market policies. Other crises – price increases, 
market crushes, energy, water and food shortages, social polarization resulting into the creation 
of terrorists etc – are also the result of the free-market policies (Bello, 2004; Raskin, Bamuri, et al 
2002; Shutt, 1998). Hence, there is need for a wider reform of the global societal organization and 
relations. 
Specific conclusions 
A number of specific conclusions can be drawn from Uganda’s experience, and from market-
based HSRs around the world. These are:  
One, market-based HSRs have either destroyed health systems or added negligible value to 
health systems around the world. In Uganda and other poor countries they have destroyed or 
fragmented health systems, and in some cases reversed progress that had been made in health 
and health-care objectives (Paper II, IV, and V). In rich countries, there is no clear evidence of the 
value added by market-based approaches (Eriksson, Lönnroth, et al. 2002).  
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Two, market-based principles may be good and superior for making profits and creating private 
wealth, but they are disastrous for social services such as health-care. Markets have no 
superiority at all in most aspects of health services. The assumptions on which market principles 
are supposed to operate (assumptions of a perfect market) do not hold true (Hsaio, 1995; Rice 
,1998; Sachs, 2005). 
Three, for a balanced economic and human development, which includes better health and 
health care, the market needs to be directed, controlled and regulated by the Government. In the 
wider scheme, the market needs to be regulated by the government (Paper II). In particular, to 
avert an impending crisis of over-use of global resources through globalized capitalism, which 
will lead to social conflict arising from deepening inequity, governments and international 
institutions urgently need to intervene in two specific areas: 1) save the environment, and 2) 
reduce widening inequity (Bello, 2004; Raskin, Bamuri, et al 2002; Shutt, 1998).  
Four, the failure of market-based HSRs in Uganda and other countries - both poor and rich - is 
not the result of “the devil in the details” (McKee and McPake, 2004), or of how badly the 
reforms were done, but the problem of the “big picture” – the whole market-approach to health-
sector reform (Hsaio, 1995; Rice ,1998; Sachs, 2005) . The market-approach is simply unworkable 
for organizing health and other social services, especially for the poor. 
Five, external aid has proven to be disruptive and even destructive to socio-economic 
development in poor countries (Paper I; Rodman, 2005; Hancock, 2006). As a general rule, it is 
important for countries to wean themselves off external aid as quickly as possible (Schieber , 
Flesher, et al, 2007). But aid can be useful if the quality of aid is good and it is well-managed. 
Aid should be aligned to the recipient country’s socio-economic development framework (Fritz 
and Menacol, 2007). It should not just support a market-oriented, detached and parallel macro-
economic policy. The governance and management of aid has to be improved both within the 
recipient country and by the donors. Accountability mechanisms need to be strengthened for 
both recipient countries and donors.  
Spending decisions should be unlocked from IMF, World Bank and other donor 
conditions(Rodman, 2005). Recipient countries should raise their own revenue for health 
services and plan to wean themselves off aid funds. Leaders at all levels should be educated 
about the political economy of aid. In addition, for aid to be accepted and judged as useful, it 
should not be tied to ideological, bureaucratic and profit-oriented conditions; aid-administrative 
structure should not be large and costly; beneficiaries of aid should be prepared to implement 
aid-funded programmes, and participate fully in all stages of programme design; and project 
approach to the use of aid, especially where aid is proliferated into small grants, should be 
avoided. 
Six, user-fees for health services were imposed as a principle of the market, allegedly based on 
research findings from Philippines and Malaysia in 1980’s (Akin et al. 1985) which contributed 
to the World Bank policy that supported user-fees for health services. After more than twenty 
years and over 100 large-scale studies on user-fees around the world, it is now abundantly clear 
that user-fees have had very negative effects on the utilization and development of health 
services, especially in poor countries (Paper IV; Bodart, Servais et al 2001; Deineger and Mpuga 
2004; Nabyonga, Karamagi et al, 2008). There is now a trend of reversing the policy on user-fees. 
It is important to spread the message about the pernicious nature of user-fees for social services 
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and to destroy the false creed that even the poor are willing to pay for health care, and are not 
deterred by user-fees. 
Seven, the importance of inflation and other macro-economic variables in poor countries are 
overstated (Weeks and McKinley, 2007; Paper IV) and are often assigned without due 
consideration to the consequences they could have on human welfare. It is perfectly possible to 
design a system where both economic and social development can be achieved. Progressive 
fiscal and monetary policies can be harmonized within a pro-poor national development 
framework. Fiscal policy should be expansionary and focused on financing wide-ranging public 
investments; exchange rates should be managed in order to maintain short-term price and 
currency stability and foster long-term competitiveness and diversification of the economy. The 
monetary policy should accommodate fiscal expansion, instead of restricting it through 
targeting of unreasonably low inflation rates and correspondingly high real interest rates. 
Eight, reckless and uncontrolled decentralization driven by politics and ideology can destroy 
health and social service systems, as has happened in Uganda and Zambia (Paper III; Saito 
2004). But well planned decentralization can also improve participation, and provide better 
oversight and accountability for services.
Nine, neither the private-sector nor the public–private partnerships are a panacea for health 
sector development (Nickolic and Maikish, 2006). Both have been promoted merely as part of 
market ideology. The impact of the private-sector and the PPP on health systems development is 
mixed (Sunderwall and Forsberg, 2006). They can only work well in particular contexts, where 
certain prerequisites are in place. These include a) functional legal systems b) management 
institutions and skills, c) adequate time to nurture partnership, and d) in-built business and 
management functions. Such prerequisites are absent in most African and low-income countries. 
Ten, the development of a SHI is tied to long-term plans for sustainable health financing (Paper 
II; Berman, Hsiao et al, 2001). This is in turn linked to, and will be determined by, the macro-
economic policy. Once the bigger socio-economic development strategy is enabling, SHI 
becomes feasible. Thus, sustainable financing strategy for health-care, and eventually of 
universal coverage of health-care, becomes feasible. For Uganda, the macro-economic policy 
needs to be reviewed and harmonized with economic and social development (Ekman and 
Gerdtham 2006). Then SHI development process may start with the development of 
mechanisms and institutions for a) collecting and managing funds; b) management and 
regulation c) health-care provision, d) accreditation and quality control. 
Eleven, if Uganda, and indeed any other poor country, is ever going to get the HSD and the 
bigger socio-economic development right, it must have the three pre-requisites: a) adequate 
internal capacity (knowledge, skills, infrastructure etc.), b) accountability to the people of the 
country, and c) sovereignty (freedom from external forces to make decisions concerning the 
welfare of the country and in particular to own policies) (Paper I; Schieber , Flesher, et al 2007).  
Twelve, good health care systems around the world have unique and consistent characteristics 
(WHO 2000; WHO 2007 b). These characteristics have not been developed through market-
based approaches (Paper IV). The characteristics are: oriented to serve the poor, while the well-
off cater for themselves; oriented to reducing access gaps between the rich and the poor; charity, 
where the rich show genuine concern for the sick, poor and unfortunate and provide help; 
compassion, where those who provide health-care have a strong ethic of compassion or are 
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regulated to have a strong ethic of fairness and courtesy; solidarity, where people pool risks and 
resources, and where the well-off cross-subsidize the poor; centrally-designed and directed 
system of health care; are not allowed to evolve spontaneously or directed and fragmented by 
market forces; a strong and functional legislation to control the delivery of health care and 
constrain the undesirable behaviour of health care providers, funders, users and evaluators; and 
partnership between public and private sectors, including the civil society in the overall context 
of equity and other health-sector objectives (Abel-Smith, 1994). 
Thirteen, health systems all over the world are experiencing crises (Paper V). The degree of crises 
varies, being more severe in poor countries with fragile health systems attempting to introduce 
market-based HSRs. The crises are also severe in former socialist countries which have 
embraced market reforms wholesale, such as Russia. However, the crises are moderate where 
health systems are centrally managed, based on solidarity and directed by the government (e.g. 
Sweden and UK). Where crises are moderate, only minor market changes have been made to try 
and improve otherwise well functioning systems. But the evidence of the value of these market 
changes is hard to see. These widespread crises signal the point where market-based approaches 
for HSD need to be replaced with another policy. Neither the pure government-approach, nor 
the market-driven approaches are perfect. But we are now better equipped to design much 
improved health systems based on evidence, best-practices, and on what actually works. 
Fourteen, health system crises around the world are part of the wider crises in the global 
economy and social stability (Paper V). In particular, global resources are fast being consumed 
at unsustainable rate through globalized capitalism. In the process of expanding markets for the 
large capitals in the West, social safety networks around the world are breaking down and 
inequity is increasing causing social stability and terrorism. Therefore, the wider socio-economic 
situation of the world has reached a point where it needs to be replaced. Emerging problems 
from these crises require urgent action. But ultimately, the world needs to adopt new values and 
lifestyles that can enable us live in a sustainable way and in peace. 
7.2 Lessons 
Lessons in general 
Uganda has learned its lessons the hard way. The decision to embrace such a massive, long-term 
and unproven policy of free-market health sector reform has become disastrous. The GoU’s 
relegation of its roles of providing health service to NGOs, donors and UN organizations has 
made things even worse.  This underlines the basic fact that development should be internally 
initiated and driven. The health sector has deteriorated beyond the level where it would need 
only remedial actions and policies such as SHI. It needs a total overhaul.  It is critical and urgent 
to significantly bring up public spending on health, reorganize the health system and make 
decentralization functionally viable. Uganda needs to reorganize the way aid is accepted, 
overseen, and used.  Partnership with donors is good but in the case of Uganda, the partnership 
under SWAp is a false one; donors and other external actors still determine policy. The 
partnership is based on a dependency relationship: GoU being almost fully dependant on it’s 
partners for technical and financial support. This dependency comes about because GoU has, 
through the free-market macro-economic policy, restricted allocation from its internal revenues 
to the health sector. Thus, in effect GoU has relegated its role of planning and financing health 
services to donors and other partners. Lack of assertion and bad aid-conditions have kept GoU 
in a subordinate position to donors and other external actors. 
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Specific lessons 
Specific lessons from Uganda’s experiment with market reforms in general and with HSRs in 
particular are: 
1) The single-minded pursuit of economic growth without due regard to social 
development has led to disintegration of health and other social services in Uganda 
(Papers IV and V). Economic pursuit is a good thing, but it should not be at the expense 
of, or regardless of, social goals. Economic growth is a means to development, not an end 
in itself. 
2) The blind faith in the market as a vehicle to prosperity and as a way to manage society is 
disastrous (Shutt 1998; Stigliz 2002; Sachs 2005).  It has led to disintegration of social 
services, deepened inequity, and it has thrown wide open the doors for increased 
corruption through reckless deregulation of the civil service. 
3) The macro-economic stability of fixed low inflation budget and balance-of-payment 
deficits is not sacrosanct (Paper IV; Vernengo 2006; Filho 2007; Weeks and McKinley 
2007).  Desired pro-poor fiscal and monetary policies that allow economic growth are 
possible. Under fiscal policy, the desired outcomes, macro variables, and boundaries 
between excessive and non-excessive economic fluctuations need to be set. The macro-
variables are a) rate of economic growth, b) distribution of income, c) investment, and d) 
public expenditure.  
4) Under monetary policy, investment in pro-poor sectors (health and education) is critical 
(Paper IV; Filho 2007). Also, capital flow into the country needs to be controlled, since 
uncontrolled capital flow can destabilize the economy. Specific pro-poor financial policy 
interventions need to be introduced. These include subsidized lending to the poor, 
reduced premiums on long-term lending through the establishment of credit guarantee 
schemes; establishment of variable asset-based reserves for stocks, bonds and mortgages; 
facilitation of micro-credit institutions; and introduction of employment-oriented 
financial policies. 
5) While it can be useful if well intended and managed, aid has become an encumbrance to 
socio-economic development, including democracy in Uganda (Paper I; Ortendahl 2007). 
Huge and constant aid to Uganda has led to a culture of dependency, corruption and 
impunity. It is a big disincentive to innovation of indigenous solutions to social and 
economic problems of the country. It has distorted the allocation of resources, 
paradoxically “starving” the health sector where most of the aid is supposedly coming 
to. The aid in the sector is for donor favoured programmes, such as AIDS and 
immunization, leaving the mainstream health system development under-funded. 
Uganda has to free itself from aid as soon as possible. However, the country should find 
ways to increase the generation of internal revenue and allocate more to social sectors. 
Rules should be set for aid to be accepted and rejected, and for its effective use. 
6) Decentralization is not an end in itself (Paper III; Saito 2004). It is supposed to improve 
social services and accountability. Uganda is fast becoming a museum of a runaway 
decentralization, which was derailed by politics and market orthodoxy. Decentralization 
should be redesigned together with macro-economic policy and the new health system. 
Education and health services will remain key services to be provided by decentralized 
units. 
7) The current promotion of private-sector involvement in health-care and of public-private 
partnership needs to be supported by the wider and simultaneous development of skills 
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and knowledge in management, legal and regulatory systems, quality assurance and a 
business-like culture (Paper III; Nikolic and Maikish 2006). 
8) The development of the SHI for Uganda is intricately linked to public sector spending, 
health-sector reorganization (including decentralization), and macro-economic policy. 
Unless these policies are designed together with a focus of improving the welfare of the 
population (specifically to reducing equity and improving access to services), none of the 
policies designed without the other will be effective (Papers III, IV and V) 
9) A number of donor and poor countries have now understood the negative impact of 
market-based HSRs and market reforms supporting globalized capitalism. Together, 
they have signed an agreement to increase aid to fund health and education, and to use 
the funds effectively. The donor countries and organizations include Norway, Germany, 
Italy, France, Netherlands, European Union and WHO. The poor countries include 
Burundi, Nepal, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Cambodia, Brazil, Indonesia, 
Senegal, South Africa and Thailand (Amorim et al. 2007; WHO 2007). Uganda should 
join hands with these countries, taking advantage of the lessons it has learned to design a 
better health system and use aid-funding in an effective way. 
10) Past experience has shown that there are numerous actors in the health sector with a 
wide range of objectives, many conflicting (Paper I). And these actors are fiercely 
independent. They usually congregate under a loose coordination arrangement called 
Sector-wide Approaches (SWAPs). In principle, the government is supposed to lead the 
process of coordination and policy-making. In reality, the government is subordinate to 
these actors. In developing new policies and designing organizational structures, the 
government should keep these actors at bay and only consult them where necessary. 
Otherwise, governments of poor countries will never get a clear way forward in 
determining their own destinies (Papers I and II). 
11) No genuine development in general or HSD in particular is possible unless a nation 
exercises sufficient sovereignty, capacity to take charge, and accountability to its people 
through true democracy (Paper I; Sen 1999). 
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8.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 General principles 
The recommendations below consist of general principles, socio-economic changes for 
sustainable health system in Uganda, and global reforms towards justice, peace and 
sustainability of resources and environment. It is through these changes that sustainable and 
equitable health systems can come about. 
The collapse and devastation of Uganda’s health system is intertwined with a wide range of 
social and economic crises in the country and in the world. The root cause is the unfettered 
global capitalist globalization. Health system and other social sector crises cannot be effectively 
or fully resolved without tackling the root cause. However, it has to be recognized that the 
momentum of unfettered market globalization is too immense to be stopped in the short-term, 
without reigning in global forces. But its effects could be contained. 
Practical steps can be taken to address the crises at national and global levels. Thus, general 
principles underpinning the recommendations given below are: 
a) Improvement in the health system cannot be made successfully in isolation, rather it 
should be part of a wider social reform 
b) Economic growth without human development in terms of appreciable improvements  
in health, education, nutrition etc should be abandoned 
c) People’s empowerment through health, education and general wellbeing should be used 
as an engine for economic growth  
d) Policies, regulation and incentives should be created to ensure economic growth 
improves human welfare, and this wellbeing is channelled and harnessed to feed into 
economic growth. 
e) Leadership that is pro-poor, and for sustainable environment, stability and peaceful co-
existence, should be promoted nationally and worldwide. 
8.2 Uganda: Reforms for a sustainable health system  
A) Economic policy reform 
The current economic policy in Uganda can only bring about cyclic crises in form of social 
polarization, instability, environmental degradation and conflict. Foreign capital mainly from 
multi-national corporations is what drives the economy and the economic growth. While foreign 
firms employ a number of local people, this has not stopped the rise of unemployment. 
Moreover, employment terms under foreign-funded businesses are usually deplorable –very 
low wages and harsh terms that contravene labour laws. Under conditions where the vast 
majority is unemployed or underemployed and underpaid, domestic production is below 
optimal, incomes are low, purchasing power (spending) is low, and the demand for services like 
education and health is low.  
Unemployment in an environment subjected to capacity constraints will generate a poverty trap 
(GoU, 2004). The limited capacity of an economy to absorb labour will result in high and 
increasing levels of unemployment with depressing socio-economic and growth implications. 
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High and rising levels of unemployment will cause a large portion of the population to be 
subjected to low income levels and poverty, thereby limiting their access to a range of economic 
and social services and which further diminishes their chances to be absorbed into the economy. 
The problem is further exacerbated by those who have become discouraged and have lost faith 
in the ability of the system to generate jobs, resulting in them remaining unemployed "by 
choice".  
In addition, low income and poverty-stricken groups have little financial maneuverability and 
make little to no contribution to savings, which in itself hampers investment, output growth and 
employment. While adverse socio-economic conditions contribute to the creation of only a 
limited amount of job opportunities, a high level of relatively unskilled labour supply further 
exacerbates the unemployment problem. Unemployment and poverty thereby becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy - unemployment creates a poverty trap which requires innovative 
intervention targeted at eliminating the significant structural impediments (GoU, 2004). 
Uganda's accelerated growth is diverging from its employment and development performance. 
There is a significant and sustained decrease in the employment rate as measured by the ratio of 
the total number of employed people, formal and informal sectors, to the economically active 
population. The declining trend in this ratio implies that the labour market has not sufficiently 
absorbed new job-market entrants, causing growth in the economically active population to 
outstrip the amount of new jobs created, resulting in increased unemployment. The most 
disconcerting about the overall employment rate is that even though GDP growth rates have 
recently been on the increase, the trend of employment rate is still declining. This negative 
relationship between GDP growth and the employment rate suggests that the employment 
problem is not only a cyclical problem, but is structural in nature. 
Accelerated economic growth that Uganda aspires to is not necessarily sustainable or does it 
always translate into accelerated employment. Bohlmann, Du Toit et al, 2007 argue that
demand-side fiscal and monetary policy interventions aiming at accelerating gross domestic 
output will be effective in an economic environment without structural constraints impeding the 
capacity of the economy to absorb everyone willing and able to work. It will also serve to attract 
sufficient investment capital. In an environment unfettered by structural constraints, this course 
of action will achieve the goal of higher economic growth without putting pressure on the 
balance of payments, the exchange rate and domestic inflation.  
Figure 21 shows that a supply-side based strategy, such as the lowering of taxes and/or interest 
rates will cause increased demand/spending assuming little or no capacity constraints, which 
will translate into higher domestic production and subsequent higher shared income for the 
owners of domestic production factors (labour, capital and land). However, in a scenario where 
the economy is faced with structural supply-side constraints, domestic production will fail to 
meet increased demand. In this case, accelerated growth represented by increased domestic 
expenditure on gross domestic product will not cause an equivalent increase in employment 
and hence fail to have everyone share in the higher income generated in the economy. The lack 
of domestic production to meet the increased domestic demand will merely be supplemented by 
increased imports, which, in turn will impact negatively on the balance of payments, the local 
currency exchange rate and domestic inflation. 
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Figure 21: New paradigm: supply-side driven growth strategy 
Source: Bohlmann, Du Toit et al 2007 
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A new paradigm: a shared economic initiative
Thus, a new economic paradigm is required for Uganda. This is an initiative that is led by the 
government but should involve the full cooperation of businesses, civil society and donors 
Bohlmann, Du Toit et al, 2007). It consists of five key strategies: 
• Shared responsibility between the government, businesses, civil society and donors to 
act in complementation on poverty reduction and appreciable improvement of the 
welfare of the population 
• Mobilize and empower all employable persons 18- 60 years 
• Target family and household as a unit for employment benefits 
• Define social–economic employment benefit-packages to consist of nominal wages, social 
wages and in-kind compensation, infrastructure and social services 
• Define socio-service package that the community must be entitled to. This is to be 
provided by the government, businesses and civil society, in a combination and 
proportions that will depend on the where the community is and who is the dominant 
actor on the ground. 
Reform of macroeconomic policy
Pro-poor macroeconomic stability is possible (Epstein and Grabel, 2007). Reforms of fiscal, 
monetary and financial policies require harmonization, consistency and focus on two moving 
targets: economic growth and people’s welfare. 
Fiscal policy reform: The country should agree on what is excessive and non-excessive economic 
fluctuation.  Fluctuation in the economy is what has led governments to maintain a low inflation 
to prepare a good environment for foreign investment and to cut down social spending putting 
severe constraints on social welfare. But some fluctuation is inevitable and with this the 
economy can be steered back on the growth course. So, micro-variables such as rate of growth, 
investment, public-spending and income distribution can be balanced in such a way that both 
economic growth and appreciable poverty reduction occur. 
Monetary policy reform: The country should target credit for investment in pro-poor sectors. 
The flow of capital into the country should be controlled. Uncontrolled capital flow into the 
country can actually distort national priorities and override any pro-poor plans and strategies. 
In the end it can destabilize the whole economy. 
Financial policy reform: A deliberate investment regime in pro-poor sectors is required. It has to 
be supported by the government depositing insurance to enhance confidence in the economy. 
Credit and subsidized lending should be made available to the poor. Lending targets, ceilings 
and tax incentives need to be set to facilitate lending to the poor. Specialized lending institutions 
and development banks should be set up and facilitated to function for the purpose they were 
created. Such facilitation may include providing information and business services and linking 
formal and informal financial institutions. It also includes providing technical support to micro-
credit institutions to serve borrowers better.  
Other interventions include depositing insurance to enhance confidence in the economy; 
directing credit allocations and subsidized-lending to the poor; establishing and implementing 
lending-targets, ceilings and tax incentives; establishing specialized lending-institutions and 
development banks; establishing credit-guarantee schemes to reduce premiums on long-term 
investments; introducing variable asset-based reserves for stocks, bonds and mortgages; 
improving and easing lending through information and business services by linking formal and 
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informal financial institutions; providing technical support to micro-credit institutions to serve 
borrowers better; and introducing employment-oriented financial policies. 
Reform of aid policy
Aid is still expected to play an important role in the foreseeable future. So a number of strategies 
of using aid better and to effectively and genuinely support pro-poor agenda are recommended, 
adopted from recommendations of research on aid (Fritz and Menacol, 2007) : 
Aid governance: The governance and management of aid in Uganda should be restructured. It 
should be governed by a board consisting economists, social welfare experts, health experts and 
educationists. It should include civil society as well as the private sector. The board should be 
charged with: a) accepting or rejecting aid according to agreed criteria fashioned on the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; b) appraising the pro-poor orientation of aid project and its 
overall social and economic benefits versus its costs and damages; c) evaluating aid funded 
projects and programmes. The board should set up accountability mechanisms in consultation 
with donors. 
Criteria to accept or reject aid: Criteria to accept or reject aid should be set. In particular, the 
amount of aid coming to the country should not be subjected to arbitrary ceilings set under the 
macro-stability policy. Social welfare factors need to be factored in. 
Weaning Uganda off aid-dependency:  The government should identify the sectors that need aid 
and those that do not.   It should then set ceilings and targets to reduce aid over a period initially 
of say, ten years. In general, the desired trend should be that of aid levels coming down as the 
economy grows. Only under certain conditions, such as disasters and crises, should aid be 
increased. It is always much better to plan with your own resources. This will provide a better 
view on how to forge a head with our national development. 
Unlock aid decisions from IMF: The most unhelpful advice on aid regarding social development 
and poverty reduction is usually given by IMF. The board on aid should act as the final nation al 
decision forum for matters concerning aid. Political interference and interests may persist. But a 
political strategy for the social reform will require the participation and promotion of politicians 
with a different set values and development outlook from those who are currently in power. 
More of the political strategy is discussed under C) below. 
B) Health policy reform 
The current rush in Uganda to set up a SHI scheme is untimely and ill-advised. The country is 
simply not yet ready for such a huge transition.  SHI entails a total reorientation of the national 
system with new institutions and capacities. This requires carefully planned and executed 
preparation – and time. Currently, public dismay and mistrust of the health system in Uganda is 
high, as is clearly evident from the media and population surveys. A national SHI scheme, 
though a good move, should not be the first thing to be done to address the health system crisis.  
The first thing is to restore the functioning of the health system and to regain public confidence 
and trust in the health system. Then a SHI scheme covering at least 50% of the population 
should start, based on the confidence and trust in the system. Plans should be made upfront to 
swiftly bring everybody on board under the scheme. The coverage must be large to give it a 
national character and where the division of the health system into tiers does not occur.  
The health policy reform should address the following critical areas of the Ugandan health 
system: 
• Human resources 
• Equipment supplies 
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• Financing
• Payment system 
• Organization and decentralization 
• Performance improvement 
Human resources
A key constraint to the good functioning of Uganda’s health system is inadequate, poorly paid, 
unmotivated and ill-trained health staff. Ultimately, the plan should be build a human resource 
to provide equitable, efficient and quality health care. But in the short-term, the following 
strategies could be adapted to set the country in the right course: 
Task-shifting: This entails identifying cadres of staff who can undergo short courses to carry out 
duties that were usually done by staff at a higher level (WHO(c), 2007). Such duties should be 
relatively simple but with huge social benefit ratio to the population. These potentially include 
prescription by nurses, dispensing by nurses, diagnosis by nurses, and simple surgical 
operations and Caesarean sections by clinical officers and nurses. 
Salary and benefit enhancement: A salary and benefit enhancement programme should be set 
up to attract and retain good staff in health service, including in difficult areas. If this is not 
possible through the government budget appropriation, then this is an area where short-term 
and phased external aid is required. A similar programme has been implemented in Malawi 
with considerable success (Okuonzi, Ali et al, 2007). 
Sharing of health staff: The health staff is inadequate and will remain so in the foreseeable 
future.  As an interim measure, some sharing of staff will be necessary. Arrangements need to be 
made to share staff between hospitals and outlying health centres. Better staffed hospitals and 
health centres should be supported give supervisory, technical and back-up support to outlying 
and understaffed health units.
Human resource for health (HRH) strategic plan: Several HRH plans have been made in past 
but not implemented. It will be imperative for a new strategic (long-term) plan to be developed 
based on the current needs, knowledge and technology skills requirements.  
Equipment, drugs and supplies:
Another cause of poor health care services in the country is the lack of medical equipment, 
drugs and other supplies. Four problems are related to the “lack” of equipment: a) none 
availability of equipment, b) incompleteness of equipment for use, c) un-serviced otherwise 
usable equipment, d) staff are unable to use equipment (GoU, 1998).  Therefore as a way 
forward: 
• Existing equipment need to assessed to find out the extent to which the four problems 
contribute to the health care crisis 
• Organize short-term trainings on the use of existing equipment 
• Establish a program to service equipment that require servicing throughout the country, 
including replacing missing parts and repairing  
• Redistribute equipment where a health unit or district has more than is needed 
• Based on equipment needs assessment a procurement program should be drawn to re 
equip all health facilities  
• Work with manufacturers and suppliers to set up service and repair workshops in the 
country 
• Review and update policy and standards on quality, safety, cost-effectiveness, and 
scientific soundness of equipment and technology 
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• Review and update policy on procurement, supply, storage and distribution of 
equipment 
On drugs and supplies the following are recommended (MCDI and SCL 2006): 
• The NMS should remain under 100% government ownership.  Under no circumstance 
should the objective of the NMS be to maximize profits.  This would simply be 
inconsistent with the distributive equity objective of the National Drug Policy and the 
National Health Policy. 
• The National Drug Policy should largely focus on the supply of essential drugs, while 
allowing private drug suppliers to compete for the non-essential or specialty drug 
supply market. 
• Short to medium-term to support should be given to the effort of fully developing the 
capacity of the NDA and MOH to undertake accurate procurement planning. 
• Third party national health programmes need to coordinate their input supply with the 
national drug supply system (the NMS, NDA, MOH and Districts).  This analysis 
confirms what previous analyses have made clear:  there is considerable inefficiency, 
duplication, and resource wastage occurring as a result of inadequate coordination 
between the third party programmes, their MOH managers, donors, NMS and NDA. 
Health financing:
While the health sector budget is still far short of the optimal level of 15% of government 
budget, funds in the sector are not currently used efficiently. There is need to systematically re-
asses the use of available funds in the sector so as to improve the use of funds, and to strategise 
for more health budget allocation. The following steps are suggested: 
• Assess all health sector funding, government, NGOs, and off-budget 
• Renegotiate all off-budget funds to be aligned with Uganda’s priorities and to be 
equitably distributed countrywide 
• Identify areas /systems where wastage occurs most in MOH and districts. And find cost-
saving strategies to prevent such wastages 
• Increase government spending in line with agreed priorities and overall long-term plan. 
The increase in government spending will be for two purposes: a) to improve services by 
providing the necessary inputs and b) to invest in infrastructure to expand services in 
readiness for a SHI. 
• As people gain confidence in different health units, micro prepayment schemes can be 
introduced slowly by health units in consultation with district and other local 
authorities. 
• The national SHI scheme can then come at a later stage to help gradually raise revenue 
so as to create a sustainable health-care system. This is in the long term 
Payment of health facilities and workers
The way health workers are paid (in form of salary) has been a source of inefficiency and abuse. 
Under a new programme to enhance health worker pay, a different pay system must be worked 
out. It should be based on outputs and results. It could include a basic salary and a bonus based 
on results produced. Likewise, payment or funding of health facilities has to change.  It should 
also be related to outputs and results. The annual number of clients and patients seen is a good 
starting point. But the sizes of populations being served, the proportion of the population the 
facility is serving etc, will all be important. 
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Performance improvement
There are simple practical performance and quality improvement steps that have worked and 
can be employed on a national scale.  These require: a) documentation of best practices in 
performance and quality improvement approaches; b) root cause analysis, solution finding and 
implementation; and c) packaging best practices in a nation-wide context. 
Reorganization of the health system
Under the current political and administrative decentralization, it is almost impossible to run a 
health system tied to local governments. This is because the local governments so created are not 
viable in authority, capacity and resources to run relatively independent district health systems. 
The recommended strategy is for the health system in Uganda to be divided into health regions. 
It is possible with such a health care region to mobilize adequate resources – human, financial 
and material - to run a self-sustaining health care system. In such a region that consists of 
several districts, it is recommended that: 
• Unified health programmes for all the districts in the region be established 
• At least one hospital is designated as a referral hospital where difficult cases requiring 
highly specialized skills can be handled. Such a hospital would also provide back-up 
support to lower level health facilities and services 
• A regional medical store and equipment workshop be set up 
• A regional health council or committee consisting of all District Council Chairmen, Chief 
Administrative Officers, District Health Officers and Superintendents of hospitals be 
established. One district council chairmen would be elected as chairman of the regional 
health council, and the chairmanship would rotate annually. 
• A joint regional health plan for some joint programmes with clear financial support be 
made and implemented  
• The Sub-district health system be maintained and strengthened, especially to cater for 
maternal health where a doctor’s or a senior midwife is required. 
Regulation
There has been a near total breakdown in law and order in the health sector. It is important to 
begin a process leading to the observance of and enforcement of law and order. The following 
steps will lead the way: 
• Identify all laws in the health sector and find out why they are not enforced or observed 
• Pick out the most critical health system and public-behaviour related laws that need 
support for enforcement. Mobilize human, material resources for enforcing the laws. The 
number of laws being enforced should be increased over time to cover all existing laws 
in the country. 
• Laws should be should reviewed to assess whether a) they can be reduced and perhaps 
merged, b) they can be updated, and c) they can address new health issues. 
• Mobilise resources as part of the overall policy reform to address the breakdown of law 
and order in the health sector 
Social Health Insurance
When the critical elements of the health system have been put in place, it is expected that the 
functioning of the system will be set in motion (Berman, Hsio, et al. 2001). This process should 
be allowed to unfold over a period of 5 – 10 years effective from the onset of implementation of 
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the policy reform. The SHI scheme would be the second phase of the health policy reform. 
Meanwhile, the following are recommended during the transition: 
a) A programme with targets towards universal health service coverage and quality 
improvements should be established through this policy reform 
b) Social services revitalization programme (addressing education, child welfare, water and 
sanitation, food security and maternal health) is established and progressing well. 
c) Investment, capacity building and preparation in the following areas related to a future 
SHI scheme: 
• Design mechanisms for collecting funds 
• Identify and design methods for paying health facilities and health workers 
• Create a management and regulation regime for the SHI scheme  
• Design mechanisms of accreditation of health facilities for inclusion under a SHI 
scheme 
• Design and establish quality and performance improvement mechanisms 
C) Social Services Reform  
Without an effective social service provision, health will not improve. Social services cover what 
are called health determinants or prerequisites (Abel Smith, 1994). As a beginning only few 
critical services could be embarked on and others would be added as the economy and the social 
systems improve. The critical social services / benefit packages are: 
• Primary school completion and quality enhancement  programme 
• Child welfare and protection  
• Food security and nutrition 
• Water and sanitation  
• Maternal health 
The following strategies are recommended to deliver the services/ benefit packages: 
a) Improving basic salary and other benefits for workers through a review and amendment 
of laws governing salary and workers benefits 
b) Incentives and regulations to firms to provide better benefit packages for their workers 
c) Mobilizing an effective workforce for employment through employment oriented 
policies and regulations  
d) Pension benefits ( which usually support disadvantaged homes with very old people and 
very young  children) should be increased through a concerted effort of budget reform 
and  social policy reform 
e) Programme to provide food or cash support to  very poor families should be piloted and 
scaled-up 
The funding to finance these services and reforms could come from the following sources: 1) 
government to provide better social sector funding, now that the false constraint of macro-
stability being tied to an arbitrarily low social spending has been disproved and addressed in a 
different way; 2) firms and businesses will be compelled by law to pay a reasonable salary and 
other benefits that can meet demands of the household; and 3) civil society organizations who 
will mobilize funds through charity and donations to support the indigent.  
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D)  Leadership for pro-poor socio-economic reform  
A national leadership to steer the country towards pro-poor development (as opposed to 
economic growth that merely benefits foreigners and multi-nationals) will be critical. Three 
possible ways by which such a leadership can come about are a) persons who are convinced 
about the misery of the majority poor and the hopelessness brought about by the current 
economic growth policy in Uganda should aspire to national leadership and influence policy in 
the pro-poor direction. This is possible as many people are getting restless with the current 
policies and their disastrous results; b) mobilize a large number of likeminded political and civil 
leaders against the current free-market policies that are damaging social services, causing social 
polarity and instability; and c) mobilize and lobby Uganda’s development partners to put 
pressure on the government to adopt serious pro-poor socio-economic policy reforms, and scale 
down its free-market model of “development”. 
8.3 Towards global sustainable health systems  
National efforts to build sustainable, equitable and effective health systems will be severely 
constrained by the current unjust world economic order. So, national efforts alone will not be 
sufficient to bring about sustainable health systems. Uganda and other poor countries can only 
hope to achieve sustainable and equitable health systems through wide ranging socio-economic 
reforms globally. And these reforms will require international efforts. By nature, global reforms 
are long-term and can be contentious. But world leaders who are genuinely concerned about the 
current injustice and unfairness brought about by the free-market policies could firmly turn 
around the situation within a decade by first controlling the harmful effects of the global free-
market economic policies and secondly by basing the new global economic order on different 
values.   The world has come a long way from where every nation or ethnic group was at war 
with its neighbours, to the current situation where some semblance of coexistence is possible 
between different peoples. A global leadership that can turn the current situation around can be 
mobilized by coalescing likeminded individuals and groups (through networks) to ascend to 
positions of leadership.  
Three key approaches can be used: a) changing global governance, b) actions to support global 
policy reforms, and c) working towards a new civilization. 
A)  Global governance  
Currently, the global economic system is built around and to serve the floating capital from the 
rich western countries (Shutt, 1998; Amin, 2000). The Breton Wood institutions as agencies of the 
west are used to impose structural economic adjustments on poor countries, mainly to open up 
their markets to enable the floating capital to be absorbed. And yet there is no effective political 
management of such a global system. In particular, the poor countries are not effectively 
represented in the current institutions that attempt to govern the world politically. Instead, the 
world is being run as a huge market, where communities are subordinated to the demands of 
the market. A prerequisite of the market is that states should be weakened or even destroyed so 
that they to do not interfere with capital globalization. This has dire consequences for a 
sustainable and equitable health system, because such a health system can only come about 
through state leadership and assertion. 
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Thus, the following should be done: 
1. The current efforts to reform the UN system as a true global forum for global governance 
should be enhanced. This will entail the creation of a global parliament where decisions 
are taken by representatives of the world in a democratic way. 
2. IMF should be reformed to issue real currency to replace the US dollar as this tends to 
facilitate one country – USA - to dominate the world economically. In other words, the 
Fund should act as the world’s central bank 
3. The World Bank should be reformed to collect surpluses from Japan and Germany (the 
only rich countries that currently have surpluses) to lend to the third world. This would 
be called development fund. 
4. A genuine World Trade Organization should be created based on true free-trade rules 
that applies equally to all countries 
5. Environment and sustainable resource use issues should be key global concerns. Global 
tax to manage and prevent environmental crisis should be decided on by the global 
forum and instituted to all countries equitably and in a phased manner. 
B) Policy reform actions 
The free-market capitalism which constrains efforts to build equitable health systems, as 
discussed above was predicted by many to implode sooner rather than later because of the flaws 
in the entire system. The solution is to create new institutions or reform the old ones, and 
institute better regulated practices. 
 Nine key actions to support global policy reforms will include ( Shutt, 1998; Amin, 2000): 
1. The third world must organize itself urgently to break away from the five monopolies 
enjoyed by the rich west – monopolies that have made global justice impossible. These are 
the monopolies for financial systems, technology, culture, media and military power. 
Unless these monopolies are broken it will not be possible to stop the western world from 
asserting its will on the rest of the world. The Third World forums are a useful beginning 
to nurture these ideas and bring them into real actions. The breakaway from these 
monopolies means that more countries will be able to express themselves in the affairs of 
the world and will not be mere recipients of harsh policies such as market-based HSRs. 
2. The European left is sympathetic about social justice and so it should be mobilized and 
lobbied to work with the left of the Third World to push for reform in global governance 
and for dismantling of unfettered free-market economy, which has severe implications for 
health and other social services.  
3. Lobbying through networks and justice-conscious leaders to reconstruct the UN as the 
locus for global political and economic negotiation. 
4. Mechanisms to limit the return on capital by major private-sector companies must be 
established. This will need the involvement of the public in influencing prices and 
investment strategies. 
5. Private investors will tend to find rates of return deemed to be compatible with financial 
stability to be too low to compensate them for the risk of loss. So, the government will 
need to guarantee them against loss or break the enterprise into small viable companies 
independent of external shareholders. 
6. Enterprises underwritten by the taxpayer must be accountable and subject to public 
approval of their policies. 
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7. The value added of return on capital, which is usually inflated, will need to be greatly 
reduced. Instead, the bulk of this “value” can be applied to a) reduce public deficits and 
debts; b) reduce prices for consumers; c) provide adequate and equitable salary; and d) 
provide adequate social benefits and services, including health services. 
8. Any compensation to existing private owners for transfer of assets to collective ownership 
must be below the market value so that the huge overhang of surplus capital, which is 
destabilising markets, can be reduced. 
9. Accountability through a new democracy in the world will be necessary. All party 
manifestos will require wide public consultation, and will not be left only for party 
officials to decide. Mechanisms will be needed to ensure that the public can access 
economic and investment policies and agreements. Where the state provides protection to 
a corporation, such a corporation will have to be subjected to government supervision. 
The media will need to be given access to corporation’s policies and reports. 
   
C) Towards a new civilization: fundamental changes in values 
Global policy reforms without fundamental changes in social values will not bring about 
sustainable development, peace, and social stability (Raskin, Bamuri et al, 2002). A new 
civilization is needed. It will require a shift of values from profit maximization, market 
competition, and market allocation to social stability and environmental sustainability, output 
based performance and employment, integration, harmony, and coexistence. There has to be a 
shift away from materialism, winner-takes-it-all, individualism and domination - which are the 
values of the current dying civilization. It will require the control over the market by the state. 
Trade flows will have to be regulated. New rules based on new values will have to be adopted 
using democratic global institutions. New values for a new civilization will include equity, 
mutual coexistence, solidarity, shared responsibility, among others. Trade will be allowed only 
where such rules are acceptable to participating nations. Official polices on trade will promote 
output and employment. Peripheral economies will need to be integrated into the mainstream 
global economy, where the same rules apply to all nations.  
All these will require value-based organizations (VBOs) through networks and alliances, and the 
reformed and democratic global institutions to advocate for these changes. VBOs can target 
governments to be transformed in such a way that they are responsible and accountable to the 
people. They can campaign to reduce prices, and increase opportunities for employment by 
making governments and corporations change their policies. They can also campaign to 
promote the creation of a global welfare system where equitable and sustainable health systems 
can become a reality. 
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